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This	   thesis	   is	   a	   critical	   assessment	   of	   Edith	   Stein’s	   critique	   of	  Martin	   Heidegger,	   which	   is	  
focused	  on	  the	  definition	  of	  the	  human	  being.	  I	  explore	  Stein’s	  ontology	  of	  the	  person	  from	  
the	   point	   of	   view	   of	   her	   examination	   of	   Heidegger’s	   existential	   ‘Dasein’	   and	   the	  way	   she	  
reaches	  a	  very	  different	  answer	  to	  the	  same	  question	  that	  Heidegger	  posed,	  the	  question	  of	  
the	   meaning	   of	   being.	   To	   this	   end	   I	   examine	   key	   passages	   of	   Stein’s	   most	   important	  
ontological	  work	  Finite	  and	  Eternal	  Being	  -­‐	  An	  Attempt	  at	  an	  Ascent	  to	  the	  Meaning	  of	  Being	  
along	   with	   its	   appendix	  Martin	   Heidegger’s	   Philosophy	   of	   Existence,	   in	   which	   she	   directly	  
discussed	  Heidegger’s	  philosophy,	  focusing	  on	  his	  work	  Being	  and	  Time.	  	  	  
In	   the	   first	  part	  of	   this	   research	   I	  draw	  a	  historico-­‐philosophical	  overview	  of	   the	  academic	  
and	  political	  background	  of	  the	  period	  between	  World	  War	  I	  and	  World	  War	  II	  in	  Germany	  in	  
order	   to	  position	  both	   authors	   in	   context	   and	   investigate	   their	   philosophical	   influences	   as	  
well	  as	  their	  ambiguous	  relationship	  with	  the	  phenomenological	  school.	  The	  central	  part	   is	  
dedicated	   to	   Stein’s	   analysis	   of	   Heidegger’s	  Dasein:	   I	   compare	   and	   explain	   both	   authors’	  
approaches	  to	  the	  philosophical	  understanding	  of	  human	  being,	  person,	  life,	  soul	  and	  death.	  
This	   investigation	  was	  carried	  out	  with	  both	  a	  hermeneutical	  and	  terminological	  analysis.	   I	  
draw	   upon	   the	   results	   to	   demonstrate	   how	   Stein’s	   phenomenology	   of	   life	   experiences	  
enlarges	  the	  borders	  of	  human	  finitude	  to	  embrace	  the	  possibility	  of	  its	  ontological	  horizon	  
while	  Heidegger	  restricts	  and	  concentrates	  the	  entire	  ontological	  question	  on	  the	  Dasein,	  its	  
existence	  and	  ultimately	  its	  finitude.	  
My	  findings	  provide	  an	  assessment	  of	  the	  limits	  as	  well	  as	  the	  strengths	  of	  Stein’s	  critique.	  I	  
demonstrate	   that	   Stein	   attempted	   to	   build	   a	   bridge	   between	   classical	   ontology	   and	  
phenomenology,	  while	  Heidegger’s	  distance	  from	  the	  philosophical	  tradition	  was	  rooted	   in	  
his	  methodological	   refusal.	   I	   also	   show	   how	   their	   opposite	  methods	   and	   findings	   present	  
unexpected	  similarities	  and	  how	  Stein’s	  philosophical	  significance	  should	  be	  reconsidered	  in	  
the	  light	  of	  her	  work.	  	  
This	   research	   leads	   to	   various	   implications	   for	   today’s	   philosophical	   debate	   and	  makes	   it	  
possible	  to	  view	  Stein’s	  theory	  of	  being	  in	  a	  wider	  ethical	  context,	  as	  presented	  in	  the	  final	  
part	  of	  this	  work.	  I	  argue	  that	  Heidegger	  depersonalises	  and	  violates	  traditional	  ontology	  to	  
explain	   the	   human	   being	   only	   in	   terms	   of	   pure	   existence,	   while	   Stein’s	   portrait	   of	   the	  
‘fullness’	   and	   the	   meaning	   of	   life	   contributes	   to	   the	   discussion	   between	   philosophy	   and	  
religion.	   In	  the	  final	  section	  of	   this	  work	   I	  show	  how	  some	  of	  the	  elements	  emerging	  from	  
Stein’s	   critique	   of	   Heidegger	   can	   cast	   a	   light	   on	   the	   current	   ethical	   discussion	   about	   how	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  I	   have	   been	   fortunate	   in	   that	   a	   translation	   of	   Stein’s	   essay	   on	   Martin	   Heidegger’s	  Philosophy	  of	  Existence	  was	  completed	  recently	  by	  Mette	  Lebech.	  This	   text	  along	  with	  the	  English	  translation	  of	  Finite	  and	  Eternal	  Being	  (CWES	  9)	  provides	  the	  main	  text	  for	  my	  research.	  As	   for	  Being	  and	  Time	   I	  have	  used	   the	  English	   translation	  by	  Macquarrie	  and	  Robinson	  (first	  edition	  1962).	  	  For	  the	  main	  texts	  I	  have	  generally	  quoted	  from	  the	  English	  translation,	  however	  a	  large	  part	  of	  my	  observations	   rely	  on	   the	  original	   text;	  where	  necessary	   I	   have	   indicated	   in	  brackets	   the	   original	   German	   or	   Latin	   expression.	   I	   have	   avoided	   capitalization	   of	   the	  words	   ‘being’	   as	  well	   as	   other	   capitalization	   in	   the	   English	   translation	   of	   the	   German	  words	  (as	  reported	  for	   instance	  by	  Macquarrie	  and	  Robinson)	  and	  in	  this	  sense	  I	  have	  amended	   English	   translations	   where	   so	   indicated.	   	   I	   also	   chose	   to	   use	   the	   original	  expression	  Dasein	   for	   Heidegger’s	   term	   instead	   of	   any	   proposed	   translation.	   All	   texts	  that	  were	  not	  already	  translated	  into	  English	  I	  have	  translated	  myself.	  For	  practicality	  I	  have	  used	  abbreviations	  of	  the	  original	  German	  titles	  of	  the	  three	  main	  text	  involved	  in	  this	   research,	   although	   the	   page	   number	   indicated	   for	   quotes	   refers	   to	   the	   English	  edition,	  as	  follows:	  	  
° EES:	   Edith	   Stein,	   Endliches	   und	   Ewiges	   Sein:	   Versuch	   eines	   Aufstiegs	   zum	   Sinn	   des	  
Seins,	   Gesamtausgabe	   11-­‐12	   Freiburg:	   Herder,	   2006,	   trans.	   K.	   F.	   Reinhardt,	   Finite	  
and	  Eternal	  Being:	  An	  Attempt	  at	  an	  Ascent	  to	  the	  Meaning	  of	  Being,	  Washington,	  DC:	  ICS	  Publications,	  2002.	  
° MHE:	   Edith	   Stein	   “Anhang:	   Martin	   Heideggers	   Existentialphilosophie”	   in	   ibidem,	  trans.	   Mette	   Lebech,	   “Martin	   Heidegger’s	   Existential	   Philosophy”,Maynooth	  Philosophical	  Papers	  4,	  2007.	  
° SZ:	  Martin	   Heidegger,	   Sein	  und	  Zeit,	   Tübingen:	  Max	  Niemeyer	   Verlag	   2001,	   trans.	  John	   `Macquarrie	   and	  Edward	  Robinson,	  Oxford:	   Blackwell	   Publishing,	   2012,	   first	  ed.	  1962.	  	  Other	  recurrent	  abbreviations	  are:	  
° CWES:	  The	  Collected	  Works	  of	  Edith	  Stein.	  
° ESGA	   (Edith	  Stein	  Gesamtausgabe):	   The	  Complete	  German	  Edition	   of	   Edith	   Stein’s	  Works.	  	  




° JPPF	   (Jahrbuch	   für	  Philosophie	   und	   phänomenologische	   Forschung):	   Yearbook	   for	  Philosophical	  and	  Phenomenological	  Research.	  
° AMP	  (Der	  Aufbau	  der	  menschlichen	  Person):	  STEIN,	  E.	  Der	  Aufbau	  der	  menschlichen	  
Person	  :	  Vorlesung	  zur	  philosophischen	  Anthropologie,	  ESGA	  14.	  
° Ideas	   (Ideas	   Pertaining	   to	   a	   Pure	   Phenomenology	   and	   to	   a	   Phenomenological	  
Philosophy):	   HUSSERL,	   E.	   Ideen	   zu	   einer	   reinen	   Phänomenologie	   und	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   1	  
“Dass	  Heidegger	  etwas	  Großes	  ist	  und	  dass	  er	  uns	  alle	  in	  die	  Tasche	  stecken	  kann,	  glaube	  ich	  
auf	  Grund	  seines	  Buchen	  auch.	  Vorher	  wusste	  ich	  es	  nicht	  bzw.	  ich	  sah	  nur	  die	  Wirkungen,	  d.h.	  
seinen	  großen	  Einfluss	  auf	  die	  junge	  Generation“.	  	  
	  “The	  fact	  that	  Heidegger	  is	  something	  big	  and	  can	  put	  all	  of	  us	  in	  his	  pockets	  is	  something	  that	  I	  believe	  also	  because	  of	  his	  book.	  I	  didn’t	  know	  it	  before,	  I	  only	  saw	  the	  effects,	  the	  great	  influence	  that	  he	  has	  on	  the	  young	  generation”.	  	  (Edith	  Stein,	  letter	  to	  Roman	  Ingarden	  on	  2	  February	  1927.)	  	  
Chapter	  1.	  Introduction	  
	   In	   this	   section	   I	   explain	   the	   methodology	   and	   the	   structure	   of	   this	  thesis.	  I	  offer	  an	  overview	  of	  the	  life	  and	  work	  of	  Edith	  Stein,	  her	  decision	  to	  write	   an	   essay	   on	  Martin	  Heidegger’s	   philosophy	   of	   existence,	   and	   review	  the	  existing	   literature	  on	  this	   topic.	   I	  also	  briefly	  address	   the	  controversial	  topic	  of	  Heidegger’s	  silence	  and	  the	  fact	  that	  he	  never	  directly	  addressed	  his	  critics.	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1.1.	  	   Aim,	  methodology	  and	  structure	  	  
This	  research	  aims	  to	  offer	  a	  critical	  evaluation	  of	  Martin	  Heidegger’s	  and	   Edith	   Stein’s	   philosophical	   analysis	   of	   the	   human	   being,	   as	   they	   both	  address	   the	   following	  questions:	  What	   is	   the	  human	  being?	  Are	   the	  end	  of	  temporal	  life	  and	  the	  ontological	  horizon	  part	  of	  what	  constitutes	  the	  human	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being	  and,	  if	  so,	  how	  is	  our	  understanding	  of	  it	  affected	  by	  the	  experience	  of	  death?	  	  
I	   defend	   the	   thesis	   that	   Stein’s	   short	   essay	   has	   the	   great	   merit	   of	  ‘opening	  up’	  Heidegger’s	  difficult	  thought	  (in	  the	  words	  of	  Paolinelli,	  2011,	  p.	  10)	   and	   making	   it	   accessible	   in	   a	   clear	   and	   genuine	   way	   by	   forcing	  Heidegger	   to	  answer	   to	  everyday	  questions	  and	   translating	  his	  vocabulary	  into	  concepts	  such	  as	  life,	  death,	  fear	  and	  humanity,	  something	  only	  a	  few	  of	  Heidegger’s	   commentators	   have	   managed.	   I	   also	   demonstrate	   how	   these	  two	   very	   opposite	   thinkers	   share	   more	   than	   a	   surprising	   closeness	   of	  questioning	  and	   intent	   in	   their	  works,	  why	  this	  closeness	  gives	  Stein	  more	  than	  one	  reason	  to	  criticise	  Heidegger’s	  existential	  philosophy	  and	  what	  the	  scope,	  the	  merit	  and	  the	  validity	  of	  this	  critique	  is.	  
This	   is	   not	   a	   full-­‐scale	   comparison	   of	   Stein	   and	  Heidegger.	   From	   the	  point	   of	   view	   of	   a	   historical	   and	   hermeneutical	   examination,	   I	   take	   into	  consideration	   the	   academic	   development	   of	   both	   authors	   in	   the	   years	  broadly	  enclosed	  by	  WWI	  and	  WWII,	  from	  the	  time	  when	  they	  both	  started	  their	   academic	   careers	   at	   the	   University	   of	   Freiburg	   to	   the	   completion	   of	  Edith	   Stein’s	  main	   ontological	  work	  Finite	  and	  Eternal	  Being,	   in	  which	   she	  discusses	   Heidegger’s	   positions	   and	   to	   which	   she	   decides	   to	   add	   a	   short	  essay	  which	  is	  a	  direct	  critique	  of	  Being	  and	  Time1.	   	  In	  particular	  I	  highlight	  the	   distinctiveness	   of	   their	   opposing	   routes:	   from	   the	  many	   similarities	   in	  their	   academic	   beginnings,	   to	   the	   turn	   into	   very	   different	   trajectories	   in	  philosophy	  and	  in	  life.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Edith	  Stein	   takes	  on	  the	  position	  of	  private	  assistant	  of	  Husserl	   in	  1916.	  After	   two	  years	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As	  for	  the	  analysis	  of	  the	  human	  person,	  I	  proceed	  by	  making,	  in	  a	  way,	  a	   ‘critique	   of	   a	   critique’:	   I	   expose	   and	   assess	   the	   structure	   of	   Stein’s	  reasoning,	  while	   she	   is	   -­‐	   in	   turn	   -­‐	   analysing	  Heidegger’s	   thought.	   I	   am	  not	  aiming	   to	   determine	  who	   is	   right	   or	   wrong.	   On	   the	   contrary,	   while	   I	   find	  most	   of	   Stein’s	   argumentation	   logical	   and	   truthful,	   in	   following	   her	  discussion	   with	   and	   about	   Heidegger	   I	   come	   to	   the	   conclusion	   that	   the	  understanding	  of	  what	   life	   and	  death	  are,	   forms	   the	  essential	   core	  of	  both	  Stein	   and	   Heidegger’s	   philosophical	   systems.	   Furthermore,	   I	   demonstrate	  how	  Heidegger	  provides	  a	  constructive	  counterpoint	  to	  Stein’s	  theory,	  which	  allows	  her	  to	  articulate	  her	  own	  views	  even	  more	  clearly	  and	  coherently.	  	  
Finally,	   as	   I	   aim	   to	   assess	   Stein’s	   critique	   concerning	   the	   specific	  subject	   of	   the	   understanding	   of	   the	   human	   being,	   I	   bring	   her	   critical	  discussion	  out	  of	  the	  parameters	  of	  her	  evaluation	  of	  Heidegger,	  and	  use	  it	  to	   contribute	   to	   the	   current	   ethical	   debate	   concerning	   the	  meaning	   of	   life	  and	   death,	   more	   precisely	   I	   look	   at	   the	   way	   that	   death	   is	   perceived	   and	  experienced	  today.	  	  
This	  project	  will	  be	  structured	  as	  follows:	  
a) In	  the	  first	  part	  (Chapter	  2:	  Opposite	  routes	  and	  a	  common	  question)	  I	  conduct	   a	   historic-­‐philosophical	   overview	   of	   the	   period	   between	  World	  War	   I	  and	  World	  War	   II	   in	  Germany,	   in	  order	   to	  position	  both	  authors	   in	   context.	   In	   particular,	   I	   aim	   to	   explain	   Stein’s	   and	  Heidegger’s	  close	  relationship	  with	  Husserl	  and	  their	  connection	  to	  the	  phenomenological	   method,	   since	   it	   is	   this	   strong	   ‘imprinting’	   which	  initiates	  their	  investigation	  of	  the	  problem	  of	  being.	  While	  I	  do	  not	  seek	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to	  offer	  an	  exhaustive	  explanation	  of	  the	  phenomenological	  method,	  I	  support	   the	   theory	   that	   this	   method	   provided	   both	   authors	   with	   a	  research	  approach	  essentially	   free	   from	  prejudice,	  which	  was	  helpful	  in	   confronting	   their	   religious	   beliefs.	   Also	   it	  was	   Stein’s	   interest	   in	   a	  phenomenology	   of	   life	   experience	   that	   helped	   her	   to	   enlarge	   the	  borders	   of	   the	   investigation,	   and	   include	   a	   lively	   discussion	   with	  Aquinas’	   philosophical	   perspectives,	   as	   well	   as	   other	   philosophical	  sources.	   	   In	   this	   chapter	   I	   also	  address	   the	  matter	  of	   the	  best	  way	   to	  compare	   the	   authors	   in	   question	   and	   explain	   Heidegger’s	   silence	  regarding	   the	   critiques	   of	   his	   philosophy.	   I	   also	   briefly	   look	   at	  Heidegger’s	  early	  years,	  and	  consider	  how	  he	  starts	  to	  come	  to	  terms	  with	  his	  own	  religious	  beliefs	  and	  his	  understanding	  of	  a	  philosophical	  method.	   This	   part	   concludes	   with	   an	   overview	   of	   the	   history	   of	   the	  question	   of	   being,	   its	   role	   and	   importance	   for	   contemporary	  philosophy.	  	  	  b) The	   central	   part	   of	   this	   work	   consists	   of	   a	   close	   analysis	   of	   Stein’s	  critique	   of	   Heidegger’s	   Dasein	   (Chapter	   3:	   Understanding	   Being	   and	  
Time).	   I	   draw	  on	   Stein’s	   assessment	   and	   highlight	   the	   key	   aspects	   of	  her	  critique	  while	  explaining	   the	  difference	   in	  her	  ontological	   system	  from	   that	   of	   Heidegger.	   The	   key	   elements	   that	   I	   analyse	   are	  Heidegger’s	  reasons	  to	  refuse	  to	  use	  a	  traditional	  personal	  terminology	  and	   the	   consequences	   that	   follow	   from	   the	   coincidence	   of	   being	   and	  existence	   for	   the	   definition	   of	   the	   human	   being.	   To	   this	   aim	   I	   look	  closer	   at	   Aquinas’	   classical	   metaphysics	   and	   Heidegger’s	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understanding	  of	  Christian	  ontology	  as	  expressed	  in	  Being	  and	  Time.	  I	  also	   draw	   a	   parallel	   between	   Heidegger’s	   definition	   of	   Geworfenheit	  (being	   thrown)	   and	   Stein’s	   concept	   of	   Geborgenheit	   (being	   held	  securely),	   which	   is	   representative	   of	   their	   different	   approach	   to	   the	  existential	   condition	   of	   the	   human	   being:	   alone	   and	   estranged	   for	  Heidegger;	  secure,	  supported	  and	  hopeful	  for	  Stein.	  	  	  c) In	  the	  final	  chapter	  (Chapter	  4:	  For	  an	  ontology	  of	  the	  person)	  I	  draw	  upon	   my	   analysis	   of	   Stein’s	   positions:	   Stein	   offers	   a	   comprehensive	  view	  of	  the	  human	  being	  and	  the	  idea	  of	  life,	  caducity,	  authenticity,	  and	  future,	  as	  they	  emerge	  from	  the	  confrontation	  with	  Heidegger.	  While	  in	  Chapters	   2	   and	   3	   I	   mostly	   aim	   to	   present	   Stein’s	   critique	   and	  investigate	  its	  reasons,	  structure	  and	  connections	  to	  other	  thinkers,	  in	  this	   final	  part	   I	   critically	  assess	   the	   intent	  behind	  such	  a	  critique	  and	  aim	   to	   understand	   its	   consequences,	   particularly	   what	   she	   sees	   as	  missing	   in	  Heidegger’s	   theory	   and	  what	   she	  proposes	   instead.	   In	   the	  last	  part	  of	  this	  chapter	  I	  attempt	  to	  put	  Stein’s	   ‘personal	  ontology’	  to	  good	   use	   by	   addressing	   one	   of	   today’s	   most	   pressing	   ethical	  controversies:	   the	   debate	   on	   end-­‐of-­‐life	   care	   and	   the	   way	   death	   is	  regarded	   and	   dealt	   with.	   It	   is	   my	   opinion	   that	   a	   philosophical	  contribution	  to	  the	  meaning	  of	  being	  a	  human	  person,	   the	  end	  of	   life,	  acceptance	  and	  death,	  has	  much	  to	  offer	  to	  the	  practical	  implications	  of	  end-­‐of-­‐life	  care.	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1.2.	   	   About	  Edith	  Stein	  
At	  this	  stage	  it	   is	  necessary	  to	  offer	  a	  brief	  overview	  of	  Edith	  Stein’s	  life	  and	  work2.	  Her	  research	  enjoyed	  a	  relative	  notoriety	  during	  her	  lifetime,	  thanks	  to	  the	  publications	  of	  her	  phenomenological	  essays,	  and	  her	  career	  as	  a	  public	  speaker,	  however	  her	  most	  important	  works	  could	  not	  be	  published	  until	  after	  her	  death	  and	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Second	  World	  War.	  Although	  the	  first	  edition	  of	  Stein’s	  collected	  works	  contributed	  greatly	  to	  earning	  her	  a	  place	  in	   philosophical	   history,	   and	   demonstrated	   the	   depth	   and	   range	   of	   her	  investigations,	  some	  of	  her	  writings	  were	  misplaced	  and	  inaccurately	  dated,	  which	  involuntarily	  contributed	  to	  fundamental	  aspects	  of	  her	  philosophical	  progression	   being	   overlooked 3 .	   This	   progression	   can	   be	   broadly	  characterised	  as	  a	  move	  from	  phenomenology	  to	  Christian	  ontology	  and	  into	  mysticism.	  	  	  
After	  she	  was	  beatified	  and	  declared	  a	  martyr	  of	  the	  Catholic	  Church	  in	   1987,	   when	   she	  was	   canonised	   in	   1998	   by	   Pope	   John	   Paul	   II	   with	   her	  Carmelite	   name	   of	   Saint	   Teresia	   Benedicta	   of	   the	   Cross	   and	   proclaimed	  patroness	   of	   Europe	   in	   1999,	   there	   was	   an	   increased	   interest	   from	  many	  areas	  of	  academia	  in	  Stein’s	  work.	  	   The	   results	   of	   this	   renewed	   interest	  revealed	   more	   clearly	   the	   roots	   of	   Stein’s	   philosophy	   in	   the	   19th	   century	  tradition	  of	  phenomenology	  and	  personalism.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  I	   am	   not	   quoting	   from	   a	   particular	   biography,	   but	   out	   of	   the	   many	   being	   written	   I	  benefitted	   the	   most	   from	   Gerl,	   Unerbittliches	   Licht,	   1991;	   the	   very	   first	   one	   written	   by	  Teresia	  Renata	  Posselt,	  Edith	  Stein:	  the	  Life	  of	  a	  Philosopher	  and	  Carmelite	   (revised	  edition	  2005)	   and	   Stein’s	   autobiography	   Aus	   dem	   Leben	   einer	   jüdishen	   Familie	   and	   biographical	  letters	  and	  writings	  (ESGA	  I,	  II,	  III,	  IV).	  	  3	  See	  1.5.	  Literature	  review,	  p.	  15.	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Edith	  Stein	  studied	  psychology,	  German	  and	  history	  at	  the	  University	  of	  Breslau,	  her	  hometown,	  but	   later	  decided	   to	  move	   to	  Göttingen	   to	   learn	  phenomenology	   from	  Edmund	  Husserl,	   fascinated	  by	   the	  new	  method	  and	  its	  research	  possibilities.	  It	  was	  the	  start	  of	  a	  long	  intellectual	  commitment:	  	  Stein	   obtained	   her	   doctorate	   with	   a	   thesis	   on	   the	   phenomenology	   of	  empathy	   and	   then	   took	   up	   the	   great	   task	   of	   working	   as	   Husserl’s	   private	  assistant	  in	  Freiburg,	  a	  position	  that	  she	  maintained	  for	  two	  and	  a	  half	  years,	  hoping	   for	   the	  chance	  of	  collaborating	  with	  him.	   In	  1918	  she	  resigned	  and	  Husserl	   offered	   the	   position	   to	   Martin	   Heidegger.	   In	   the	   following	   years	  Stein	   published	   three	   more	   phenomenological	   studies4	  and	   collaborated	  with	   fellow	   phenomenologists	   on	   new	   editions,	   however	   the	   tragic	  experience	   of	   the	   war,	   along	   with	   personal	   and	   professional	  disappointments,	  brought	  her	  to	  an	  extensive	  reconsideration	  of	  her	  life	  and	  her	  beliefs.	  	  
In	   January	   1922	   Stein	   officially	   became	   a	   Catholic,	   although	   the	  process	  of	  her	  religious	  conversion	  had	  already	  started	  years	  before.	  From	  this	  point	  on	  she	  produced	  significant	  works	  particularly	  on	  the	  education	  of	  Catholic	  women,	  and	  participated	  in	  international	  educational	  seminars	  and	  radio	   programmes.	  While	  working	   as	   a	   school	   teacher,	   she	   completed	   the	  German	   translations	   of	   John	   Henry	   Newman’s	  Apologia	   and	   The	   Idea	   of	   a	  
University,	   of	   Aquina’s	   De	   ente	   et	   essentia	   and	   Quaestiones	   disputatae	   de	  
Veritate	  and	   (together	  with	  Hedwig	   Conrad-­‐Martius)	   of	   Alexandre	  Koyre’s	  
L'idée	  de	  Dieu	  et	  les	  preuves	  de	  son	  existence	  chez	  Descartes,	  which	  has	  now	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  The	  essays	  “Sentient	  Causality”	  (1918)	  and	  	  “Individual	  and	  Community”	  (1919),	  in	  ESGA	  8,	  and	  the	  essay	  “On	  the	  State”	  (1921),	  ESGA	  7.	  See	  also	  p.	  25.	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been	  included	  in	  the	  new	  collected	  edition5.	  These	  translations	  were	  carried	  out	   between	   1920	   and	   1930,	   and	   provide	   insights	   into	   Stein’s	   readings	   at	  the	  time	  and	  the	  breadth	  of	  her	  academic	  interests.	  	  
After	  working	  on	  Aquinas,	  Stein	  embarked	  on	  an	  original	  comparison	  of	  Scholastic	  philosophy	  and	  phenomenology	  and	  published	   first	  an	  article	  in	  Husserl’s	   journal6	  and	   later	   a	   detailed	   tractate,	  which	   she	   titled	  Potency	  
and	   Act,7	  that	   underwent	   a	   complete	   revision	   between	   1935	   and	   1936	  serving	  as	  the	  basis	  for	  the	  first	  part	  of	  her	  greatest	  ontological	  work	  Finite	  
and	  Eternal	   Being:	   An	  Attempt	   at	   an	  Ascent	   to	   the	  Meaning	   of	   Being.	   	   Also	  with	   this	   work	   Stein	   made	   one	   last	   attempt	   to	   obtain	   a	   Habilitation	   (a	  German	  qualification	  allowing	   the	  holder	   to	   teach	  at	  University	  Level)	  and	  become	  a	  professor,	  which	  was	  ultimately	  refused.	  	  She	  was	  instead	  offered	  a	  position	  at	   the	  German	  Institute	   for	  Scientific	  Pedagogy	   in	  Müster	  where	  she	  taught	  two	  modules	  on	  the	  philosophical	  and	  theological	  structure	  of	  the	  human	  person	  between	  1932	   and	  19338.	   In	   1933	   she	  was	   relieved	  of	   this	  position	   due	   anti-­‐Semitic	   legislation.	   In	   the	   same	   year	   she	   became	   a	  Carmelite	  nun:	  in	  her	  own	  words	  this	  decision	  fulfilled	  a	  lifelong	  wish,	  which	  had	  not	  been	  followed	  before	  because	  of	  the	  explicit	  encouragement	  of	  her	  spiritual	  adviser	  to	  do	  some	  good	  in	  the	  public	  world.	  	  
At	   this	   point	   Stein	   had	   been	   planning	   to	   give	   up	   academic	   work	  altogether,	  but	  was	  once	  again	  encouraged	  by	  her	  superiors	  to	  continue	  her	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  ESGA	  vol.	  21-­‐26.	  	  6	  Husserls	   Phänomenologie	   und	   die	   Philosophie	   des	   hl.	   Thomas	   v.	   Aquino:	   Versuch	   einer	  
Gegenüberstellung,	  Stein,	  1929.	  7	  ESGA	  10.	  8	  ESGA	  14	  and	  15.	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work.	   Her	   mature	   writings	   on	   ontology,	   mysticism	   and	   spirituality	   were	  composed	   in	   the	   Carmelite	   cloister;	   along	   with	   Finite	   and	   Eternal	   Being	  which	   was	   completed	   in	   1937.	   In	   1942	   Stein	   was	   deported	   and	   killed	   in	  Auschwitz.	  	  She	  was	  one	  of	  the	  Catholic	  members	  of	  religious	  orders	  killed	  in	  reprisal	  for	  the	  public	  criticism	  of	  Nazi	  policy	  towards	  the	  Jews	  by	  the	  Dutch	  Catholic	   Church.	   After	   her	   deportation,	   Stein’s	   will	   was	   found	   among	   her	  papers	   and	   books:	   it	   had	   been	  written	   after	   she	  was	   transferred	   from	   the	  Cloister	  in	  Cologne	  to	  the	  one	  in	  Echt	  (Holland)	  in	  1938	  and	  in	  it	  she	  offered	  her	  life	  for	  the	  Jewish	  people	  and	  the	  Catholic	  Church.	  	  
	  
1.3.	  	   	   Stein’s	  decision	  to	  write	  on	  Heidegger’s	  philosophy	  
This	   research	   focuses	   on	   a	   particular	   text	   by	   Stein,	   a	   short	   essay	  dedicated	  to	  Martin	  Heidegger’s	  philosophy	  that	  she	  chose	  to	  append	  to	  her	  ontological	  work	  Finite	  and	  Eternal	  Being	   -­‐	  An	  Attempt	  at	  an	  Ascent	   to	   the	  
Meaning	  of	  Being	  along	  with	  a	  second	  appendix	  titled	  “Die	  Seelenburg”	  (The	  
Castle	  of	  the	  Soul),	  after	  the	  work	  of	  St	  Theresa	  of	  Avila9.	   In	  Stein’s	  original	  plan	  both	  appendices	  were	  to	  appear	  in	  the	  final	  edition	  of	  Finite	  and	  Eternal	  
Being,	  and	  indeed	  they	  should	  be	  read	  as	  an	  extension	  of	  this	  work,	  because	  of	  the	  many	  links	  between	  them.	  Although	  Stein	  had	  already	  read	  Being	  and	  
Time	  in	  1927,	  when	  it	  was	  published,	  she	  was	  still	  working	  on	  her	  essay	  on	  Heidegger	   in	   1936.	   In	   a	   letter	   to	   her	   friend,	   the	   phenomenologist	   Hedwig	  Conrad-­‐Martius,	   she	   explained	   that	   she	   had	   terminated	   the	   book	   but	   was	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  Stein	   refers	   to	   El	   Castillo	   Interior	   or	   Las	  Moradas	   (The	   Interior	   Castle	   or	   The	  Mansions)	  written	  by	  Saint	  Teresa	  of	  Ávila	  in	  1577.	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still	  working	  and	  struggling	  with	  an	  appendix	  on	  Heidegger’s	  philosophy10.	  Obviously,	  it	  was	  very	  important	  to	  Stein	  that	  the	  book	  would	  be	  published	  with	  this	  additional	  analysis.	  	  
Finite	  and	  Eternal	  Being	  was	   not	   published	   until	   after	   Stein’s	   death	  despite	   various	   agreements	   and	   attempts	   to	   publish	   it	   were	  made	   before	  1940,	   however,	   these	   were	   subsequently	   abandoned	   because	   of	   the	   non-­‐Arian	   origins	   of	   its	   author.	   Finite	   and	   Eternal	   Being	   was	   firstly	   published	  posthumously	   in	   1950	   by	   Herder	   and	   Nauwelaerts,	   however	   this	   edition,	  like	   the	   three	   that	   followed,	  was	   not	   including	   the	   two	   appendices11.	   It	   is	  only	   the	   most	   recent	   edition	   of	   ESGA	   (vol.	   11/12)	   that	   has	   restored	   the	  original	  order	  of	  the	  book,	  as	  intended	  by	  Stein.	  	  
But	  why	  was	   Stein	   so	   keen	   to	  provide	   an	   evaluation	  of	  Heidegger’s	  work?	  During	  and	  after	  her	   religious	  conversion	   to	   the	  Catholic	   faith	  Stein	  re-­‐elaborates	  many	  concepts	  of	  classical	  and	  medieval	  Christian	  philosophy	  along	  with	  contemporary	  research	  on	  metaphysics;	  particularly	  she	  aims	  to	  merge	  Aquinas’	  philosophy	  with	  phenomenology.	  This	  was	  the	  scope	  of	  her	  
tractatus	  on	  Act	  and	  Potency	  from	  1931,	  however	  in	  Finite	  and	  Eternal	  Being	  Stein	  progresses	  from	  the	  doctrine	  of	  act	  and	  potency	  to	  conduct	  an	  ‘inquiry	  into	  the	  meaning	  of	  being’.	  	  
Finite	   and	   Eternal	   Being	   contains	   many	   references	   to	   Martin	  Heidegger’s	  Being	  and	  Time;	   indeed,	   the	   first	   two	   chapters	   appear	   to	   be	   a	  direct	  confrontation	  with	  it.	  This	  is	  partly	  because	  Stein	  wrote	  the	  majority	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  On	   the	   20	   February	   1936	   Stein	   writes	   “Jetzt	   habe	   ich	   die	   Arbeit	   an	   dem	   endlosen	  Opus	  
wieder	   aufnehmen	   können.	   Seit	   vielen	   Wochen	   plage	   ich	   mich	   mit	   einem	   Anhang	   über	  
Heideggers	  Existenzphilosophie”,	  letter	  nr	  473	  to	  Hedwig	  Conrad-­‐Martius	  (ESGA	  3,	  p.	  221).	  11	  See	  the	  Introduction	  to	  ESGA	  11/12	  by	  Andreas	  Uwe	  Müller.	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of	   this	   manuscript	   after	   reading	   Heidegger’s	   work	   and	   it	   made	   a	   strong	  impression	  on	  her,	  as	  she	  declared	  in	  the	  preface.	  Her	  personal	  need	  for	  an	  evaluation	  and	  her	  will	  to	  offer	  a	  response	  results	  in	  the	  decision	  to	  append	  the	   essay	   that	   is	   the	   object	   of	   this	   research.	   Stein	   gives	   an	   eloquent	  explanation	  for	  this	  decision:	  	  
“Finally,	   a	   word	   should	   be	   said	   about	   the	   relationship	   this	   book	  bears	   to	   the	  most	   significant	   efforts	   that	   have	   been	  made	   in	   our	   time	   to	  arrive	   to	   a	   foundation	   for	   metaphysics,	   namely,	   Martin	   Heidegger’s	  
philosophy	   of	   existence	   and	   its	   counterpart,	   the	   ontology	   [Seinslehre]	  embodied	  in	  the	  writings	  of	  Hedwig	  Conrad-­‐Martius.	  At	  the	  time	  when	  the	  author	   was	   Husserl’s	   assistant	   at	   the	   University	   of	   Freiburg,	   Heidegger’s	  thinking	   was	   moving	   in	   the	   direction	   of	   phenomenology.	   This	   common	  interest	   in	  the	  philosophy	  of	  Edmund	  Husserl	   led	  to	  the	  author’s	  personal	  acquaintance	  with	  Heidegger	   and	   to	   a	   first	   contact	  with	   his	   thought.	   The	  author’s	  subsequent	  course	  in	  life	  and	  a	  change	  of	  environment	  caused	  the	  interruption	   of	   this	   contact.	   She	   read,	   however,	   Heidegger’s	   Sein	  und	  Zeit	  (Being	  and	  Time)	  shortly	  after	  its	  publication	  and	  was	  deeply	  impressed	  by	  it,	  but	  without	  being	  able	  at	  that	  time	  to	  evaluate	  it	  objectively.	  Though	  the	  first	   acquaintance	   with	   Heidegger’s	   great	   work	   dates	   back	   many	   years,	  certain	   reminiscences	  may	   have	   found	   their	   way	   into	   this	   present	   study.	  The	  desire,	  however,	  to	  confront	  these	  two	  decidedly	  different	  approaches	  to	  the	  meaning	  of	  being	  was	  not	  felt	  until	  after	  the	  conclusion	  of	  the	  work.	  This	   explains	   why	   the	   section	   dealing	   with	   Heidegger’s	   philosophy	   of	  existence	  has	  been	  appended.”	  (EES,	  p.	  xxxi).	  	  
1.4.	   The	  question	  of	  Heidegger’s	  silence	  
Thanks	   to	   Stein’s	   letters	  we	   have	   evidence	   that	   helps	   to	   reconstruct	  the	   personal	   contacts	   between	   her	   and	   Heidegger.	   	   After	   Stein	   leaves	  Freiburg	  she	  often	  comments	  on	  the	  state	  of	  things	  in	  Freiburg	  and	  the	  way	  that	   Husserl	   was	   placing	   absolute	   trust	   in	   Heidegger,	   who	   was	   instead	  making	   ‘digs’	  at	  phenomenology	  and	  establishing	  his	  personal	   influence	  on	  students	   (ESGA	   4,	   p.	   143-­‐144)).	   In	   1931	   she	   seeks	   advice	   from	  Heidegger	  when	  she	  submits	  her	  habilitation	  work	  Act	  and	  Potency.	  She	  describes	  how	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Heidegger	   was	   friendly	   and	   offered	   encouragement,	   but	   also	   pointed	   out	  that	  it	  would	  have	  been	  difficult	  for	  him	  to	  support	  her	  submission	  because	  of	  her	  Catholic	  profile.	  On	  this	  occasion	  the	  two	  of	  them	  must	  have	  discussed	  Stein’s	  ontological	  work	  at	  length,	  possibly	  Heidegger’s	  too,	  and	  it	  is	  possible	  to	   speculate	   that	   Stein	   must	   have	   been	   pointing	   out	   at	   least	   some	   of	   her	  queries	   on	   the	   connection	   between	   phenomenology	   and	   ontology	   and	   the	  role	  of	  Christian	  metaphysics12.	  	  	  
It	  is	  also	  important	  to	  point	  out	  that	  although	  ‘Act	  and	  Potency’	  wasn’t	  directly	   aimed	   at	   Heidegger’s	   theories,	   it	   is	   after	   Stein	   reworks	   this	  manuscript	  and	  expands	  it	   into	  Finite	  and	  Eternal	  Being	  that	  the	  critique	  of	  Heidegger	  acquires	  a	  central	  role.	  It	  is	  therefore	  important	  to	  read	  the	  essay	  on	  Heidegger’s	   philosophy	   along	  with	  Finite	  and	  Eternal	  Being,	   in	   the	  way	  presented	  here.	  
It	  is	  a	  great	  shame	  that	  Stein’s	  book	  couldn’t	  be	  published	  as	  planned,	  as	  it	  would	  have	  increased	  the	  chance	  that	  Heidegger	  could	  have	  read	  it.	  It	  is	  however	   uncertain	   whether	   he	   would	   have	   responded	   to	   the	   critique,	  mostly	  because	  he	  didn’t	  do	  so	  when	  he	  was	  directly	  and	  openly	  criticised	  by	  others.	  As	  well	   as	  many	   admirers,	  Heidegger	  has	  many	  detractors	  who	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  This	  meeting	  proves	  that	  Heidegger	  must	  have	  read	  at,	  least	  part	  of	  Stein’s	  book	  Act	  and	  
Potency	  which	  was	  submitted	  for	  Habilitation	  at	  the	  University	  of	  Freiburg	  in	  1931.	  During	  their	   meeting	   Heidegger	   explains	   that	   Stein	   should	   ask	   Martin	   Honeker	   for	   support	  (Honeker	  was	  a	  Catholic	  philosopher	  who	  held	  the	  chair	  in	  Catholic	  philosophy	  at	  Freiburg	  University).	   See	   Stein’s	   letter	   to	   Ingarden	   on	   25th	   December	   1931	   (ESGA	   4,	   p.	   225),	   and	  Stein	  letter	  to	  Heinrich	  Finke	  on	  26	  January	  1931	  (ESGA	  1,	  p.	  156).	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openly	  criticised	  his	  philosophy13.	  Others	  criticised	  Heidegger’s	  philosophy	  purely	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  his	  affiliation	  with	  the	  National	  Socialist	  party14.	  	  	  
More	   interesting	   for	   us	   are	   two	   short	   essays	   by	   Stein’s	   friend	   and	  fellow	  phenomenologist	  Hedwig	  Conrad-­‐Martius,	  who,	   like	   Stein,	   belonged	  to	   Husserl’s	   close	   knot	   of	   phenomenologists	   in	   Göttingen.	   The	   first	   essay	  published	  first	  in	  ‘Deutsche	  Zeitschrif’	  in	  1932	  with	  the	  title	  ‘Heideggers	  Sein	  
und	  Zeit’	  and	  the	  second,	  more	  critical	  article,	  ‘Existentielle	  Tiefe	  und	  Untiefe	  
von	   Dasein	   und	   Ich’,	   which	   appeared	   in	   ‘The	   Schildgenossen’	   in	   193415.	  	  Another	  important	  work	  which	  also	  must	  have	  influenced	  Stein	  is	  the	  essay	  written	   by	   the	   Jesuit	   Erich	   Przywara	   in	   1928	   The	   Direction	   of	  
Phenomenology.	  Judith	  Wolfe	  rightly	  includes	  Przywara’s	  and	  Stein’s	  essays	  in	  a	  wider	  response	  to	  Heidegger	   from	  Neo-­‐Scholastic	  Catholic	   theologians	  with	  phenomenological	  training	  (including	  also	  Romano	  Guardini	  and	  Hans	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  A	   famous	   attack	   is	   represented	   by	   the	   1964	   book	   by	   Theodor	   Adorno	   The	   Jargon	   of	  
Authenticity	   which	   criticises	   the	   language	   and	   general	   conceptualisation	   of	   existential	  philosophy.	  Emmanuel	  Levinas	  also	  criticises	  Heidegger’s	  project	  of	  a	  fundamental	  ontology	  in	   his	   essay	   from	   1951	   Is	  Ontology	   fundamental?	   (Adorno,	   2007;	   Levinas,	   1951.	   See	   also	  Inwood,	  1997,	  p.	  75	  and	  	  p.	  133).	  	  14	  To	   name	   a	   few:	  Hans	   Jonas,	   one	   of	  Heidegger’s	   former	   students,	   and	   Jürgen	  Habermas	  who	   publicly	   called	   for	   an	   explanation	   from	   Heidegger	   after	   reading	   Introduction	   to	  
Metaphysics	  which	  was	  alluding	  to	  the	   ‘greatness’	  of	  National	  Socialism.	  See	  also	  the	  entry	  on	   Habermas	   in	   the	   Standford	   encyclopaedia	   of	   Philosophy:	   “	   the	   latter's	   [Heidegger’s]	  silence	  confirmed	  Habermas's	  conviction	  that	  the	  German	  philosophical	  tradition	  had	  failed	  in	   its	   moment	   of	   reckoning,	   providing	   intellectuals	   with	   the	   resources	   neither	   to	  understand	  nor	  to	  criticize	  National	  Socialism”.	  (Source:	  http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/habermas).	  	  15	  Conrad-­‐Martius,	   1933;	   1934.	   It	   isn’t	   my	   aim	   to	   compare	   Stein’s	   and	   Conrad-­‐Martius’	  approach	   to	   Heidegger’s	   philosophy,	   although	   such	   a	   comparison	   would	   be	   extremely	  interesting.	  It	  will	  suffice	  to	  note	  how	  both	  Stein	  and	  Conrad-­‐Martius	  feel	  the	  need	  to	  assess	  Heidegger’s	   work	   in	   an	   attempt	   to	   demonstrate	   a	   different	   use	   and	   understanding	   of	  phenomenology.	   As	   Stein	   quotes	   both	   Conrad-­‐Martius	   and	   Heidegger	   as	   sources	   in	   the	  preface	  of	  Finite	  and	  Eternal	  Being,	   it	   is	  not	   incorrect	   to	   say	   that	   she	   saw	   their	  writing	  as	  complementary	  of	   each	  other:	  Heidegger’s	   analysis	   of	   the	   existence	  of	   the	   subject	   on	  one	  side,	  Conrad-­‐Martius	  investigation	  of	  nature	  and	  reality	  (as	  independent	  from	  the	  subject’s	  perception)	  on	  the	  other	  (see	  also	  p.	  37).	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Urs	   von	  Balthasar,	  who	  was	   influenced	   by	   Przywara	   and	  Guardini	   (Wolfe,	  2013,	  p,	  151).	  	  
It	  is	  difficult,	  if	  not	  impossible,	  to	  try	  and	  give	  a	  reason	  for	  the	  fact	  that	  Heidegger	  didn’t	   reply	   to	  any	  critique.	  We	  cannot	  be	  sure	  whether	  he	  was	  simply	  too	  busy	  with	  his	  work	  to	  care	  to	  reconsider	  his	  position,	  didn’t	  feel	  the	  necessity	  to	  respond,	  or	  refused	  to	  dignify	  the	  critiques	  with	  an	  answer.	  A	   partial	   explanation	   of	   his	   silence	   can	   be	   found	   perhaps	   in	   the	  Letter	  on	  
Humanism,	   which	   was	   written	   in	   1945	   to	   Jan	   Beaufret	   as	   a	   response	   to	  Sartre’s	   attempt	   to	   define	   existentialism	   as	   a	   form	   of	   humanism,	   and	   it	  contains	   many	   critical	   remarks	   directed	   at	   Sartre	   (and	   indirectly	   to	   his	  detractors)16.	  However	  Heidegger	  is	  not	  interested	  in	  commenting	  on	  these	  critiques:	   “It	   is,	   everywhere,	   supposed	   that	   the	   attempt	   in	   Sein	   und	   Zeit	  ended	   in	  a	  blind	  alley.	  Let	  us	  not	  comment	  any	   further	  upon	   that	  opinion”	  (Heidegger,	   1995,	   p.	   75).	   	   Aside	   from	   small	   remarks	   such	   as	   this	   one,	   the	  letter	  is	  not	  intended	  as	  a	  response	  to	  a	  critique,	  but	  rather	  as	  clarification	  of	  his	   thought.	   Indeed	   rather	   than	   addressing	   questions	   posed	   from	   the	  outside,	   Heidegger	   generally	   seemed	   more	   concerned	   that	   his	   own	  philosophy	  was	  appropriately	  understood.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  (Heidegger,	   2004).	   Heidegger	   also	  wrote	   a	   letter	   to	   Sartre	   on	   28	   October	   1945,	   Sartre	  never	  replied.	  One	  of	   the	  reasons	  behind	  Heidegger’s	   letter	  was	  a	  proposed	  public	  debate	  between	   him	   and	   Sartre,	   which	   never	   took	   place.	   It	   is	   also	   important	   to	   note	   that	   this	  exchange	   happened	   in	   a	   time	   when	   Heidegger	   was	   banned	   from	   teaching	   for	   political	  reasons	  (after	  the	  post	  war	  hearings	  and	  his	  ban	  from	  teaching,	  Heidegger	  was	  classified	  in	  1949	  as	  a	  Mitläufer	  or	  Nazi	  follower.	  The	  teaching	  ban	  was	  lifted	  in	  1951	  and	  Heidegger	  was	  nominated	  emeritus	  in	  1953)	  and	  keen	  to	  reestablish	  his	  links	  with	  the	  academic	  world	  (see	  Introduction	   of	   the	   Italian	   edition	   by	   Franco	   Volpi	   in	   Heidegger,	   Lettera	   sull’Umanismo,	  Adelphi	  1995,	  p.	  13-­‐14).	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In	   the	   famous	   interview	   for	  Der	  Spiegel	  magazine	   in	   1966	  Heidegger	  discusses	  some	  of	  the	  criticism	  related	  to	  his	  political	  involvement,	  therefore	  the	   published	   version	   of	   the	   interview	  Only	  a	  God	  can	   save	  us	   (which	  was	  largely	   edited	   by	   Heidegger	   himself)	   can	   be	   considered	   his	   only	   open	  response	  to	  criticism17.	  	  
	  
1.5.	   	   Literature	  review	  
A	  new	   complete	   collection	   of	   Stein’s	  works	  was	   completed	   in	   2012	  under	  the	  supervision	  of	  Professor	  Hanna-­‐Barbara	  Gerl-­‐Falkovitz	  (Technical	  University	  of	  Dresden)	  and	  the	  Edith	  Stein	  Archive	   in	  Cologne:	   this	  edition	  includes	  new	  autobiographical	  documents,	  a	  critical	  apparatus	  of	  historical	  remarks	   and	   notes	   explaining	   the	   timeline	   of	   her	   works	   along	   with	   the	  differences	   between	   early	   and	   late	   manuscripts18 .	   This	   extensive	   new	  material	   provides	   a	   wealth	   of	   information	   concerning	   the	   historical	  background	  and	   the	   theoretical	   sources	   that	   influenced	   Stein’s	  works.	  The	  now	  standard	  critical	  edition	  ESGA	  is	  composed	  of	  27	  volumes	  and	  includes	  a)	  biographical	  writings,	  letters	  and	  documents,	  b)	  philosophical	  writings,	  c)	  writings	   on	   anthropology	   and	   education,	   e)	   writings	   on	   mysticism	   and	  spirituality	  and	  f)	  translation.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  In	  1966,	  Heidegger	  gave	  an	  interview	  for	  Der	  Spiegel	  magazine,	  in	  which	  he	  discussed	  his	  political	  past.	  The	  interview	  was	  published	  posthumously	  (on	  his	  request)	  in	  1976	  with	  the	  title	  Nur	  noch	  ein	  Gott	  kann	  uns	  retten	  (Only	  a	  God	  can	  Save	  Us);	  see	  Heidegger,	  1976.	  	  18	  I	  am	  referring	  to	  the	  Edith	  Stein	  Gesamtausgabe,	  (ESGA),	  which	  has	  replaced	  the	  previous	  series	  Edith	  Steins	  Werke	   (ESW).	  ESGA	   is	  published	  by	  Herder	   (Freiburg	   in	  Breisgau);	   the	  previous	  ESW	  was	  the	  first	  edition	  of	  Stein’s	  writings	  and	  consisted	  of	  only	  nine	  works	  of	  Stein	  and	  a	  biography	  written	  by	  Romaeus	  Leuven.	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As	  previously	  mentioned	  in	  the	  first	  edition	  of	  works	  ESW	  a	  few	  texts	  were	   misplaced	   and	   wrongly	   dated.	   It	   is	   here	   worth	   mentioning	   a	   short	  essay	   originally	   titled	   by	   the	   publisher	   “Nature,	   Freedom,	   Grace”	   and	  included	   in	   the	  volume	   IV	  of	  ESW,	   as	   it	  was	  assumed	  being	  part	  of	   Stein’s	  notes	   for	   the	   lecture	   on	   the	   structure	   of	   the	   human	   person,	   composed	  between	   1930	   and	   1931.	   However,	   as	   demonstrated	   by	   Claudia	   Mariele	  Wulf,	  it	  was	  actually	  written	  between	  1918	  and	  1920,	  a	  fact	  that	  puts	  in	  an	  all	  new	  light	  some	  of	  the	  content	  of	  this	  particular	  essay,	  as	  I	  will	  explain	  in	  chapter	   219.	   Stein’s	   epistolary	   collection	   has	   also	   been	   enriched,	   and	   the	  complete	  body	  of	   her	   translation	  work	   is	  now	  available	   and	  demonstrates	  her	   wide	   interests	   and	   sources	   (ESGA	   21-­‐27),	   which	   includes	   Stein’s	  translation	  of	  Aquinas	  and	  Cardinal	  John	  Henry	  Newman.	  	  
Edith	   Stein’s	   most	   important	   writings	   have	   being	   translated	   into	  English,	   Italian,	   French	   and	   Spanish:	   the	   English	   translation	   series	   The	  
Collected	  Works	  of	  Edith	  Stein	  (CWES)	  currently	  consists	  of	  11	  volumes.20	  	  
As	   a	   consequence	   of	   this	   extensive	   editorial	   project	   Stein’s	  philosophical	   writings	   have	   been	   investigated	   by	   a	   new	   generation	   of	  scholars,	   keen	   to	   draw	   attention	   to	   the	   role	   she	   played	   in	   the	  phenomenological	  movement	  as	  well	  as	  the	  significance	  of	  her	  works	  in	  the	  context	  of	  contemporary	  ethical	  questions.	  
Currently	   there	   aren’t	   any	   monographs	   entirely	   dedicated	   to	   the	  particular	   topic	   of	   Stein’s	   critique	   of	   Heidegger,	   with	   the	   exception	   of	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  See	  p.	  41.	  20	  In	   this	   thesis	   I	  will	   quote	   (for	   existing	   translations)	   from	   the	  English	   translation	   series	  
The	  Collected	  Works	  of	  Edith	  Stein	  (CWES),	  published	  by	  the	  Institute	  of	  Carmelite	  Studies,	  Washington,	  which	  currently	  consists	  of	  11	  volumes.	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Italian	   volume	   Edith	   Stein	   e	   l’uomo	   non	   redento	   di	   Martin	   Heidegger	   by	  Marco	  Paolinelli,	  which	  includes	  a	  new	  Italian	  translation	  of	  Stein’s	  essay	  on	  Heidegger’s	   philosophy,	   preceded	   by	   an	   historical	   introduction	   which	  describes	   the	   life	   of	   both	   authors	   and	   their	   philosophical	   development21	  (Paolinelli,	  2011).	  
	   	   While	  the	  bibliography	  of	  Edith	  Stein	  is	  large	  and	  constantly	  growing,	  there	  are	  only	  a	   few	  published	  articles	  and	  essays	   that	  analyse	  specifically	  her	   connection	   to	   Heidegger	   or	   are	   more	   generally	   aimed	   to	   present	   the	  similarities	   between	   the	   two	   authors.	   Amongst	   them	   are:	   Edith	   Stein	   and	  
Martin	  Heidegger	  by	  John	  Nota	  S.	  J.,	  who	  personally	  met	  Edith	  Stein	  in	  1942	  (Nota,	   1987),	   Edith	   Steins	   Auseinandersetzung	   mit	   Martin	   Heideggers	  
Existentialphilosophie,	   by	   Lina	   Börsig-­‐Hover	   (Börsig-­‐Hover,	   1991),	   La	  
persona	  come	  apertura	  all'Essere	  Eterno	  secondo	  Edith	  Stein.	  Primo	  tentativo	  
di	  confronto	  con	  M.	  Heidegger	  by	  Michele	  D’Ambra	   (D’	  Ambra,	  1994).	  More	  recent	   articles	   include:	   Die	   Fülle	   oder	   das	   Nichts?:	   Martin	   Heidegger	   and	  
Edith	  Stein	  on	  the	  Question	  of	  Being	   by	  Antonio	  Calcagno,	   originally	   a	  book	  chapter,	   later	  published	  as	  article	   (Calcagno,	  2007);	  Edith	  Stein	  and	  Martin	  
Heidegger	   on	   the	  Meaning	   of	   Being,	   by	  Mette	   Lebech	   (Lebech,	   2006),	   who	  also	  translated	  Stein’s	  critique	  in	  English	  (Lebech,	  2007);	  On	  Human	  Being:	  A	  
Dispute	  between	  Edith	  Stein	  and	  Martin	  Heidegger	   (Wilk,	   2007);	  Do	  We	  Die	  
Alone?	  Edith	  Stein’s	  Critique	  of	  Heidegger	  by	  Ken	   Casey	   (Casey,	   2012),	   The	  
Difference	  for	  Philosophy:	  Edith	  Stein	  and	  Martin	  Heidegger	  (Ballard,	   2007),	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21	  The	  first	  part	  of	  this	  book	  is	  a	  summary	  of	  the	  academic	  course	  in	  History	  of	  Philosophy	  tought	  by	  Paolinelli	  at	  the	  Università	  Cattolica	  in	  Milan	  in	  2010/11.	  The	  topic	  of	  the	  course	  was	  the	  analysis	  Stein’s	  essay	  on	  Heidegger	  and	  the	  volume	  is	  published	  by	  EDUCatt,	  which	  is	  the	  Foundation	  of	  the	  Università	  Cattolica.	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Die	   Such	   nach	   der	   Modernen	   Metaphysik.	   Edith	   Steins	   Heidegger-­‐Exzerpte,	  
eine	  Kritik	  der	  Metaphysik	  des	  Daseins	  by	  Anna	  Jani	  (Jani,	  2012)	  and	  a	  recent	  article	   by	   James	   Orr	   published	   in	   ‘Modern	   Theology’:	   “Being	   and	  
Timelessness”:	  Edith	  Stein’s	  critique	  of	  Heideggerian	  temporality	  (Orr,	  2014).	  	  
	   	   I	   have	   found	   Wilk’s	   and	   Casey’s	   articles	   very	   useful,	   as	   they	   both	  focus	   specifically	   on	   the	   issue	   of	   death	   and	  dying,	  while	  Orr	   and	   Calcagno	  investigate	  in	  depth	  Stein’s	  views	  on	  after-­‐death	  and	  temporality	  (Calcagno	  does	   this	   also	   in	   another	   article	   titled	   Being,	   Aevum,	   and	   nothingness.	  Calcagno,	  2008).	  	  
Only	   a	   few	   books	   on	   Edith	   Stein	   highlight	   in	   depth	   her	   critique	   of	  Heidegger,	   particularly	   “Unterscheidung	   as	   Naehe:	   Edith	   Stein	   und	  Heidegger”	  in	  Unerbittliches	  Licht.	  Edith	  Stein:	  Philosophie	  –	  Mystik	  –	  Leben	  (Gerl,	   1991,	   pp.	   95	   –	   101),	   clearly	   sees	   Stein’s	   critique	   of	  Heidegger	   as	   an	  essential	   stage	   of	   her	   philosophical	   development.	   Gerl-­‐Falkovitz	   wonders	  especially	  if	  Stein	  attempts	  to	  justify	  Heidegger’s	  position	  from	  the	  point	  of	  view	   of	   his	   philosophical	   procedere,	   and	   if	   this	   attempt	   is	   not	   in	   fact	   the	  driving	   force	  behind	   the	  writing	  of	  Finite	  and	  Eternal	  Being	   (Gerl,	   1991,	  p.	  104).	  	  
Amongst	   recently	   published	   volumes	   that	   had	   the	   great	   merit	   of	  renewing	   the	   interest	   on	   Stein’s	   philosophy	   for	   the	  wide	  English-­‐speaking	  audience,	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  mention	  Edith	  Stein,	  A	  Philosophical	  Prologue,	  by	  Alasdair	   MacIntyre,	   which	   contains	   a	   few	   remarks	   on	   Stein’s	   critique	   of	  Heidegger	   in	   its	   final	   chapter	   (MacIntyre,	   2006,	   p.	   184).	   A	   recent	   book	   on	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Heidegger	  by	  Judith	  Wolfe,	  Heidegger’s	  Eschatology:	  Theological	  Horizons	  in	  
M.	   Heidegger’s	   Early	   Work	   (Wolfe,	   2013,	   p.	   149)	   highlights	   the	   way	   that	  	  Phenomenology	   and	   Neo-­‐scholasticism	   reacted	   to	   Heidegger’s	   philosophy.	  In	  this	  book	  Wolfe	  provides	  a	  sharp	  evaluation	  of	  how	  Catholic	  theologians	  respond	   to	   Heidegger:	   Edith	   Stein’s	   critique	   is	   praised	   by	   Wolfe	   for	  sensitively	  pointing	  out	  Heidegger’s	  dogmatism,	  particularly	  in	  regard	  to	  the	  way	  Heidegger	  discusses	   the	   event	   of	   death.	  However	   she	   also	  wonders	   if	  the	   difference	   between	   Stein’s	   Thomism	   and	   Heidegger’s	   Lutheran	  sensibilities	   are	   not	   one	   of	   the	   reasons	   behind	   their	   opposite	   use	   of	  phenomenology	  to	  analyse	  human	  existence22.	  	  
	   Another	  important	  source	  of	  information	  which	  helps	  to	  reconstruct	  the	   relationship	  between	   these	   two	  authors	   is	  offered	  by	  several	   scholarly	  articles	   which	   describe	   the	   role	   of	   Stein	   in	   the	   phenomenological	  movements	  in	  general	  and	  in	  Husserl’s	  circle	  in	  particular.	  Amongst	  the	  ones	  I	   found	   particularly	   interesting,	   the	   articles	   written	   by	   Stein’s	   fellow	  phenomenologist	   Roman	   Ingarden	   on	   her	   activity	   as	   Husserl’s	   assistant	  (Ingarden,	  1979),	  by	  Reiner	  Sepp	   (Sepp,	  1988)	  and	   the	  article	   ‘Edith	  Stein	  und	  Freiburg’	  by	  the	  historian	  Hugo	  Ott	  (Ott,	  1993),	  clearly	  stand	  out.	  	  
	   	  Finally	  Stein’s	  autobiography	  (ESGA	  1)	  along	  with	  her	  letters	  to	  and	  from	  the	  former	  members	  of	  the	  phenomenological	  circle	  (ESGA	  2,	  3,	  4),	  are	  an	  essential	  resource	  to	  reconstruct	  her	  connection	  to	  Heidegger	  at	  the	  time	  before,	  and	  during,	  the	  conception	  and	  writing	  of	  her	  critique.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22	  See	  also	  p.	  125.	  Wolfe	  has	  recently	  published	  a	  new	  book	  Heidegger	  and	  Theology	  (2014),	  which	  unfortunately	  could	  not	  be	  examined	  for	  this	  research.	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Chapter	  2.	  	   Opposite	  routes	  and	  a	  common	  question	  
	   In	   this	   chapter	   I	   look	   at	   the	   political,	   religious	   and	   philosophical	  context	   behind	   the	   work	   of	   Stein	   and	   Heidegger	   in	   the	   period	   between	  World	  War	  I	  and	  World	  War	  II.	  I	  explain	  Stein’s	  and	  Heidegger’s	  connection	  with	  Husserl	  and	  the	  role	  that	  phenomenology	  plays	  in	  their	  early	  work;	  in	  particular	   Stein’s	   interest	   in	   a	   phenomenology	   of	   life	   experience,	   and	   her	  attempt	   to	   enlarge	   the	   borders	   of	   her	   philosophical	   investigation.	   I	   also	  show	  their	  struggle	  for	  independent	  and	  personal	  research;	  their	  interest	  in	  the	   question	   of	   being,	   and	   the	   connection	   between	   newly	   discovered	  religious	  beliefs	  and	  Neo-­‐Scholasticism.	  	  Heidegger’s	  way	  ‘out’	  of	  the	  system	  of	   Catholicism	   stands	   out	   in	   contrast	   to	   the	   growing	   number	   of	   religious	  conversions,	   and	   I	   look	   briefly	   at	   his	   early	   years,	   and	   specifically	   at	   his	  explanation	  of	  the	  structure	  of	  a	  philosophical	  investigation	  (as	  opposed	  to	  a	  theological	  one),	  as	  delineated	  in	  Phenomenology	  and	  Theology23.	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  23	  This	  is	  the	  title	  of	  a	  lecture	  delivered	  in	  March	  1927	  (Heidegger	  and	  McNeill,	  1998).	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2.1.	  	   	   Preliminary	  remarks	  
Stein	  and	  Heidegger	  moved	  along	  a	  close	  path	  for	  a	  few	  crucial	  years	  in	   Freiburg,	   when	   they	   were	   both	   setting	   the	   foundation	   for	   their	   future	  academic	   careers.	   Both	   worked	   as	   assistants	   to	   Edmund	   Husserl,	   the	  founder	   of	   modern	   phenomenology,	   until	   Heidegger	   replaced	   Stein	   as	  Husserl’s	  assistant	  after	  she	  left	  the	  position	  in	  1918.	  During	  this	  period	  they	  both	  had	  privileged	  access	  to	  Husserl’s	  most	  recent	  works	  and	  enjoyed	  his	  trust	   and	   guidance	   and	   they	   both	   published	   their	   early	   phenomenological	  works	   in	  Husserl’s	  Yearbook	  for	  Philosophy	  and	  Phenomenological	  Research	  (hereafter	   JPPF).	  The	   journal	  was	   founded	   in	  1912	  by	  Husserl	  with	  Moritz	  Geiger,	  Alexander	  Pfänder,	  Adolf	  Reinach	  and	  Max	  Scheler	  and	  became	  the	  official	   journal	   of	   the	  phenomenological	   circle,	  which	  published	   significant	  articles	  by	  members	  of	   the	  movement	   from	  1913	   to	  1930	  and	   later	  Oskar	  Beckar	  and	  Martin	  Heidegger	  also	  became	  editors.24	  	  
When	  reading	  the	  contributions	  of	  Husserl’s	  students	  to	  his	  journal,	  one	  finds	  that	  the	  frequent	  ‘philosophical	  discussions’	  within	  the	  scholarly	  circle	  and	  in	  other	  occasions	  were	  a	  clear	  influence	  on	  all	  participants,	  since	  most	  of	  them	  share	  an	  interest	  for	  similar	  topics	  in	  their	  research.	  Another	  factor	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24	  The	  first	  issue	  of	  the	  journal,	  Jahrbuch	  für	  Philosophie	  und	  phänomenologische	  Forschung,	  was	   published	   in	   1913	   and	   contained	   Husserl’s	   Ideas.	   In	   the	   following	   years	   the	   journal	  hosted	   some	   of	   the	   defining	  writings	   of	   phenomenology,	   including	   Husserl’s	  Vorlesungen	  
zur	   Phänomenologie	   des	   inneren	   Zeitbewusstseins	   (edited	   by	   Heidegger),	   Scheler’s	   Der	  
Formalismus	   in	   der	   Ethik	   und	   die	   materiale	   Wertethik,	   Conrad-­‐Martius’	   Realontologie,	  Heidegger’s	   Sein	   und	   Zeit	   and	   Vom	   Wesen	   des	   Grundes	   and	   three	   contributions	   by	   Stein:	  
Beiträge	   zur	   philosophischen	   Begründung	   der	   Psychologie	   und	   der	   Geisteswissenschaften	  
(1922),	   Eine	   Untersuchung	   über	   den	   Staat	   (1925)	   and	   Husserls	   Phänomenologie	   und	   die	  
Philosophie	   des	   heiligen	   Thomas	   v.	   Aquino	   (1929,	   in	   the	   special	   edition	   of	   the	   yearbook	  
dedicated	  to	  Husserl’s	  70th	  birthday).	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that	  is	  essential	  to	  consider	  is	  the	  rich	  and	  stimulating	  intellectual,	  political	  and	   religious	   environment	   that	   Stein	   and	  Heidegger	  were	   both	  moving	   in,	  which	  was	  particularly	  fervent	  in	  the	  years	  following	  WWI.	  As	  for	  the	  intent	  of	   their	   work,	   both	   authors	   aimed	   to	   solve	   one	   of	   the	   most	   ancient	  philosophical	  questions,	  the	  question	  of	  the	  meaning	  of	  being,	  and	  in	  doing	  so	   they	   discussed	   and	   evaluated	   past	   and	   present	   philosophical	   history,	  starting	   from	   Aristotle’s	   ontological	   difference,	   through	   to	   the	   medieval	  proofs	  of	  God’s	  existence,	  up	  to	  Cartesian	  methodological	  doubt.	  They	  both	  made	   use	   of	   a	   sound	   knowledge	   of	   Christian	   ontology	   and	   dealt	   with	   the	  contemporary	   perspectives	   of	   Husserl’s	   phenomenological	   revolution,	  Scheler’s	   personalism	   and	   ethical	   anthropology,	   neo-­‐scholasticism	   and	  modernism,	   which	   were	   shaking	   the	   grounds	   of	   the	   traditional	   academic	  system	   at	   that	   time.	   It	   is	   also	   important	   to	   consider	   their	   position	   in	   the	  phenomenological	   movement	   and	   the	   influence	   of	   Husserl	   on	   them	   both,	  especially	   in	   the	   light	   of	   Stein’s	   conversion	   to	   Catholicism	   and	   the	   much-­‐debated	  matter	  of	  Heidegger’s	  religiosity.	  Both	  authors	  ultimately	  provided	  the	   basis	   for	   a	   new	   independent	   and	   innovative	   way	   of	   dealing	   with	   the	  question	   of	   being,	   and	   in	   doing	   so	   inevitably	   re-­‐defined	  what	   the	   ‘human	  being’	  actually	  is.	  	  
Considering	   all	   of	   these	   elements,	   Stein’s	   interest	   in	   analysing,	  understanding	   and	   evaluating	   the	   philosophical	   position	   of	   Heidegger,	  should	  come	  as	  no	  surprise.	  	  In	  fact	  the	  impact	  of	  Being	  and	  Time,	  which	  first	  appears	   in	   1927,	   is	   such	   that	   many	   others	   felt	   the	   urge	   to	   comment	   and	  respond	  to	  Heidegger’s	  work.	  However	  the	  fact	  that	  such	  original	  proximity	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of	   intent	   and	   academic	   work	   leads	   these	   authors	   to	   extremely	   distant,	  antithetic	  positions	  deserves	  deeper	  consideration,	  especially	  with	  regards	  to	  their	  work’s	  significance	  and	  their	  contribution	  to	  today’s	  philosophy.	  	  
In	  order	  to	  evaluate	  Stein’s	  work,	  and	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  her	  attempt	  to	  answer	   Heidegger’s	   position	   is	   justified,	   a	   few	   more	   historic	   remarks	   are	  necessary	  to	  highlight	  the	  multifaceted	  political,	  religious	  and	  philosophical	  context	   of	   these	   two	   authors	   and	   to	   determine	   the	   significance	   of	   their	  works.	  	  
	  
2.2.	   Edith	  Stein	  and	  the	  care	  for	  society	  
At	  the	  core	  of	  Stein’s	  work	  is	  the	  interconnection	  between	  philosophy,	  religion,	   ethics	   and	   human	   life.	   She	   researches	   the	   human	   being	   as	   a	  philosophical	  object	  and	  analyses	  it	  from	  different	  points	  of	  view:	  ontology,	  psychology,	   politics	   and	   social	   studies,	   gender,	   education,	   theology,	   value	  theory	  and	  mysticism.	  It	  is	  an	  impressively	  multi-­‐facetted	  and	  inter-­‐related	  body	  of	  work,	  which	  forms	  a	  well-­‐rounded	  theory	  of	  the	  person.	  
An	   important	   element	   of	   Stein’s	   thought	   is	   the	   maturation	   of	   her	  political	  consciousness,	  which	  guided	  her	  throughout	  her	  life	  and	  is	  essential	  to	   understand	   her	  moral	   imperative	   of	   ‘doing	   what	   is	   right’.	   She	   strongly	  believed	   in	   the	   importance	   of	   a	   participative	   role	   of	   the	   individual	   in	   the	  community	  and	  reconciled	  her	  own	  Jewish	  origins	  with	  her	  German	  political	  identity.	  Stein	  grew	  up	  in	  Breslau	  (then	  in	  German	  Silesia,	  today	  the	  city	  of	  Wroclaw	  in	  Poland),	  and	  considered	  herself	  a	   ‘Prussian’	  and	  Jewish	  citizen,	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as	   she	   declared	   in	   her	   curriculum	  vitae	   (ESGA	   1,	   p.	   364).	   Educated	   in	   the	  Jewish	  faith,	  she	  welcomed	  it	  for	  family	  tradition	  and	  general	  interest	  rather	  than	   out	   of	   personal	   belief	   and	   described	   herself	   as	   an	   atheist	   while	   at	  university.	  During	  her	  early	  student	  years	  she	  joined	  a	  left-­‐oriented,	  liberal	  group	   supporting	   the	  Women	   Students’	   Union	   and	   campaigning	   to	   enable	  women	  to	  vote.	  At	  the	  outbreak	  of	  WWI	  she	  chose	  to	  drop	  out	  of	  University	  and	  volunteer	  for	  the	  Red	  Cross,	  putting	  on	  hold	  her	  State	  examinations	   in	  order	   to	   ‘do	   her	   part’	   for	   her	   country.	   The	   love	   for	   her	   country	   and	   her	  concern	   for	   the	   political	   situation	   and	   the	   increasing	   hatred	   for	   Jews	  was	  also	   behind	   Stein’s	   decision	   to	   write	   an	   autobiography	   entitled	   Life	   in	   a	  
Jewish	  Family,	  which	  she	  started	  composing	  in	  September	  1933	  (ESGA	  1).	  
As	  explained	  in	  the	  introduction,	  she	  wanted	  to	  give	  an	  honest	  account	  of	  the	  experience	  of	  the	  Jewish	  population,	  which	  was	  not	  composed	  of	  ‘rich	  capitalist,	  political	  subverts	  and	  impudent	  intellectuals’	  as	  presented	  by	  the	  propaganda	   machine,	   but	   of	   employees,	   neighbours	   and	   schoolmates	   of	  German	   citizens,	   whom	   she	   grew	   to	   know	   in	   time,	   as	   they	   lived	   in	   close	  proximity.	   Stein’s	   condemnation	   of	   the	   totalitarian	   indoctrination,	   which	  also	  emerges	  in	  her	  essay	  on	  the	  state	  published	  in	  1925,	  is	  again	  discussed	  and	  is	  explained	  in	  the	  letter	  she	  wrote	  in	  1933	  to	  Pope	  Pius	  XI,	  where	  she	  begged	  him	  to	  take	  a	  public	  stand	  against	  the	  current	  actions	  of	  the	  German	  government	  and	  she	  also	  predicted	  the	  tragic	  future	  consequences,	  not	  only	  for	  the	  Jews,	  but	  also	  for	  the	  Catholic	  community:	  	  
“the	   responsibility	  must	   fall,	   after	   all,	   on	   those	  who	   brought	   them	   to	  this	   point	   and	   it	   also	   falls	   on	   those	   who	   keep	   silent	   in	   the	   face	   of	   such	  happenings.	   Everything	   that	   happened	   and	   continues	   to	   happen	   on	   a	   daily	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basis	  originates	  with	  a	  government	  that	  calls	  itself	  "Christian”.	  For	  weeks	  not	  only	  Jews	  but	  also	  thousands	  of	  faithful	  Catholics	  in	  Germany,	  and,	  I	  believe,	  all	  over	  the	  world,	  have	  been	  waiting	  and	  hoping	  for	  the	  Church	  of	  Christ	  to	  raise	   its	   voice	   to	   put	   a	   stop	   to	   this	   abuse	   of	   Christ’s	   name.	   Is	   not	   this	  idolization	  of	  race	  and	  governmental	  power	  which	  is	  being	  pounded	  into	  the	  public	  consciousness	  by	  the	  radio’s	  open	  heresy?”25	  	  After	  obtaining	  her	  doctoral	  title	  in	  1916	  with	  a	  dissertation	  dedicated	  to	  the	  analysis	  of	  empathic	  experiences,	  Stein	  worked	  as	  Edmund	  Husserl’s	  private	   assistant	   and	   contributed	   to	   the	   editing	   of	   some	   of	   his	   most	  important	  manuscripts.	  She	  left	  this	  position	  in	  1919	  but	  continued	  to	  work	  on	   strictly	  phenomenological	   subjects	  until	   1921.	   In	   this	  period	   she	  wrote	  four	   phenomenological	   essays,	   her	   doctoral	   thesis	   “On	   the	   Problem	   of	  Empathy”,	  which	  was	  published	  in	  1917,	  and	  the	  essays	  “Sentient	  Causality”	  (1918),	   “Individual	   and	  Community”	   (1919)	   and	   “On	   the	   State”	   (1921),	   all	  written	   in	   the	   final	   stages	   and	   immediately	   after	   her	   collaboration	   with	  Husserl	  in	  Freiburg	  and	  published	  in	  the	  Yearbook	  of	  the	  phenomenological	  circle	   (JPPF)	  between	  1922	  and	  1925.	  The	   two	  essays	   “Sentient	  Causality”	  and	   “Individual	   and	   Community”	   were	   published	   together	   under	   the	   title	  ‘Contributions	   to	   a	   Philosophy	   of	   Psychology	   and	   the	   Humanities’26.	   Both	  contributions	  were	  intended	  to	  be	  Stein’s	  Habilitation	  dissertation	  and	  these	  works	   were	   independent	   attempts	   to	   investigate	   and	   further	   expand	  particular	  topics	  of	  Husserl’s	  phenomenology.	  She	  offers	  her	  views	  as	  both	  a	  corrective	   to,	   and	   an	   argumentation	   of	   Husserl’s	   second	   book,	   Ideen	   zur	  
einer	   reinen	   Phänomenologie	   und	   phänomenologischen	   Philosophie	   (Ideas	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  25	  English	  translation	  of	  the	  original	  German	  letter	  by	  Mrs.	  Suzanne	  Batzdorff,	  niece	  of	  Edith	  Stein,	   Sr.	   Josephine	   Köppel,	   and	   Rev.	   Dr.	   John	   Sullivan,	   published	   for	   the	   Discalced	  Carmelites	  of	  The	  Collected	  Works	  of	  Edith	  Stein.	  	  Online	  source:	  http://www.baltimorecarmel.org/saints/Stein/letter%20to%20pope.html	  26	  Beiträge	   zur	   philosophischen	   Begründung	   der	   Psychologie	   und	   der	   Geisteswissenschaften	  (ESGA	  6)	  appeared	  first	  in	  JPPF	  1922.	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pertaining	   to	   a	   pure	   phenomenology	   and	   to	   a	   phenomenological	  
philosophy)27.	  	  
Stein	   intended	   that	   her	   ideas	   would	   underpin	   a	   range	   of	   additional	  investigations	   connected	   to	   Husserl’s	   on-­‐going	   project.	   In	   particular	   she	  addressed	   issues	   raised	   by	   the	   constitution-­‐analysis:	   how	   the	   sentient	  subject	  relates	  to	  nature,	  the	  world,	  and	  others.	  For	  her	  doctoral	  thesis	  Stein	  chose	  to	  fill	  in	  what	  she	  believed	  to	  be	  a	  gap	  left	  by	  Husserl:	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  empathic	   experience.	   In	   the	   second	   book	   of	   Ideas	   Husserl	   described	   a	  modality	   through	  which	   the	   external	  world	   can	  be	   experienced	  by	   related	  subjects,	   individuals	   who	   are	   interconnected	   in	   a	   participative	   manner.	  Husserl	   calls	   this	   connection	   state	   ‘emphatic	   experience’	   but	   does	   not	  provide	   any	   deeper	   account	   of	  what	   this	   actually	  means.	   The	   term	   caught	  Stein’s	   attention	   and	   she	   decided	   to	   write	   her	   first	   personal	  phenomenological	  work	  about	  it.	  	  
Stein’s	   attraction	   to	   the	   topic	   of	   empathy	   was,	   without	   a	   doubt,	   the	  result	   of	   her	   political	   consciousness	   and	   her	   belief	   that	   personal	  participation	  in	  the	  life	  of	  a	  community	  belongs	  to	  the	  essential	  traits	  of	  the	  human	  person	  and	  should	  characterise	  its	  actions	  and	  its	  moral	  values.	  The	  Polish	   philosopher	   Roman	   Ingarden,	   also	   a	   phenomenologist,	   a	   scholar	   of	  Husserl	   and	   a	   close	   friend	   of	   Stein,	   offers	   an	   account	   of	   the	   theoretical	  directions	  of	  Stein’s	  research.	  
“What	   interested	   her	   most	   was	   the	   question	   of	   defining	   the	  possibility	   of	   mutual	   communication	   between	   human	   beings,	   in	   other	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  27	  Husserl	  1950,	  1952.	  Hereafter	  Ideas.	  	  
	   27	  
words,	   the	   possibility	   of	   establishing	   community.	   This	   was	   more	   than	   a	  theoretical	   concern	   for	   her;	   belonging	   to	   a	   community	   was	   a	   personal	  necessity,	  something	  that	  vitally	  affected	  her	  identity.	  […]	  It’s	  also	  clear,	  as	  I	  learned	   from	   her	   recollection	   that	   she	   needed	   to	   belong	   to	   a	   national	  community	  –	  to	  think	  of	  herself	  as	  a	  member	  of	  a	  particular	  country.	  I	  still	  remember	   how	   she	   went	   through	   the	   entire	   war	   with	   the	   attitude	   of	  someone	   always	   on	   the	   verge	   of	   beginning	   a	   one-­‐man	   battle.	   She	   was	  determined	   to	   serve;	   there	  was	  no	  question	  about	   it.	  During	   the	   time	  she	  worked	   as	   Husserl’s	   graduate	   assistant,	   she	   wrote	   me	   letter	   after	   letter	  asking	  whether	  she	  had	  the	  right	  to	  waste	  her	  time	  on	  philosophy	  and	  other	  such	  nonsense	  when	   there	  were	  people	  out	   there	  dying	  whom	  we	  should	  be	  helping.	  Thus,	  we	  can	  see	   that	   it	  was	  essential	   to	  her	  personally	   that	  a	  community	   of	   this	   sort	   should	   exist,	   and	   that	   what	   she	   was	   doing	   was	  examining	  the	  theoretical	  foundation	  necessary	  for	  such	  community.	  Later	  on,	   in	   “The	   Individual	   and	   the	   Community”,	   she	   considered	   the	   various	  ways	   that	   relationships	   can	   be	   established	   between	   individuals,	   and	   here	  again	   empathy	   appears	   precisely	   as	   one	   of	   these	   possibilities.	   All	   these	  issues	  were	  closely	  interrelated	  in	  her	  thinking.”	  (Ingarden,	  1979,	  p.	  472).	  	  	  In	   the	   following	   years	   Stein	   concentrated	   on	   the	   phenomenological	  constitution	  of	  the	  community,	  a	  topic	  that	  was	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  Göttingen	  philosophical	   circle,	   and	   on	   its	   psychological	   foundation.	   However	   at	   the	  heart	  of	  Stein’s	  body	  of	  work	  is	  the	  constitution	  of	  the	  human	  person:	  all	  her	  phenomenological	  analysis	  and	  writings	  on	  society,	  education,	  anthropology	  and	   gender	   prepared	   the	   basis	   for	   Stein’s	   mature	   philosophy	   and	   later	  ontological	   theory	  of	   the	  person,	  which	   is	   central	   for	   the	   comparison	  with	  Heidegger	  in	  this	  thesis.	  In	  fact,	  her	  focus	  on	  the	  social	  and	  psychological	  life	  of	   the	   human	   subject,	   in	   her	   essays	   written	   between	   1917	   and	   1921,	  demonstrates	  Stein’s	  innovative	  take	  on	  phenomenology.	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2.3. Phenomenology	  and	  the	  human	  person	  
In	   developing	   Husserl’s	   theories	   further,	   Stein	   addresses	   many	  anthropological	  and	  social	  issues	  of	  her	  time,	  in	  line	  with	  other	  members	  of	  the	   philosophical	   circle	   who	   focused	   on	   the	   phenomenology	   of	   religious	  experience,	  of	  moral	  values	  and	  of	  emotions.	  Her	  research	  progresses	  from	  phenomenological	   analysis	   of	   the	   different	   layers	   of	   the	   human	   person	  towards	   a	   phenomenological	   ontology	  of	   the	  person.	  This	   progression	   can	  be	   rightly	   described	   as	   an	   independent	   and	   original	   use	   of	   Husserl’s	  phenomenology,	   which	   Stein	   applies	   in	   a	   personal	   way.	   	   In	   tracing	   the	  connection	   from	   Stein’s	   first	   phenomenological	   writing	   on	   empathy	   to	  
Philosophy	  of	  Psychology	  and	  the	  Humanities,	   Lebech	   identified	  an	  early	  set	  of	   works	   (the	   three	   tractates	   on	   sentient	   causality,	   individual	   and	  community	   and	   the	   state),	   which	   complete	   the	   phenomenological	  foundation	  and	  analyse	   the	  constitution	  of	   the	  human	  being	   in	   its	   sentient	  (psyche)	   and	   spiritual	   (mind)	   parts	   (Lebech,	   2004).	   The	   second	   stage	   is	  represented	  by	  the	  two	  works	  The	  Structure	  of	  the	  Human	  Person	  and	  What	  
is	   the	  Human	  Being?	   which	   Stein	   composed	   in	   1932-­‐32	   for	   her	   courses	   in	  philosophical	   anthropology	   and	   theology	   at	   the	   academy	   in	   Münster.	   The	  final	   stage,	   which	   Stein	   called	   her	   spiritual	   testament,	   is	   the	   ontological	  study	  Finite	  and	  Eternal	  Being,	  which	  is	  largely	  based	  on	  the	  analysis	  of	  her	  previous	   works	   as	   well	   as	   on	   Stein’s	   study	   of	   Scholasticism.	   However,	  Lebech	  reminds	  us	  that:	  	  
“It	  was	   the	   importance	  of	   empathy	   that	  made	  her	   stand	   in	  a	   certain	  contrast	   with	   Husserl,	   and	   it	   was	   also	   empathy	   that	   enabled	   her	   to	   use	  Scheler’s	   insight’s	   concerning	   morality	   more	   constructively	   than	   Husserl	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did.	   The	   topics	   she	   discussed	   –	   the	   foundation	   of	   psychology	   and	   the	  humanities	   –	   required	   this	   sensitivity	   to	   intersubjectivity	   and	   its	   moral	  dimension,	  as	  both	  of	  these	  sciences	  are	  concerned	  with	  the	  individual	  as	  a	  producer	  of	  meaning	  and	  as	  a	  member	  of	  communities.”(Lebech,	  2004,	  p.	  2)	  	   Phenomenology	  teaches	  that	  the	  world	  around	  us	  can	  be	  grasped	  and	  understood	  by	  the	  direct	  experience	  of	  foreign	  objects	  or	  ‘phenomena’.	  After	  a	   long	   tradition	   of	   cognitive	   philosophy	   and	   Kantian	   Idealism,	   which	   was	  centred	   on	   the	   ethics	   of	   ‘how’	   the	   subject	   experiences	   the	   world	   and	   the	  nature	  of	  mind	  and	  consciousness,	  Husserl’s	  method	  brings	  attention	  back	  to	   the	   object	   itself,	   which	   can	   be	   accessed	   (in	   fact	   ‘encountered’)	   in	   a	  scientific	   way.	   Phenomena	   (objects	   of	   experience)	   can	   be	   of	   all	   kinds:	  physical	  things,	  emotions,	  feelings,	  judgments,	  values,	  the	  self	  and,	  of	  course,	  other	  individuals.	  The	  essence	  of	  phenomena	  is	  what	  is	  given	  to	  us	  in	  the	  act	  of	   experience	   and	   it	   is	   disclosed,	   it	   reveals	   itself	   to	   us,	   after	   an	   analytic	  process,	   a	   ‘reduction’,	   which	   consists	   of	   ‘bracketing’	   the	   existence	   of	   the	  physical	  world.	  In	  the	  process	  of	  experience	  both	  the	  subject	  and	  the	  object	  can	   be	   doubted,	   their	   existence	   questioned	   and	   any	   other	   preconceptions	  that	   we	   receive	   from	   any	   other	   sources	   outside	   of	   the	   direct	   immediate	  experience	   of	   the	   object	   is	   considered	   to	   be	   irrelevant.	   The	   only	   elements	  that	  cannot	  be	  questioned	  are	  the	  conscious	  activities	  of	  the	  first	  person	  (the	  ‘pure	  I’)	  and	  the	  essence	  of	  the	  act	  of	  experience	  itself.	  	  
The	   understanding	   of	   how	   the	   cognitive	   ‘I’,	   the	   human	   being,	  encounters	   others	   fascinated	   Stein,	   and	   she	   aimed	   to	   investigate	   how	   the	  experience	  of	  others	  enrich	  and	  complete	   the	  subject	   in	  return:	   I	  am	  given	  (by	  the	  other)	  to	  myself	  as	  “a	  psychological	   individual	   in	  the	  full	  sense.	  My	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awareness	  of	  myself	  which	  is	  integral	  to	  my	  being	  and	  my	  being	  in	  the	  world	  is	   constituted	   through	   interactions	   with	   others,	   particularly	   acts	   of	  reiterated	   empathy”	   (ESGA	   5,	   p.	   58).	   In	   doing	   so,	   Stein	   applied	   the	  phenomenological	   method	   in	   an	   original	   way	   in	   a	   field	   that	   traditionally	  belonged	  to	  psychology	  and	  social	  sciences,	  welcoming	  the	  contributions	  of	  philosophical	   anthropology	   (particularly	   the	   phenomenological	  understanding	   of	   Max	   Scheler,	   as	   I	   will	   later	   highlight).	   In	   her	   further	  writings	   she	   focuses	   on	   the	   interconnections	   between	   the	   individual,	  intellectual,	  sensory	  and	  physical	  levels	  of	  the	  person.	  	  
Finite	   and	   Eternal	   Being	   completes	   a	   series	   of	   work	   that,	   if	   viewed	  together,	   build	   a	   concentric	   analysis	   from	   the	   ‘outer’	   elements	   that	  constitute	   the	   human	   being	   (its	   place	   in	   the	   community,	   the	   body	   and	   its	  psychophysical	   reactions)	   towards	   the	   core	   of	   the	   human	   being,	   the	  significance	  of	   the	  human	   soul,	   the	   spiritual	   strength	   (lifeforce/lifepower),	  the	   source	   of	   faith	   and	   finally	   the	   ineffable	   ‘depth’	   of	   the	   human	   person.	  Stein’s	   last	   book	   The	   Science	   of	   the	   Cross	   (Kreuzwissenschaft,	   ESGA	   18),	  which	  she	  writes	  between	  1941	  and	  1942	  and	  which	  is	  left	  incomplete,	  is	  a	  study	  of	   the	   life	  and	  doctrine	  of	  a	  Carmelitan	  Saint,	   the	  Mystical	  Doctor	  St.	  John	  of	  the	  Cross.	  	  
The	  extent	  of	  Stein’s	  contribution	  to	  the	  phenomenological	  movement	  of	  her	  time	  in	  general,	  and	  to	  the	  writing	  of	  Edmund’s	  Husserl	  in	  particular,	  has	  been	  widely	  discussed.	  It	  is	  not	  the	  aim	  of	  this	  work	  to	  give	  an	  account	  of	  Stein’s	   contributions	   to	   phenomenology,	   however	   it	   will	   suffice	   here	   to	  remark	  on	  how	  she	  made	  Husserl’s	  work	  accessible	  by	  filling	  in	  the	  gaps	  in	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his	   theories	   with	   personal	   contributions	   and	   by	   meticulously	   editing	   his	  manuscripts.	  	  
Stein	   took	  on	   the	  enormous	   task	  of	  organising	  Husserl’s	  manuscripts	  with	   great	   professionalism	   and	   enthusiasm	   for	   what	   she	   understood	   as	   a	  collaborative	   enterprise,	   in	   the	   same	  way	   as	   intended	  by	  Adolf	  Reinach	   in	  Göttingen.	  She	  possessed	  a	  sound	  knowledge	  of	  the	  methodology	  and	  of	  the	  way	  Husserl	  worked,	  as	  she	  had	  discussed	  philosophical	  problems	  with	  him	  in	   private	   discussions	   and	   public	   seminars	   for	   years.	   Husserl’s	  phenomenology	  was	   constantly	   debated	   by	   him	   and	   his	   circle	   of	   scholars,	  and	  some	  of	  his	  more	  elaborate	  theories	  were	  to	  be	  developed	  and	  refined	  during	   such	   discussions:	   in	   a	   short	   article	  which	   appeared	   in	   1962	   in	   the	  
Journal	   of	   Philosophy	   and	   Phenomenological	   Research,	   Roman	   Ingarden	  defended	  her	  legacy	  from	  the	  accusation	  of	  altering	  and	  deforming	  Husserl’s	  thought	   (advanced	   by	   P.	   M.	   Schultz	   in	   Revue	   Philosophique	   1960):	   “she	  studied	   under	   Husserl	   for	   many	   years,	   read	   a	   great	   number	   of	   his	  manuscripts,	  and	  discusses	  scientific	  subjects	  with	  him	  hundreds	  of	  times	  in	  private	  conversations.	   It	   is	  well	  known	  to	  me,	  that	  during	  such	  discussions	  with	   his	   direct	   disciples	   Husserl	   used	   to	   develop	   some	   of	   his	   best	   and	  deepest	   thoughts.	  Moreover,	   his	   phenomenology	  was	   constantly	   discussed	  at	   that	   time	   in	   the	  circles	  of	  young	  phenomenologists.”	   (Ingarden,	  1962,	  p.	  156).	  	  
Stein’s	  work	  on	  the	  second	  book	  of	  Husserl’s	  Ideas,	  far	  from	  being	  only	  a	  translation	  and	  adaptation	  of	  shorthand	  notes,	  consisted	  of	  rewriting	  and	  completing	   entire	   sections.	   In	   particular	   she	   documented	   and	   retraced	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passages	   on	   intersubjectivity	   in	   the	   second	   and	   third	   book	   of	   Ideas28	  and	  composed	  Appendix	  XII	  which	  is	  dedicated	  to	  the	  theme	  of	  person,	  spirit	  and	  soul.	  This	  fact	  is	  very	  important	  if	  we	  attempt	  to	  reconstruct	  the	  beginning	  of	   Stein’s	   independent	   work	   and	   –	   more	   importantly	   –	   her	   independent	  research.	   As	   Ingarden,	  who	  was	  more	   than	   familiar	  with	  Husserl’s	  way	   of	  working,	   having	   studied	  with	   him	   in	   Göttingen	   and	   Freiburg,	   described	   in	  the	   previously	   cited	   article,	   her	   position	   as	   Husserl’s	   private	   assistant	  authorised	  her	  to	  introduce	  editorial	  changes	  and	  section	  titles	  and	  compose	  bridge	   paragraphs	   to	   create	   an	   organic	   text	   from	   multiple	   fragments.	  Furthermore,	   the	   writings	   required	   much	   work	   in	   order	   to	   be	   made	  readable,	  and	  since	  it	  was	  almost	  impossible	  to	  convince	  Husserl	  to	  review	  old	   manuscripts,	   because	   he	   was	   quickly	   bored	   of	   old	   material	   and	  constantly	  moving	  towards	  new	  projects,	  Stein	  had	  to	  elaborate	  the	  content	  from	   various	   fragments	   and	   introduce	   explanatory	   sections	   or	   changes	   to	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  text.	  Husserl’s	  later	  assistants,	  Landgrebe	  and	  Fink,	  did	  the	   same:	   the	   second	  book	  of	   Ideas	  was	   finally	  published	  posthumously	   in	  1952,	   however,	   in	   this	   case	   it	   is	   known	   that	   Husserl	   did	   review	   the	   final	  draft.	  	  
In	  the	  same	  article	  Ingarden	  explained	  how	  he	  had	  the	  chance	  to	  view	  Husserl’s	   manuscript	   of	   the	   lectures	   on	   Internal	   Consciousness	   of	   Time	   in	  1927	   (Husserl,	   1928),	  which	  had	  been	   transcribed	  by	  Edith	   Stein	   and	  had	  been	   left	  untouched	  since,	   and	  how	  he	  was	  offered	   the	   task	   to	   review	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  28	  See	  XII:	   I)	  Die	  Person	  –	  der	  Geist	  und	  sein	  seelisher	  Untergrund;	   II)	  Subjektivität	  als	  Seele	  
und	  als	  Geist	  in	  Naturwissenschaftlicher	  und	  in	  Geisteswissenschaftlicher	  Einstellung”	  in	  Ideas	  
II.	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elaborate	  on	  it	  for	  a	  future	  publication,	  a	  task	  he	  ultimately	  refused.	  He	  also	  reports	  how	  shortly	  after	  he	  was	  offered	  this	  task,	  Heidegger	  became	  aware	  of	   the	   existence	   of	   the	   manuscript	   and	   convinced	   Husserl	   to	   publish	   it,	  noting	  how	  the	  final	  version	  of	  it	  presented	  minimal	  changes	  from	  the	  copy	  transcribed	  by	  Stein.	  	  
Husserl	  trusted	  Stein	  with	  his	  writings	  because	  he	  knew	  her	  to	  be	  not	  only	  fully	  qualified	  to	  act	  on	  his	  manuscripts	  but	  also	  capable	  of	  independent	  phenomenological	   research;	   he	   had	   also	   previously	   commented	   on	   how	  parts	   of	   Stein’s	   doctoral	   thesis	   on	   empathy	   anticipated	   some	   of	   his	   own	  theories	  from	  the	  second	  book	  of	  Ideas	  II	  (ESGA	  1,	  p.	  340).	  Since	  Stein	  had	  a	  chance	  to	  view	  the	  manuscript	  of	  Ideas	  II	  only	  after	  presenting	  her	  thesis;	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  her	  work	  on	  empathy	  is	  the	  result	  of	  personal	  research.	  When	  compared	   with	   Husserl’s	   work	   it	   is	   evident	   that	   Stein	   was	   moving	   on	   a	  parallel	   route,	   particularly	   if	  we	   compare	   their	   analysis	   of	   constitution.	   In	  the	  foreword	  of	  Stein’s	  tractate	  on	  ‘Sentient	  Causality’	  Stein	  explained:	  	  
“I’ve	   been	   helping	   Professor	   Husserl	   for	   nearly	   two	   years	   with	   the	  preparation	  of	  large	  publications.	  During	  this	  time,	  all	  his	  manuscripts	  from	  the	  last	  ten	  years	  have	  been	  at	  my	  disposal	  (among	  them	  those	  that	  have	  to	  do	  with	  the	  topic	  of	  psychology	  and	  the	  humanities	  as	  well).	  It	  goes	  without	  saying	   that	   important	   influences	  on	  my	  work	  came	  out	  of	   the	   stimulation	  that	  I	  was	  receiving	  in	  this	  way	  and	  in	  many	  conversations.	  Today	  I	  myself	  no	   longer	   am	  able	   to	   keep	   track	   of	   the	   extent	   to	  which	   this	   has	   been	   the	  case.”(Stein	  and	  Sawicki,	  2000,	  p.	  2)	  	   Stein’s	   interest	   focused	   on	   the	   analysis	   of	   how	   a	   foreign	   subject	  constitutes	   itself	   as	   ‘other’	   and	  how	   “I”	   can	  participate	   in	   the	   feeling	   (mit-­‐
fuhlen)	   and	   share/comprehend	   the	   experience	   of	   another	   subject,	   who	   is	  given	  to	  me	  as	  a	  whole	  along	  with	  the	  experience,	  which	  is	  recognised	  as	  an	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experience	   of	   another	   I.	   When	   Husserl	   describes	   the	   inter-­‐subjective	  experience	  of	  the	  Ego	  in	  the	  surrounding	  world	  and	  he	  defines	  ‘motivation’	  as	   the	   basic	   law	   that	   regulates	   spiritual	   life,	   he	   describes	   “webs	   of	  motivation”	  running	  through	  “the	  unitary	   intentionality	   in	  which	  a	   thing	   is	  given	   to	   me	   in	   one	   stroke”	   (Ideas	   II	  	   §56,	   p.	   236).	   In	   a	   similar	   way	   Stein	  defines	   the	   description	   of	   self-­‐awareness	   and	   the	   givenness	   of	   the	   other	  subject	   as	   previously	   seen	   in	   the	   analysis	   of	   empathy:	   the	   fact	   that	   I	   am	  given	  by	  the	  other	  to	  myself.	  	  
	   Husserl’s	   account	   of	   how	   the	   world	   constitutes	   itself	   for	   the	   ‘I’	  through	  individual	  streams	  of	  consciousness	  and	  through	  empathy	  seems	  to	  exclude	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	  solipsistic	  I,	  much	  like	  the	  Kantian	  ‘ego’.	  In	  Ideas	  
II	  Husserl	  makes	  it	  extremely	  clear	  that	  it	  is	  only	  in	  the	  encounter	  with	  the	  psychic	  life	  and	  the	  bodies	  of	  others	  that	  the	  subject	  can	  apprehend	  its	  own	  subjectivity.	   However	   he	   later	   takes	   what	   appears	   to	   be	   a	   turn	   to	   a	  transcendental	  idealism	  by	  concluding	  that	  the	  constitution	  of	  the	  world	  can	  be	   already	   achieved	   on	   the	   level	   of	   pure	   (transcendental)	   consciousness,	  which	  excludes	   the	   aspect	  of	   the	  bodily	   life	  of	   the	   I	   and	   the	  natural	  world	  around	  it.	  	  	  
Like	  many	  scholars,	   Stein	   too	  struggles	  with	   this	  direction,	   especially	  because	  she	  has	  doubts	  regarding	   the	  relationship	  between	  a	  real	  physical	  body	   (the	   subject	   experiences	   its	   I	   as	   embodied)	   and	   a	   fully	   constituted	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world	   of	   nature,	   therefore	   she	   sets	   up	   to	   demonstrate	   how	   personal	  embodiment	  is	  phenomenologically	  indispensable29.	  	  
Stein’s	  analysis	  on	  empathy	  had	  revealed	  a	  human	  being	  that	  is	  deeply	  rooted	  in	  the	  world,	  and	  that	  what	  it	  feels,	  encounters,	  and	  perceives	  has	  a	  bodily	   aspect	   (the	   redness	   of	   the	   face	   that	   communicated	   my	  embarrassment,	   the	   look	  of	   the	  other	  person	  that	  answers	  to	  mine).	  She	   is	  worried	  that	  Husserl’s	   focus	  on	  how	  the	  world	  constitutes	   itself	   for	  a	  pure	  
transcendental	  consciousness,	  will	   lead	  to	  a	  new	  Idealism	  (ESGA	  4,	  p.	  46).	  A	  dualism	   between	   nature	   -­‐	   spirit,	   in	   this	   case	   between	   physical	   body	   -­‐	  embodied	   consciousness30.	   In	   a	   letter	   to	   her	   friend	   and	   college	   Roman	  Ingarden,	  she	  clearly	  confessed	  how,	  after	  long	  consideration,	  she	  had	  come	  to	  a	  breakthrough	  on	  the	  concept	  of	   ‘constitution’,	  which	  she	  can	  only	  fully	  understand	   in	   a	   break	   with	   (Husserl’s)	   idealism:	   “An	   absolutely	   existing	  physical	  nature	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  a	  distinctly	  structured	  subjectivity	  on	  the	  other,	   seem	   to	   me	   to	   be	   prerequisites	   before	   an	   intuitive	   nature	   can	  constitute	  itself.	  I	  haven’t	  yet	  found	  the	  courage	  to	  confess	  this	  heresy	  to	  the	  
Meister	   [this	   was	   the	   affectionate	   name	   that	   scholars	   used	   to	   refer	   to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  29	  See	  the	  analysis	  of	  Sawicki	  in	  Body,	  Text,	  and	  Science:	  the	  literacy	  of	  investigative	  practices	  
and	  the	  phenomenology	  of	  Edith	  Stein,	  1997.	  However	   the	   fact	   that	   I	  have	  a	  body	  does	  not	  comes	   before	   constitution,	   as	   it	   is	   well	   explained	   by	   Lebech	   in	   her	   article	   Stein’s	  
Phenomenology	   of	   the	   Body:	   The	   constitution	   of	   the	   human	   being	   between	   description	   of	  
experience	  and	   social	   construction:	   “Stein	   does	   not	   think	   that	   the	   body	   is	   the	   principle	   of	  individuation	  of	  the	  I	  (as	  does	  for	  example	  Aquinas,	  whom	  she	  later	  will	  criticise	  for	  this),	  nor	  that	  it	  is	  „before‟	  constitution	  as	  Marianne	  Sawicki	  claims	  it	  is	  in	  her	  otherwise	  brilliant	  analysis	  of	  Stein’s	  editorial	  work	  on	  Ideas	  II	  (Body,	  Text	  and	  Science).	  The	  latter	  would	  have	  compromised	  Stein’s	  adherence	  to	  the	  phenomenological	  method.	  The	  body	  is	  constituted,	  for	  Stein,	  because	  it	  is	  the	  best	  way	  of	  making	  sense	  of	  what	  we	  in	  fact	  experience,	  but	  this	  is	  a	  matter	  of	  fact,	  not	  of	  necessity.	  Also,	  the	  body	  could	  not	  be	  prior	  to	  constitution	  as	  nothing	  can	  be,	  given	  that	  constitution	  is	  identification”.	  (Lebech,	  2008,	  p.	  18).	  30	  Stein	   reports	   how	  many	   of	  Husserl	   former	   students	   couldn’t	   follow	  him	   in	   this	   alleged	  ‘return	  to	  Kant’	  which	  seemed	  to	  nullify	  Husserl’s	  greatest	  merit:	  the	  centrality	  of	  the	  object.	  (Die	  Weltanschauliche	  Bedeutung	  der	  Phänomenologie,	  ESW	  IV,	  p.	  11).	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Husserl]”	  (Letter	  to	  Ingarden	  from	  3	  February	  1917,	  in	  ESGA	  4,	  p.	  40).	  A	  few	  months	   after	   writing	   these	   words,	   Stein	   left	   her	   position	   with	   Husserl	   to	  pursue	  her	  own	  research.	  	  	  
At	  this	  point	  we	  can	  make	  three	  important	  observations:	  
-­‐	   Although	   enormously	   indebted	   to	   Husserl’s	   method	   and	   early	  research	  topics,	  Stein’s	  phenomenology	  has	  a	  strong	  identity	  already	  in	  this	  early	   phase.	   Stein’s	   main	   interest	   is	   the	   analysis	   of	   the	   person	   and	   of	  personal	  experience;	  ‘how’	  we	  meet	  others	  and	  how	  the	  experience	  of	  others	  and	  of	  the	  world	  ‘enriches’	  and	  completes	  my	  understanding	  of	  myself.	  The	  focus	  is	  always	  on	  the	  structure	  and	  the	  complexity	  of	  the	  person,	  which	  is	  never	  fully	  represented	  by	  the	  notion	  of	  pure	  consciousness.	  	  
-­‐	   To	  progress	   in	   this	   research	  direction	  she	  analysed	   the	  structure	  of	  community,	   society	   and	   psychological	   experiences	   in	   detail:	   her	   personal	  interest	  and	  engagement	  in	  the	  political	  life	  of	  Germany	  and	  her	  quest	  for	  a	  professional	   affirmation	   behind	   the	   social	   and	   political	   limitations	   of	   her	  time	   act	   as	   a	   motivational	   force,	   while	   she	   maintains	   an	   intellectual	   and	  scientific	  impartiality	  in	  her	  writings.	  	  	  
-­‐	   Husserl’s	   phenomenology	   proved	   to	   be	   lacking	   a	   reasonable	  description	   of	   the	   important	   role	   played	   by	   the	   physical	   body,	   which	   is	  central	  to	  Stein’s	  understanding	  of	  the	  human	  person.	  These	  doubts	  already	  emerged	  in	  1917-­‐18	  with	  Stein’s	  disagreement	  on	  the	  topic	  of	  ‘constitution’.	  	  
Stein	  understands	  philosophical	  research	  as	  a	  collective	  enterprise	  and	  she	  makes	   use	   of	   different	   strands	   of	   phenomenology	   (Scheler’s	   philosophical	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anthropology	   and	   Conrad-­‐Martius	   real-­‐ontology	   in	   particular) 31 	  in	   an	  attempt	   to	   find	   a	   solution	   to	   this	   problem.	   In	   the	   same	   way	   she	   will	  incorporate	  Aquinas’s	  thought	  and	  existential	  insights	  into	  her	  later	  work.	  
Although	   it	   is	   generally	   established	   that	   Stein's	  mature	  philosophical	  work	  was	  completed	  after	  her	  religious	  conversion	  and	  her	  admission	  to	  the	  Discalced	   Carmelites	   where	   she	   spent	   her	   later	   life,	   her	   contribution	   to	  phenomenology	  is	  still	  often	  overlooked.	  All	  four	  attempts	  made	  by	  Stein	  to	  obtain	  a	  Habilitation	  and	  become	  a	  professor	   failed;	   for	  reasons	  connected	  to	  her	  gender,	  to	  her	  race	  and	  to	  a	  lack	  of	  support	  from	  her	  former	  teacher.	  As	  Sawicki	  suggests,	   in	   the	  difficult	  scenario	  of	  post-­‐war	  Germany,	  with	  all	  forms	   of	   social,	   intellectual	   and	   cultural	   life	   confused	   and	   affected	   by	  personal	  and	  political	  belief,	  Stein	  would	  have	  probably	  wanted	  to	  continue	  her	  research	  into	  “the	  kinds	  of	  social	  formations	  that	  would	  best	  provide	  for	  the	   welfare	   and	   flourishing	   of	   human	   beings”,	   guided	   by	   her	   sense	   of	  participation	   and	   her	   aspirations	   for	   a	   better	   society	   and	   higher	   moral	  values:	   “It’s	   hard	   to	   keep	   from	   asking:	   if	   gender	   prejudice	   had	   not	   denied	  Stein	  an	  academic	  career,	  and	  if	  a	  university	  appointment	  had	  enabled	  her	  to	  continue	   her	   research	   and	   publishing,	   would	   her	   voice	   not	   have	   offered	  answers	   to	   these	   questions	   very	   different	   from	   the	   ones	   that	   National	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  31 	  Stein	   had	   read	   with	   great	   interest	   Scheler’s	   Zur	   Phänomenologie	   und	   Theorie	   der	  
Sympathiegefühle	   und	   von	   Liebe	   und	   Hass	   from	   1913.	   In	   her	   work	   on	   empathy	   she	   also	  quoted	  Scheler’s	  Der	  Formalismus	  in	  der	  Ethik	  und	  die	  materiale	  Wertethik	  (Scheler,	  1913).	  Hedwig	   Conrad-­‐Martius	   was	   a	   close	   personal	   friend	   and	   Stein’s	   godmother	   from	   her	  baptism	   in	  1922:	   the	   two	  phenomenologists	  often	   shared	  notes	  and	  drafts	  of	   their	  works	  and	   reviewed	   each	   other’s	  writings.	   Stein	  was	   particularly	   impressed	   by	   Conrad-­‐Martius’	  
Zur	   Ontologie	   und	   Erscheinungslehre	   der	   realen	   Außenwelt.	   Verbunden	   mit	   einer	   Kritik	  
positivistischer	   Theorien,	   published	   in	   the	   Yearbook	   in	   1916.	   Later	   Stein	   would	   quote	  Conrad-­‐Martius’s	  Realontologie	   as	   a	   source	   for	   her	   ontological	   investigation	   in	  Finite	  and	  
Eternal	  Being.	  	  
	   38	  
Socialism	  gave?	  What	   if	  Husserl's	   successor	  had	  been	  she,	  not	  Heidegger?”	  (Sawicki,	  1998).32	  
	  
2.4. From	  Psychology	  to	  Ontology	  	  	  
While	   the	   phenomenological	   language	   speaks	   of	   ‘consciousness’	   and	  the	   ‘pure’	   undetermined	   I,	   Stein	   always	   highlights	   the	   importance	   of	   the	  ‘person’.	  She	   identifies	  herself	  as	  a	  realist	  phenomenologist,	  unable	  to	   fully	  follow	   Husserl	   on	   his	   path	   to	   the	   study	   of	   transcendental	   pure	  consciousness.	  	  
After	   her	   early	   studies	   in	   Breslau	   characterized	   by	   an	   interest	   in	  German,	  history	  and	  psychology,	  Stein	  was	   impressed	  by	  reading	  Husserl’s	  
Logical	   Investigations	   (published	   in	   1900-­‐01)	   and	   decided	   impulsively	   to	  leave	  her	  hometown	  and	  move	  to	  Göttingen,	  to	  be	  able	  to	  study	  with	  Husserl	  himself.	   There	   are	   many	   elements	   behind	   this	   decision	   that	   must	   be	  considered:	  the	  first	  is	  a	  personal	  need	  to	  search	  for	  truth,	  which	  is	  already	  evident	   in	   the	   young	   Stein	   who	   distinguished	   herself	   very	   early	   by	   her	  intellectual	  abilities	  and	  strong	  academic	  aspirations.	  In	  the	  light	  of	  her	  later	  life	  it	  is	  dramatically	  ironic	  that	  she	  could	  never	  obtain	  the	  professorship	  to	  which	  she	  aspired.	  The	  second,	  most	  important	  element	  behind	  this	  decision	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32	  Sawicki	   poses	   these	   questions	   at	   the	   end	   of	   the	   lecture	   Personal	   Connections:	   The	  
Phenomenology	  of	  Edith	  Stein	  delivered	  at	  St.	  John’s	  University	  in	  New	  York	  on	  October	  15,	  1998,	   and	   repeated	   at	   the	   Carmelite	   Monastery	   in	   Baltimore	   on	   November	   13,	   1998	  (Sawicki,	   2004).	   Quoted	   from	   online	   version:	  http://library.nd.edu/colldev/subject_home_pages/catholic/personal_connections.shtml	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is	  the	  discovery	  that	  psychology	  could	  not	  provide	  the	  scientific	  foundation	  and	   the	   ultimate	   clarification	   that	   she	   was	   searching	   for.	   Stein	   studied	   in	  Breslau	  with	  William	  Stern,	  who	  was	  working	  on	  ‘personalistic’	  psychology	  and	  refining	  his	  later	  theory	  of	  human	  individuality	  and	  intelligence.	  These	  are	   the	   years	   during	   which	   Sigmund	   Freud	   wrote	   his	   major	   works	   on	  psychoanalysis	  and	  the	  topic	  of	  human	  consciousness	  was	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  philosophical	  debate:	  	  
“She	  wanted	  to	  understand	  how	  the	  mind	  works,	  what	  troubles	  afflict	  the	  heart,	  and	  how	  to	  heal	  the	  soul.	  Remember,	  now,	  that	  the	  year	  is	  1911,	  Edith	  is	  19,	  and	  the	  sciences	  undergirding	  the	  psychiatry	  and	  psychology	  of	  today	  have	  not	  yet	  been	  born.	  Over	   in	  Vienna,	   Sigmund	  Freud	   is	  puzzling	  over	   those	  neurotic	   lady	  patients,	  while	  on	   the	  Susquehanna,	  a	  7-­‐year-­‐old	  named	   B.F.	   Skinner	   is	   trying	   in	   vain	   to	   train	   chipmunks.	   The	   term	  "psychology"	   still	   means	   a	   branch	   of	   philosophy.	   In	   other	   words,	  psychoanalysis,	   behaviourism,	   and	   the	   other	   foundational	   theories	   of	  psychology,	  as	  we	  know	  it,	  are	  just	  taking	  shape.	  University	  professors	  and	  their	   students	   are	   devising	   the	   first	   controlled	   laboratory	   experiments	   to	  investigate	   the	  processes	   of	   sensory	  perception.	  They	   are	   trying	   to	   figure	  out,	   if	   you	   will,	   how	   to	   think	   about	   thinking,	   how	   to	   do	   so	   reliably,	  productively,	  and	  scientifically.	  Some	  are	  guided	  in	  this	  endeavor,	  as	  Edith	  discovers,	  by	  a	  two-­‐volume	  work	  called	  Logical	  Investigations,	  published	  in	  1900-­‐01	  by	  Edmund	  Husserl.	  So	  Edith	  Stein,	  age	  21,	  decides	  to	  transfer	  to	  the	  University	  of	  Göttingen	  to	  study	  with	  Husserl	  and	  become	  initiated	  into	  the	  new	  philosophy	  of	  science	  called	  "phenomenology."	  (Sawicki,	  2004)33	  	  Stein	   describes	   psychology	   as	   a	   science	   still	   in	   its	   ‘infant’	   state	   and	  lacking	   a	   strong	   scientific	   method:	   “a	   ‘natural’	   or	   ‘dogmatic’	   science,	   a	  theoretical	  exploration	  of	   certain	  objects	   that	  we	  meet	  up	  with	  within	   ‘the	  world’	  […]	  In	  this	  world,	  alongside	  material	  things	  and	  living	  organisms,	  we	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33	  Quoted	  from	  Personal	  Connections:	  The	  Phenomenology	  of	  Edith	  Stein,	  1998	  (see	  previous	  footnote).	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also	  encounter	  human	  beings	  and	  beasts	  who,	  apart	  from	  what	  they	  have	  in	  common	   with	   things	   and	   with	   mere	   organisms,	   manifest	   certain	  peculiarities	   that	   they	   alone	   display.	   The	   totality	   of	   those	   peculiarities	   is	  what	  we	  call	  sentience,	  and	  its	  exploration	  is	  the	  task	  of	  psychology”	  (Stein	  and	   Sawicki,	   2000,	   p.	   6-­‐7).	   Psychology	   is	   therefore	   for	   Stein	   an	   ingenuous	  science	   that	   doesn’t	   engage	   in	   the	   actual	   consideration	   of	   the	   essential	  constitution	   of	   its	   objects.	   Each	   object	   in	   the	   world	   presents	   itself	  (‘phenomenon’	  from	  the	  Greek	  verb	  phainomai,	  ‘I	  appear,	  I	  reveal	  myself’)	  in	  all	  its	  ‘fullness	  and	  concretion’	  to	  a	  subject’s	  consciousness	  corresponding	  to	  it.	  The	  method	  to	  analyse	  ‘the	  constitution	  of	  objects	  in	  consciousness’	  was	  what	  Husserl	  –	   then	  a	  young	  professor	  at	   the	  University	  of	  Göttingen,	  who	  was	  starting	  to	  attract	  much	  attention	  because	  of	  his	  revolutionary	  theories	  -­‐	   claimed	   to	   have	   discovered:	   a	   new	   philosophical	   approach,	   a	   solid	  foundation	   to	   all	   knowledge,	   a	   compromise	   between	   the	   positive-­‐naturalistic	  method	  and	  Kant’s	  idealism.	  It	  was	  an	  innovative	  idea	  that	  many	  could	  not	  trust	  or	  understand	  at	  that	  time	  but	  it	  seemed	  to	  offer	  enormous	  possibilities	   and	   needed	   people	   to	   start	   working	   on	   it.	   It	   is	   with	   this	  intention	  that	  Stein	  decided	  to	  learn	  the	  new	  method	  directly	  from	  Husserl.	  	  
It	   has	   been	   debated	   whether	   Stein	   abandoned	   phenomenology	   after	  her	  conversion,	  or	  more	  simply	  whether	  she	  failed	  to	  follow	  Husserl’s	  turn	  to	   idealistic	   phenomenology.	   In	   the	   difficult	   years	   after	   her	   resignation	   as	  Husserl’s	  assistant	   in	  Freiburg	  and	  before	  her	  conversion,	   she	  composed	  a	  short	  essay	  with	   the	   title	   “Nature,	  Freedom,	  Grace”	   (Natur,	  Freiheit,	  Gnade.	  Stein,	  1962)	  which	  was	  never	  published	  and	  contains	  very	  interesting	  hints	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to	  help	  reconstruct	  this	  turning	  point	  in	  her	  life,	  at	  a	  time	  between	  the	  end	  of	  her	   work	   with	   Husserl	   and	   the	   decision	   to	   become	   Catholic	   (she	   was	  baptised	  in	  1921).	  This	  short	  text	  was	  misunderstood	  due	  to	  a	  controversial	  situation:	   in	   the	   first	   edition	   of	   Stein’s	   work	   (ESW)	   the	   essay	   ‘Nature,	  Freedom,	  Grace’	  had	  been	  wrongly	  titled	  and	  dated	  and	  it	  was	  assumed	  that	  it	  was	  part	  of	  Stein’s	  material	  for	  the	  lecture	  on	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  human	  person	   and	   therefore	  was	   composed	   between	   1930	   and	   1931.	   However	   a	  recent	   analysis	   by	   Claudia	   Mariele	   Wulf	   demonstrated	   that	   it	   actually	  belongs	   to	   Stein’s	   early	   analysis	   from	   between	   1918	   and	   1920.34	  This	   is	  extremely	   interesting	   for	   two	  main	   reasons:	   the	   first	   is	   that	   in	   this	   essay	  Stein	   makes	   an	   explicit	   connection	   to	   the	   Gospel	   and	   to	   religious	   texts,	  proving	   how	   far	   she	   was	   in	   her	   intellectual	   preparation	   towards	   her	  conversion.	   The	   second	   and	   most	   important	   element	   is	   that	   Stein	   briefly	  interprets	   in	   this	   text	   the	   philosophical	   concepts	   of	   Angst	   (anguish)	   and	  
Sorge	   (care),	   which	   became	   famous	   with	   the	   interpretation	   of	   Being	   and	  
Time	  in	  1927.	  Wulf	  ventures	  the	  hypothesis	  that	  these	  passages	  are	  written	  before	  Being	  and	  Time,	  especially	  because	  Stein	   interprets	   them	  differently	  but	   doesn’t	  mention	  Heidegger	   as	   counterpart,	   and	   that	   it	   is	   possible	   that	  Stein’s	   personal	   contact	   with	   Heidegger	   in	   those	   years	   had	   provided	   the	  chance	  to	  broach	  these	  themes	  in	  philosophical	  discussions.	  	  
Nature,	   Freedom,	   Grace	   represents	   a	   very	   important	   link	   between	  Stein’s	   early	   phenomenological	   works,	   where	   the	   human	   being	   is	   a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  34	  Natur,	  Freiheit,	  Gnade	  was	  mistakenly	  edited	  in	  vol.	  IV	  of	  ESW	  with	  the	  title	  Die	  ontische	  
Struktur	  der	  Person	  und	  ihre	  Erkennitstheoretische	  Problematik.	  For	  a	  complete	  explanation	  see	   Claudia	   Mariele	   Wulf,	   “Rekonstrution	   und	   Neudatierung	   einiger	   früher	   Werke	   Edith	  Steins”,	  in	  Edith	  Stein,	  Themen	  –	  Bezüge	  –	  Dokumente,	  Würzburg	  2003,	  pp.	  249	  –	  268.	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psychological	  object,	  and	  her	  writings	  after	  her	  conversion,	  where	  the	  tone	  is	  still	  scientific	  but	  the	  analysis	  opens	  up	  to	  ‘other’	  categories,	  for	  example	  the	   analysis	   of	   the	   religious	   experience.	   In	   this	  work	   Stein	   identifies	   three	  forces	  that	  interact	  in	  human	  life,	  namely	  1)	  natural	  instincts	  and	  impulses,	  2)	   free	   decisions	   and	   free	   will	   and	   3)	   the	   power	   of	   divine	   grace.	   Each	   of	  these	  forces	  acts	  like	  a	  force	  of	  motion	  and	  moves,	  pulls	  or	  pushes	  the	  soul	  of	  the	  person	   (intended	  as	   the	   core,	   the	   inner	   centre)	  provoking	   its	   reaction.	  All	   movements	   of	   the	   human	   soul,	   such	   as	   love,	   hate,	   shock	   or	   surprise,	  wishing	  and	  wanting,	  are	  nothing	  more	  than	  the	  visible	  reaction	  of	  the	  soul	  to	  the	  outside	  forces.	  Such	  reactions	  can	  be	  of	  two	  different	  types:	  ‘not-­‐free’	  reactions	   are	   the	   sign	   of	   a	   passive	   soul,	   a	   soul	   that	   has	   not	   yet	   found	   its	  centre	  and	  is	  unbalanced,	  leading	  the	  human	  being	  to	  an	  ‘animal’	  life,	  where	  it	   reacts	   to	   the	   pushes	   and	   pulls	   of	   the	   external	   world	   in	   a	   mechanical,	  sentient,	   naive	   way,	   without	   any	   deep	   process	   of	   reasoning.	   The	   ‘free’	  reactions	  are	   the	  response	  of	  a	   free	  soul,	   a	   soul	   that,	   in	  Stein’s	  words	   “has	  been	  freed	  from	  the	  world”	  thanks	  to	  two	  points	  of	  anchoring,	   in	  the	  inner	  centre	  (this	  expression	  is	  from	  Stein)	  and	  above.	  	  
We	  must	  here	  appreciate	   the	  visual	   aspects	  of	   this	   image:	   Stein	  does	  not	   preach	   here	   of	   a	   life	   of	   pure	   ascetics,	   as	   body	   and	   soul	   form	   an	  indissoluble	  unity	  and	  one	  cannot	  work	  without	  the	  other.	  The	  influences	  of	  behavioural	  psychology	  and	  the	  importance	  of	  a	  motivational	  pulse	  appear	  evident,	   rendering	   Stein’s	   picture	   of	   the	   human	   being	   as	   distant	   from	   a	  Cartesian	   ‘pure’	   ego	   as	   possible.	   However	   the	   person	   is	   called	   to	   a	   higher	  ‘spiritual’	  way	  of	  living,	  where	  it	  must	  put	  order	  into	  the	  soul,	  carefully	  sort	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out	   its	   emotions,	   welcome	   them	   or	   discard	   them,	   in	   a	   process	   of	   freely	  accepting	   and	   receiving.	   Freedom	   and	   reason	   are	   the	   two	   fundamental	  elements	  of	  this	  structure.	  Traces	  of	  this	  structure	  of	  the	  human	  soul	  are	  to	  be	   found	   in	   Finite	   and	   Eternal	   Being,	   with	   a	   more	   defined	   and	   significant	  role.	  This	  provides	  further	  evidence	  that	  Stein’s	  early	  investigations	  build	  a	  homogenous	   body	   of	   work	   and	   provide	   the	   necessary	   support	   for	   her	  mature	  research.	  	  
Nevertheless	  one	  question	   immediately	  arises:	   is	  allowing	  what	  Stein	  calls	   ‘an	   inner	   centre’	   to	  guide	   the	  process	  of	   sorting	  emotions	  actually	  an	  abdication	   of	   personal	   freedom?	   Stein’s	   answer	   is	   that	   in	   order	   to	   let	   this	  centre	  guide	  the	  reaction,	  the	  person	  must	  already	  be	  free.	  This	  means	  that	  personal	  freedom	  must	  be	  given	  up,	   in	  order	  to	  allow	  for	  being	  to	  be	  freed	  from	  itself.	  Blind	  freedom	  of	  choice	  can	  only	  lead	  to	  chaos.	  To	  continue	  with	  the	   figurative	   speech:	   the	   infinite	   possibility	   of	   moving	   in	   all	   directions	  leaves	  the	  subject	  ultimately	  immobile,	  because	  it	  can’t	  choose	  where	  to	  go.	  It	  is	  interesting	  to	  compare	  this	  image	  with	  Stein’s	  study	  on	  empathy	  where	  she	   describes	   how	   the	   human	   body	   has	   a	   ‘point	   zero’	   of	   orientation	   in	   a	  universe	   of	   other	   subjects:	   “I	   can	   approach	   and	  withdraw	   from	   any	   other	  thing,	   can	   turn	   toward	   or	   away	   from	   it.	   […]	   this	   one	   object	   (my	   physical	  body)	   is	   given	   to	  me	   in	   successive	   appearances	   only	   variable	  within	   very	  narrow	  limits”.	  (Stein,	  1989,	  p.	  41).	  	  
Stein	  describes	  in	  Nature,	  Freedom,	  Grace	  how	  the	  human	  being	  is	  able	  to	  move	   freely	   and	  must	   first	   of	   all	   give	   up	   his	   freedom,	   at	   least	   to	   some	  extent.	   This	   point	   is	   emphasised	   strongly	   and	   becomes	   increasingly	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important	  in	  Stein’s	  later	  works:	  true	  personal	  freedom	  is	  revealed	  in	  the	  act	  of	  self-­‐giving,	  where	  to	  give	  up	  freedom	  is	  also	  the	  ultimate	  confirmation	  of	  it35.	   	  The	  human	  being	  must	  originally	  and	  structurally	  be	  a	  free	  being,	  one	  that	  can	  take	  control	  of	  its	  freedom	  and	  –	  paradoxically	  –	  give	  it	  up.	  	  
If	  we	  consider	  one	  last	  time	  the	  spatial	  example,	  freedom	  is	  not	  meant	  as	   a	   ‘free	   from’	   something,	   a	   pulling	   away,	   but	   more	   as	   a	   ‘free	   for’,	   a	  movement	   that	  drags	   the	  subject	  away	   from	   itself	   towards	   something	  else.	  The	   possibility	   of	   ‘disposing’	   of	   oneself	   and	   ‘giving’	   away	   oneself	  must	   be	  understood	   in	   a	   positive,	   pro-­‐active	   sense,	   and	   not	   as	   a	   sacrifice	   or	  overthrow.	   Stein	   portrays	   a	   description	   of	   human	   life	   that	   is	   full,	   positive	  and	  that	  has	  meaning	  and	  depth.	  This	  perspective	  will	  acquire	  an	  ontological	  aspect	  that	  opens	  up	  to	  both	  finitude	  and	  eternity	  as	  constitutive	  parts	  of	  the	  human	  person.	  It	  is	  essential	  to	  stress	  that	  at	  this	  point	  Stein	  operates	  from	  a	  strictly	   philosophical	   (and	   phenomenological)	   perspective,	   and	   poses	  legitimate	  questions	  for	  a	  solidly	  based	  theory	  of	  being.	  	  
It	   is	   still	   necessary	   to	  briefly	  discuss	   the	   role	  of	  Max	  Scheler	   and	   the	  influence	  that	  his	  work	  had	  on	  Edith	  Stein.	  Without	  taking	  part	  in	  the	  debate	  on	   Scheler’s	   claimed	   autonomy	   in	   the	   discovery	   and	   elaboration	   of	   the	  phenomenological	   method	   (towards	   Husserl),	   there	   is	   no	   doubt	   that	   his	  work	  and	  personality	  had	  a	  great	  influence	  on	  the	  phenomenological	  circle	  in	   Göttingen	   and	   even	   greater	   influence	   on	   the	   Catholic	   academic	  community	   of	   his	   time.	   Stein	   first	   met	   him	   when	   his	   work	   Formalism	   in	  
Ethics	   and	   Non-­‐Formal	   Ethics	   of	   Values	   (Scheler,	   1913),	   published	   in	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  35	  “Die	  Selbsthingabe	  ist	  die	  freieste	  Tat	  der	  Freiheit”,	  ESW	  VI,	  p.	  156.	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phenomenological	   yearbook	   (of	   which	   Scheler	   is	   the	   co-­‐founder)	   was	  chosen	   as	   a	   selected	   reading	   for	   the	  Göttingen	   seminar	   in	  1913.	   Later	   she	  read	   his	   work	   on	   The	   Nature	   of	   Sympathy	   (Scheler,	   1954)	   and	   compared	  Scheler’s	  take	  on	  empathy	  with	  Husserl’s	  in	  her	  dissertation.	  	  
The	  major	  element	  that	  Stein	  gained	  from	  Scheler’s	  view	  was	  the	  idea	  that	  the	  world	  offers	  itself	  in	  its	  ‘givenness’	  to	  the	  person	  that	  has	  the	  ability	  to	   see	   it,	   that	   is	   open	   to	   receive	   its	   wonder.	   Phenomenology	   is	   first	   and	  foremost	   an	   act	   of	   love	   and	   wondering	   admiration,	   a	   spiritual	   attitude	   to	  encounter	   the	   other	   person	   and	   the	  world	   around	   us.	   Scheler	   trusted	   the	  power	   of	   the	   intuition	   of	   essences,	   and	   Stein	  describes	   him,	   in	   fact,	   as	   the	  most	  radical	  of	  all	  phenomenologists	  with	  respect	   to	  his	  remarks	  against	  a	  critical	  analysis	  as	  a	  fundamental	  spiritual	  attitude	  (ESW	  VI,	  p.	  11).	  Stein	  re-­‐elaborates	   Scheler’s	   theory	   of	   values,	   by	   insisting	   that	   our	   responses	   to	  situations	  and	  feelings	  are	  not	  the	  result	  of	  a	  cause-­‐effect	  chain	  but	  they	  are	  
motivated	  by	  the	  intrinsic	  value	  of	  the	  objects	  we	  encounter.	  This	  also	  causes	  personal	  acts	  to	  be	  categorized	  according	  to	  the	  inner	  feelings	  that	  motivate	  them:	   the	  act	  of	  a	  person	  would	  not	  be	   the	  same	   if	  another	  person	  does	   it	  (Sawicki,	  1997,	  p.	  41).	  This	  highlights	   the	  uniqueness	  of	   the	  character	   that	  denotes	  personal	  being.	  	  
Finally,	   Stein	   found	   in	   Scheler	   a	   differentiation	   of	   the	   levels	   of	  personhood	   that	   she	   would	   then	   further	   research	   and	   that	   provided	   the	  basis	   for	   her	   own	   theory	   of	   the	   person:	   Scheler	   not	   only	   distinguished	  between	   the	   sensible,	   the	   psychic	   and	   the	   spiritual	   levels,	   but	   he	   further	  separated	   the	   psychic	   level	   into	   the	   areas	   that	   deals	   with	   perceptions	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(psychic/vital)	   and	   the	   areas	   that	   elaborate	   meaning	   and	   logical	   thinking	  (the	  ‘soul’,	  which	  translates	  the	  German	  ‘Seele/seelish’):	  “what	  goes	  on	  at	  the	  lower	   levels	   can	   be	   scientifically	   “explained”,	  while	   activities	   at	   the	   upper	  level	   can	   only	   be	   “understood””	   (p.	   36).	   This	   separation	   resulted	   in	   a	  progression	  where	  Stein	  was	  able	  to	  overcome	  Husserl’s	  theory	  and	  theorise	  the	   experience	   of	   something	   that	   cannot	   be	   confined	   to	   the	   categories	   of	  spiritual	  intentional	  acts.	  
	  
2.5. Modern	  thinking,	  Neo-­‐Scholasticism	  and	  religious	  conversions	  
When	  Martin	  Heidegger	  spoke	  in	  front	  of	  the	  Heidelberg	  Academy	  of	  Science	   in	   1957	   he	   declared	   that	   the	   time	   between	   1910	   and	   1914	   was	  impossible	   to	   describe	   with	   words,	   and	   could	   only	   be	   explained	   with	   the	  help	  of	  Nietzsche,	  Kierkegaard,	  Dostojewskij,	  Hegel	  and	  Schelling,	  Rilke	  and	  Trakl,	  Dilthey	  (Pöggler,	  1999,	  p.	  160).	  All	  these	  authors	  had	  hoped	  that	  war	  would	  be	  a	   return	  of	   the	  great	   ideals	  and	  an	  occasion	   for	  dramatic	  change	  and	  new	  beginnings.	  On	  the	  verge	  of	  the	  Great	  War	  the	  young	  generation	  of	  academics	   and	   intellectuals	   in	   Germany,	   like	   in	   the	   rest	   of	   Europe,	  experienced	   a	   rebirth	   of	   idealism	   and	   a	   newly	   discovered	   sense	   of	  patriotism.	  Many	   of	   them	  volunteered	   to	   fight	   for	   their	   country	   and	  many	  felt	  deeply	  that	  they	  should	  do	  something	  for	  the	  war	  effort.	  Many	  women,	  including	   Edith	   Stein,	   trained	   as	   nurses	   and	  worked	   in	  military	   hospitals.	  Stein	   described	   in	   her	   autobiography	   the	   emotional	   climate	   of	   that	   period	  and	  the	  reasons	  that	  brought	  her	  to	  put	  her	  studies	  on	  hold.	  Witnessing	  the	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sacrifice	  of	  her	  male	  companions,	  who	  had	   left	  university	   to	   fight	   for	   their	  country,	  had	  made	  it	  ‘impossible	  (for	  her)	  to	  have	  a	  personal	  life’.	  	  	  
For	   this	   young	   generation	   in	   Germany	   losing	   the	   war	   was	   a	   bitter	  experience:	   survivors	   found	   themselves	  not	   only	   in	  pain	   and	   in	  mourning,	  but	  also	  spiritually	  disillusioned	  and	  confused.	  If	  on	  one	  side	  the	  experience	  of	  war	  lead	  to	  various	  cultural	  movements	  that	  rejected	  its	  premises,	  such	  as	  widespread	  anti-­‐modernism	  and	  anti-­‐patriotism,	  on	  the	  other	  side,	  Germany	  experienced	  an	  even	  greater	  revival	  of	  the	  nationalist	  spirit,	  accompanied	  by	  mistrust	   towards	   political	   dissolution,	   capitalism,	   along	   with	   the	   growing	  need	  to	  re-­‐establish	  a	  strong	  national	  identity36.	  Caught	  between	  these	  two	  viewpoints	   former	   students	   and	   young	   academics	   suddenly	   discovered	  death,	   enemies,	   poverty,	   the	   loss	   of	   jobs	   and	   social	   security,	   and	   had	   to	  rebuild	  a	  new	  life	  and	  a	  new	  collective	  conscience37.	  For	  Stein	  the	  death	  of	  Adolf	   Reinach	   in	   1917,	   her	   talented	   and	   promising	   teacher	   and	   mentor	  within	  the	  phenomenological	  circle,	  is	  only	  one	  example	  of	  the	  irrationality	  of	  war	  and	  of	  death	  itself.	  Many	  ceased	  to	  believe	  in	  their	  former	  values	  and	  ideals	   and	   developed	   a	   sense	   of	   anger	   and	   injustice.	   They	   questioned	   and	  rejected	  their	  cultural	  inheritance	  from	  the	  previous	  generation	  and	  felt	  the	  urge	   to	   confront	   their	  political	   and	   religious	  beliefs.	   It	  was	  hoped	   that	   the	  longed-­‐for	   reconstruction	   would	   come:	   a	   reconstruction	   of	   personal	  consciousness	  along	  with	  a	  new	  way	   to	  consider	   life	   itself,	  after	  chaos	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  36	  See	  the	  brilliant	  analysis	  of	  Gerl-­‐Falkovitz	  of	  Germany’s	  spiritual	  evolution	  between	  WWI	  and	  WWII	  and	  the	  effect	  on	  Edith	  Stein	  (Gerl-­‐Falkovitz,	  2003,	  p.	  149	  –	  161).	  	  37	  The	  crisis	  of	  political	  belief	  and	  the	  need	  to	  rethink	  the	  world	  generated	  cultural	  reaction	  and	  philosophical	   changes.	  Gerl-­‐Falkovitz	   shows	   that	   there	   is	   a	  new	   renewed	   interest	   for	  the	   relation	   between	   the	   human	   being,	   temporality	   and	   infinity.	   Amongst	   Stein’s,	  Heidegger’s	  and	  Husserl’s	  main	  works,	  further	  examples	  are	  Max	  Scheler’s	  On	  the	  Eternal	  in	  
Man	  (1921)	  and	  Romano	  Guardini’s	  Welt	  und	  Person	  (lessons	  between	  1933 - 1939).	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confusion.	   It	   is	  not	  a	  coincidence	  that	  two	  major	  philosophical	  works	  were	  developed	   during	   this	   time:	   in	   1927	  Being	  and	  Time	   by	  Martin	   Heidegger	  followed	   by	   Cartesian	   Meditations	   by	   Edmund	   Husserl	   a	   year	   later.	   Both	  works	  were	  an	  attempt	   to	   redefine	   the	  position	  of	   the	  human	  being	   in	   the	  world,	  between	  knowledge,	  existence	  and	  temporality.	  	  
Alongside	  the	  cultural	  reaction	  and	  the	  social	  distress,	  another,	  more	  hidden,	  phenomenon	  begins	  to	  define	   itself:	   this	   is	  the	  religious	  movement	  that	   started	   in	   Germany	   during	   this	   time	   and	   brought	   many	   to	   a	   frank	  confrontation	  with	  their	  beliefs	  and	  in	  many	  cases	  to	  religious	  conversions	  (Gerl-­‐Falkovitz,	   2003,	   p.	   151).	   ‘The	   Church	   awakes	   inside	   the	   souls’,	   with	  these	   words	   of	   Romano	   Guardini	   the	   Jesuit	   philosopher	   of	   religion	   Erich	  Przywara38	  describes	   in	   his	   work	   Ringe	   der	   Gegenwart	   the	   prevalence	   of	  religious	   movements,	   particularly	   Catholic	   movements,	   at	   the	   end	   of	   the	  1920s	  (Przywara,	  1929,	  p.	  3	  and	  p.	  48).	  This	  description	   is	  essential	   to	  the	  accurate	  portrayal	  of	  the	  academic,	  intellectual	  and	  spiritual	  setting	  in	  which	  both	   Stein	   and	   Heidegger	   developed	   their	   early	  works	   and	   their	   personal	  goals.	   	   Przywara	  belonged	   to	   the	   group	   called	   ‘Southern	  German	  Scholars’	  which	   also	   included	   Romano	   Guardini	   and	   Karl	   Adam.	   All	   of	   them	  contributed	   to	   the	   Jesuit	   magazine	   Stimmen	   der	   Zeit	   and	   were	   actively	  participating	   in	   the	   philosophical	   and	   theological	   debate	   of	   this	   time.	  Przywara	   also	   had	   a	   keen	   interest	   in	   the	   relationship	  between	  philosophy	  and	  theology	  and	  engaged	  in	  an	  evaluation	  of	  existential	  philosophy;	  in	  fact	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  38	  Erich	  Przywara	  had	  been	  a	  mentor	  for	  Stein,	  who	  was	  deeply	  impressed	  by	  his	  work	  on	  
Analogia	   entis,	   which	   she	   quotes	   as	   one	   of	   the	   sources	   for	   her	   philosophical	   ontology.	  Heidegger,	  who	  was	  brought	  up	  and	  educated	  for	  the	  priesthood	  and	  joined	  –	  briefly	  –	  the	  Jesuit	  order,	  was	  also	  acquainted	  with	  him.	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he	  was	  extremely	  open	  to	  discussion	  with	  philosophers	  of	  different	  schools	  and	   with	   non-­‐Catholics,	   and	   attempted	   a	   deeply	   critical	   and	   innovative	  evaluation	  and	  reformulation	  of	  Catholicism,	  also	  benefitting	  from	  academic	  debates	   in	   the	   Jesuit	   tradition.	   In	   particular	   he	   investigated	   the	   path	   from	  Augustine	  and	  Thomas	  Aquinas	   to	   the	  phenomenology	  of	  Edmund	  Husserl	  and	  the	  writing	  of	  John	  Henry	  Newman.	  Later	  on,	  Stein	  would	  embark	  on	  a	  long	   search	   for	   a	  methodological	   ‘third	  way’	  out	  of	   the	   traditional	  polarity	  between	  a	  critical	  philosophical	  method	  and	  a	  positive	  faith,	  highlighting	  the	  role	  of	  modern	  theology	  and	  phenomenology	  in	  reviving	  scholasticism.	  	  The	  challenging	   topic	   of	   these	   academic	   discussions	   was	   represented	   by	   the	  opposition	   between	   the	   Gospel	   and	   real	   life,	   or,	   in	   the	   words	   of	   Romano	  Guardini,	  the	  primary	  role	  of	  the	  logos	  on	  the	  ethos.	  
Przywara	   identifies	   how	   the	   different	   movements	   of	   his	   time	   were	  deeply	   interconnected,	   in	   particular	   phenomenology	   and	   the	   liturgical	  movement39.	  Phenomenology	  was	  seen	  and	  interpreted	  as	  a	  new	  scholastic	  philosophy:	   the	   renewed	   interest	   in	   Thomas	   Aquinas	   meant	   in	   primis	   an	  overcoming	   of	   the	   Cartesian-­‐Kantian	   focus	   for	   the	   cognitive	   subject	   is	  overcome	  by	  a	  new	  triple	  will:	  the	  will	  for	  the	  object,	  the	  will	  for	  the	  essence	  and	   the	   will	   for	   God	   (Gerl-­‐Falkovitz,	   2003,	   p.	   155).	   Stein	   understood	  philosophical	   investigation	   as	   a	   mutual	   effort,	   ‘walking	   a	   road	   that	   many	  before	  have	  walked	  on’,	  and	  therefore	  considered	  it	  not	  only	  legitimate	  but	  necessary	  to	  use	  the	  work	  of	  others	  before	  her	  and	  to	  build	  upon	  it,	  to	  open	  a	   dialogue	   between	   the	   past	   and	   the	   present,	   and	   to	   aid	   in	   the	   search	   for	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  39	  ‘Phenomenology	  awakes	  the	  deepest	  roots	  of	  the	  religious	  spirit’	  (Przywara,	  1929,	  p,	  3).	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universal	  truth.	  It	  is	  in	  this	  light	  that	  her	  work	  on	  a	  comparison	  of	  Husserl’s	  and	  Aquinas’	  philosophy,	  later	  published	  in	  Husserl’s	  JPPF	  on	  the	  occasion	  of	  his	   seventieth	   birthday,	   attempts	   to	   ‘build	   bridges’	   between	   different	  methods	   and	   the	  way	   they	   search	   for	   truth.	   Stein	   highlights	  many	   shared	  aspects,	  not	  only	  in	  the	  proceeding	  methods	  but	  also	  in	  their	  results,	  i.e.	  the	  fact	   that	   both	  Husserl	   and	  Aquinas	   base	   their	   system	  on	   ratio,	   a	   natural	   /	  
super-­‐natural	  reason,	  or	  that,	  for	  both,	  faith	  can	  be	  the	  path	  that	  leads	  to	  the	  truth,	   and	   their	   understanding	   of	   philosophy	   as	   practice,	   or	   again	   how	  Husserl’s	   analysis	   of	   the	   essence	   is	   to	   be	   understood	   as	   a	   renewed	  
philosophia	  perennis.	  	  
Neo-­‐Scholasticism	  was	  a	  revival	  of	  medieval	  scholastic	  philosophy	  and	  theology,	  which	  began	   in	   the	   second	  half	   of	   the	   19th	   century	   and	   included	  several	  German	  philosophers	   and	   thinkers.	   Stein	   is	   rightly	   associated	  with	  this	  group	  in	  terms	  of	  research	  topics,	  although	  her	  specific	  orientation	  was	  the	  result	  of	  her	  own	  personal	  development.	  According	  to	  Stein,	  the	  modern	  interpretation	  of	  Scholasticism	  does	  not	  see	  any	  conflict	  between	  knowledge	  and	   faith:	   in	   fact	   the	   interpretation	   of	  modern	   times	   and	   problems	   in	   the	  light	   of	   Aquinas	   becomes	   the	   intellectual	   modus	   operandi	   of	   Thomism’s	  attitude	  to	  Modernism.	  Modern	  theologians	  aim	  to	  restore	  the	  methods	  and	  the	   traditions	   of	   the	   ‘old	   school’	   while	   maintaining	   their	   personal	  orientation,	   which	   is	   grounded	   on	   faith.	   	   Major	   areas	   of	   research	   include	  metaphysics,	  natural	  philosophy	  and	  psychology,	  particularly	   the	  nature	  of	  the	  universe	  and	  the	  position	  of	  the	  human	  being	  in	  it,	   the	  structure	  of	  the	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human	   being	   seen	   as	   a	   unit	   of	   body	   and	   soul,	   the	   relationship	   between	  knowledge	  and	  faith.	  
The	  second	  element	  that	  Przywara	  brings	  to	  light	  is	  the	  overwhelming	  effect	  of	  the	  religious	  movements	  of	  these	  years40	  particularly	  the	  so-­‐called	  academic	  movement.	  This	  attempted	  to	  discuss	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  Church	  and	   its	   relationship	   with	   society,	   particularly	   analysing	   the	   direction	   that	  contemporary	  Christian	  philosophy	  was	   taking.	  This	  new-­‐found	   interest	   in	  religious	  matters	  and	  personal	  beliefs,	  along	  with	  debates	  between	  religious	  and	  secular	  philosophical	  approaches,	  was	  furnishing	  novel	  perspectives	  in	  the	   philosophy	   of	   religion.	   Catholicism,	   in	   particular,	   was	   portrayed	   as	  positive	  and	  as	  a	  valuable	  creative	  factor	  for	  general	  spiritual	  life.	  
Another	   visible	   sign	   of	   what	   will	   become	   known	   as	   the	   ‘Catholic	  Spring’	  are	   the	  numerous	  conversions	   to	  Catholicism.	  Particularly	  amongst	  the	   young	   academics	   in	   Germany,	   conversions	   show	   a	   sudden	   increase	  during	  and	  after	  World	  War	  One.	  The	  phenomenological	  movement	  listed	  a	  high	   number	   of	   students	   who	   came	   to	   the	   Protestant	   and	   Catholic	   faiths,	  most	   likely	   because	   phenomenology	   has	   the	   potential	   to	   open	   up	   to	   the	  object	  of	  one’s	  perception	  in	  a	  prejudice-­‐free	  manner.	  Amongst	  the	  Catholics	  are	  Dietrich	  von	  Hildebrand,	  Max	  Scheler,	  Adolf	  Reinach	  and	  his	  wife	  Anna,	  whose	  conversion	  after	  the	  death	  of	  her	  husband	  was	  one	  of	  the	  first	  visible	  signs	  of	   faith	  and	  trust	   in	  God	  that	  started	  Stein’s	  own	  conversion	  process.	  Heidegger’s	  way	  ‘out	  of	  the	  system	  of	  Catholicism’,	  which	  will	  be	  presented	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  40	  The	  Benedictine	  Archabbey	   of	   Beuron	   in	  Baden-­‐Württemberg	   represented	   for	  many	   in	  the	  phenomenological	  circle	  (amongst	  these	  Stein,	  Scheler,	  Heidegger)	  a	  religious	  retreat	  as	  well	  as	  an	  artistic	  and	  inspirational	  centre	  of	  interest.	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in	   depth	   in	   later	   in	   this	  work,	   is	   also	   an	   example	   of	   how	   the	   search	   for	   a	  philosophical	  method	  affects	  personal	  beliefs,	  in	  his	  case	  making	  impossible	  the	  coexistence	  of	  both:	  if	  Stein’s	  choice	  is	  to	  live	  as	  a	  Catholic	  and	  to	  address	  in	  her	  philosophical	  investigation	  matters	  that	  are	  close	  to	  her	  life	  (religious	  beliefs,	   the	   personal	   role	   in	   the	   community	   and	   the	   responsibility	   for	   the	  future	  of	  society,	  the	  human	  participation	  in	  eternal	  life	  and	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  spiritual	  experience),	  it	  is	  the	  general	  opinion	  that	  Heidegger	  maintains	  a	   strong	   separation	   between	   his	   life	   and	   his	   work,	   personal	   beliefs	   and	  philosophical	  research.	  	  
This	   theory,	   often	   used	   to	   attempt	   to	   justify	   Heidegger’s	   political	  collaboration	   with	   the	   national	   socialist	   party,	   is	   strongly	   rejected	   by	   the	  English	   philosopher	   Alasdair	   MacIntyre:	   “The	   history	   of	   Heidegger’s	  philosophical	  development	  is	  one	  thing,	  so	  these	  apologists	  say,	  the	  history	  of	  his	  political	  commitments	  and	  activities	  quite	  another.	  […]	  But	  in	  fact	  the	  story	  of	   this	   division	  within	  Heidegger	   is	   a	   piece	  of	  mythology,	  mythology	  that	   enables	   those	  who	   teach	  Heidegger’s	   philosophy	   in	   the	   classrooms	  of	  today	   to	   domesticate	   it	   and	   render	   it	   innocuous”	   (MacIntyre,	   2006,	   p.	   5).	  Although	   it	  would	  be	  wrong	   to	  accept	   the	   theory	  of	  a	   complete	  separation	  between	   Heidegger’s	   life	   and	   work,	   and	   it	   is	   true	   that	   the	   matter	   of	   his	  political	   engagement	   as	   well	   as	   his	   religious	   position	   has	   roots	   and	   deep	  consequences	  for	  his	  philosophy,	  it	  is	  impossible	  to	  judge	  the	  entirety	  of	  his	  thoughts	  as	  a	  consequence	  of	  life	  events.	  Without	  entering	  into	  the	  matter	  of	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Heidegger’s	   post-­‐war	   declarations	   to	   explain	   his	   actions41	  I	  must	   focus	   on	  the	  much-­‐debated	  matter	  of	  Heidegger’s	  religiosity.	  	  
To	   what	   extent	   is	   phenomenology	   responsible	   for	   the	   spiritual	  breakthroughs	   of	   these	   authors?	   Part	   of	   the	  method	   provides	   a	   transition	  from	  the	  natural	  attitude	  to	  the	  transcendental	  attitude	  and	  the	  purification	  of	  all	  worldly	  elements	  to	  prioritize	  the	  inner	  side.	  It	  is	  possible	  therefore	  to	  see	   similarities	   with	   many	   elements	   of	   religious	   spirituality:	   self-­‐transcendence,	   mysticism,	   and	   purification	   from	   the	   world.	   In	   fact	   many	  phenomenologists	  have	  researched	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  religious	  experience	  (Adolf	   Reinach’s	   work	   on	   phenomenology	   of	   religious	   experience	   is	   an	  example42).	  	  
Edith	   Stein	   had	   highlighted	   the	   similarities	   between	   Thomism	   and	  phenomenology	   in	   her	   essays	   for	   the	   JPPF,	   and	   she	   saw	   clearly	   –	   with	  Aquinas,	   but	  more	   clearly	   than	   him	   -­‐	   the	   limits	   of	   human	   reason	   (natural	  reason).	   She	   believed	   in	   the	   possibility	   of	   collaborative	  work	   between	   the	  analytical	   sciences	   and	   discussions	   concerning	   doctrines	   of	   faith.	   As	   she	  would	   make	   clear	   in	   the	   preface	   to	   Finite	   and	   Eternal	   Being	   she	   was	  interested	   in	   the	   search	   for	   truth	   as	   a	   doctrine	   of	   being	   and	   not	   as	   a	  philosophical	  system.	  Such	  an	  investigation	  does	  not	  presuppose	  barriers	  or	  require	  ‘bracketing’.	  It	  is	  because	  of	  the	  exclusion	  of	  the	  world	  that	  Husserl’s	  natural	   reasoning,	   his	   transcendental	   phenomenology,	   cannot	   reach	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  41See	  the	  previously	  discussed	  matter	  of	  Heidegger’s	  dealings	  with	  criticism	  in	  Introduction	  1.4.	  	  42	  See	   Beate	   Beckmann,	   Phänomenologie	   des	   religiösen	   Erlebnis.	   Religionsphilosophische	  
Überlegungen	  im	  Anschluss	  an	  Adolph	  Reinach	  und	  Edith	  Stein,	  Königshausen	  und	  Neumann,	  Würzburg	  2003.	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domain	   that	   surpasses	   human	   subjectivity	   and	   stays	   instead	   within	   the	  limits	  of	  human	  experience.	  By	  excluding	  all	  assumptions	  on	  the	  existence	  of	  external	   objects,	   Husserl	   gradually	   focused	   only	   on	   the	   structure	   of	  consciousness	   and	   on	   the	   constitutions	   of	   objects	   in	   pure	   consciousness.	  This	   appears	   to	   be	   a	   return	   to	   idealisms;	   especially	   because	   the	  phenomenological	  attitude	  had	  characterised	  a	  psychophysical	  subject	  in	  the	  
world,	   structurally	   open	   to	   other	   subjects,	   values,	   experiences,	   ideas	   and	  feelings.	  This	  focus	  on	  a	  self-­‐constituting	  subject	  unbalances	  the	  relationship	  between	   the	   act	   of	   consciousness	   and	   the	   phenomena,	   in	   favour	   of	  consciousness.	   This	   is	   also	   why	   many	   of	   Husserl’s	   early	   scholars	   defined	  themselves	  as	  ‘realist	  phenomenologists’	  and	  defended	  a	  research	  approach	  that	   preceded	   the	   publications	   of	   Ideas,	   where	   Husserl	   takes	   his	   turn	  towards	   transcendental	   reduction.	   On	   the	   other	   side	   Aquinas	   –	   so	   Stein	   -­‐	  “never	  advocates	  bracketing	  the	  existence	  of	  the	  world.	  He	  is	  not	  interested	  in	  analysing	  possible	  worlds;	   rather,	  his	  philosophy	  searches	   for	   ‘the	  most	  complete	  image	  of	  this	  world’”	  (Stein,	  1929,	  p.	  338).	  	  
Stein	  first	  encounters	  the	  world	  of	  faith	  during	  her	  research	  years	  in	  Göttingen.	   She	   firstly	   describes	   her	   new	   awareness	   with	   the	   words	   of	  phenomenology:	   ‘The	  bars	  of	  the	  rationalist	  prejudices	  I	  had	  unconsciously	  grown	  up	  with	  collapsed,	  and	  there,	  standing	  in	  front	  of	  me,	  was	  the	  world	  of	   faith.	   I	   could	   see	   that	   among	   the	   inhabitants	   were	   people	   whom	   I	  admired,	   people	   whom	   I	   worked	   with	   on	   a	   day-­‐to-­‐day	   basis”	   (ESGA	   1,	   p.	  211).	  Stein	  highlights	  the	  necessary	  capacity	  of	  observing	  the	  world	  without	  preconception,	  which	  guided	  her	   to	   the	  evidence	  of	  belief.	  Later,	  when	  she	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worked	   alongside	   Husserl	   and	   the	   time	   immediately	   after,	   she	   suffered	   a	  long	   personal	   crisis,	   highlighted	   also	   by	   the	   failing	   of	   a	   romantic	  relationship,	   the	  difficulties	  of	  establishing	  herself	  professionally	   in	  a	  male	  dominated	   academic	   world	   and	   the	   instability	   of	   the	   political	   situation	   in	  Germany:	  all	  these	  elements	  move	  Stein	  to	  search	  for	  an	  answer,	  which	  she	  finds	  in	  faith.	  	  
Her	   intellectual	   and	   personal	   path	   is	   representative	   of	   the	   tension	  between	  modern	  religiosity,	  the	  academic	  world	  and	  the	  development	  of	  the	  new-­‐Scholastic	   philosophy,	   and	   all	   of	   these	   elements	   were	   very	   much	  present	  at	   the	  Faculty	  of	  Theology	  of	   the	  University	  of	  Freiburg	  where	   the	  young	  Martin	  Heidegger	  enrolled	  in	  1909	  to	  study	  theology.	  	  
	  
2.6.	   Martin	  Heidegger’s	  philosophical	  beginnings	  
Stein’s	   first	  encounter	  with	  Heidegger	  was	   in	   the	   summer	  of	  1916	   in	  Freiburg	  at	  Husserl’s	  home:	  she	  had	  a	  positive	  impression	  of	  him	  and	  recalls	  how	  “he	  was	  quiet	  and	  introverted	  as	  long	  as	  no	  one	  discussed	  philosophy”	  in	  which	  case	  he	  would	  become	  “full	  of	  life”.	  (ESGA	  1,	  p.339)	  	  
Heidegger	   had	   begun	   teaching	   at	   the	   university	   of	   Freiburg	   after	  defending	  his	  habilitation	  work	  on	  Duns	  Scotus’s	  Doctrine	  of	  Categories	  and	  
Meaning	   (Heidegger,	   1916)	   in	   1915	   and	   he	   occasionally	   joined	   Husserl’s	  circle.	   Up	   to	   this	   point	   Heidegger,	  who	   had	   initially	  moved	   to	   Freiburg	   to	  become	   a	   Jesuit	   and	   had	   successively	   left	   the	   seminary	   and	   switched	   to	  studying	   philosophy,	   knew	   Husserl	   mainly	   for	   his	   Logical	   Investigations	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(Husserl,	   1901),	  which	   had	   impressed	   him	   deeply.	   In	   the	   following	   years	  Heidegger’s	   personal	   and	   philosophical	   convictions	  would	   shift	   drastically	  from	  a	  Catholic	   faith	  and	  Christian-­‐oriented	  theology	   to	  a	  new	  undogmatic	  religiosity	  and	  a	  scientific	   independent	  research	  towards	  the	   foundation	  of	  phenomenology	   and	   epistemology.	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   his	   personal	   and	  professional	  connection	  with	  Husserl	  grew	  stronger	  up	   to	   the	  point	  where	  Husserl	   designated	   him	   as	   his	   phenomenological	   ‘successor’	   (a	   famous	  anecdote	   reported	   on	   how	   Husserl,	   in	   the	   early	   1920s,	   declared	  “Phenomenology:	  that’s	  Heidegger	  and	  I	  –	  and	  no	  one	  else!”	  (Kisiel,	  1993,	  p.	  59).	  	  The	  matter	  of	  Heidegger’s	  phenomenology,	  and	  even	  more	  the	  reasons	  for	  his	  religious-­‐philosophical	  conversion	  are	  essential	  to	  understanding	  his	  drive	  for	  a	  new	  foundation	  of	  philosophy,	  which	  lead	  to	  his	  most	  important	  work	  -­‐	  Being	  and	  Time	  –	  being	  published	  in	  1927.	  	  
Unusually	   Heidegger	   did	   not	   publish	   any	   work	   between	   his	  dissertation	  on	  Duns	  Scotus	  and	  Being	  and	  Time,	  even	  after	  his	  appointment	  as	  associate	  professor	  in	  Marburg	  in	  1923.	  	  He,	  instead,	  devoted	  his	  time	  to	  lectures	   and	   further	   study.	   The	   publication	   of	  Being	  and	  Time	   is	   therefore	  preceded	   by	   more	   than	   ten	   years	   of	   intellectual	   clarification	   of	   his	  philosophical	   orientation,	   his	   strong	   break	   with	   religion,	   his	   lectures	   on	  phenomenology	   and	   his	   interpretations	   of	   Aristotle,	   Plato,	   Aquinas,	   Kant,	  and	  Leibniz.	  Biographers	  regard	  this	  long	  period	  as	  a	  time	  of	  personal	  crisis	  that	  determined	   the	   foundation	  of	  his	  philosophical	  method	  as	  well	   as	   the	  consolidation	   of	   his	   growing	   fame.	   In	   the	   words	   of	   his	   former	   student	  Hannah	   Arendt	   “Heidegger’s	   ‘fame’	   pre-­‐dated	   by	   about	   eight	   years	   the	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publication	  of	  Sein	  und	  Zeit	  in	  1927”	  and	  the	  success	  that	  followed	  the	  book	  started	  with	  his	  first	  lecture	  courses	  and	  seminars	  in	  1919,	  in	  fact:	  
“there	  was	  nothing	  tangible	  on	  which	  his	   fame	  could	  have	  been	  based,	  nothing	  written,	  save	  for	  notes	  taken	  at	  his	  lectures,	  which	  circulated	  among	  students	   everywhere.	   These	   lectures	   dealt	   with	   texts	   that	   were	   generally	  familiar;	   they	   contained	   no	   doctrine	   that	   could	   have	   been	   learned,	  reproduced,	   and	   handed	   on.	   There	  was	   hardly	  more	   than	   a	   name,	   but	   the	  name	   travelled	   all	   over	   Germany	   like	   the	   rumour	   of	   the	   hidden	   king”	  (Arendt,	  1971)43.	  	  	   Heidegger’s	   early	   education	   had	   been	   supported	   by	   Catholic	  scholarships	  and	   it	  was	  not	  a	   coincidence	   that	  his	   first	   choice	  had	  been	   to	  join	   the	   Jesuit	   order,	   which	   at	   that	   time	   was	   considered	   to	   be	   strongly	  traditional	   and	   critical	   towards	   modern	   influences.	   His	   decision	   was	   an	  indication	   that	   he	  was	   not	   aspiring	   to	  work	   ‘in	   the	  world’,	   by	   becoming	   a	  parish	   priest	   or	   a	   schoolteacher,	   but	   he	   was	   more	   inclined	   to	   become	   a	  religious	  author	  or	  an	  academic.	  	  
In	   1911,	   after	   only	   four	   semesters	   at	   the	   University	   of	   Freiburg,	  Heidegger	  gave	  up	  his	  training	  for	  the	  priesthood	  and	  the	  study	  of	  theology	  to	   transfer	   into	   philosophy.	   He	   would	   explain	   later	   in	   his	   career	   that	   his	  theological	  studies	  were	  ‘dissolved’	  by	  studying	  philosophy,	  humanities	  and	  the	   natural	   sciences	   (Schaber,	   2004,	   p.	   84).	   The	   shift	   to	   a	   philosophical	  orientation	  and	  the	  need	  for	  a	  research	  prospective	  free	  of	  prejudices	  drove	  Heidegger	   to	   what	   would	   later	   be	   called	   his	   ‘spiritual	   break’	   with	   the	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  Traslated	  from	  German	  by	  Albert	  Hofstadter,	  online	  sorce:	  <http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/1971/oct/21/martin-­‐heidegger-­‐at-­‐eighty>.	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Catholic	   faith.	   In	   a	   letter	   that	   he	   wrote	   in	   January	   1919	   to	   the	   Freiburg	  theologian,	  Engelbert	  Krebs,	  he	  explained:	  	  
“The	   last	   two	   years,	   which	   I	   have	   devoted	   to	   finding	   a	   principal	  clarification	  of	  my	  philosophical	  position,	  laying	  aside	  any	  non-­‐philosophical	  commitment,	  have	  brought	  me	  to	  such	  results.	  If	  I	  was	  finding	  myself	  in	  any	  commitment	  outside	  of	  philosophy,	  I	  could	  not	  have	  assured	  the	  freedom	  of	  conviction	   and	   of	   teaching	   that	   made	   these	   results	   possible.	   Logical	  theoretical	   insights	   trespassing	   the	   theory	   of	   historical	   knowledge,	   have	  made	   the	   system	   of	   Catholicism	   problematic	   and	   unacceptable	   for	   me	   –	  however	   not	   Christendom	   and	   metaphysic,	   these	   however	   seen	   in	   a	   new	  light”	  (Casper,	  1980,	  p.	  541).	  	  	  Heidegger	  was	   deeply	   interested	   in	   the	   phenomenon	   of	   religion	   and	  religious	   experiences	   and	   read	  with	   interest	   the	  works	   of	   Schleiermacher	  and	   Hegel.	   His	   ‘modernist’	   attitude	   contrasted	   strongly	   with	   the	   general	  Catholic	  compliance	  with	  the	  papal	  directive	  that	  was	  encouraging	  Catholic	  academics	   to	   remain	   in	   line	  with	   the	   Thomistic	   approach.	   As	   a	   student	   of	  theology	   he	   studied	   extensively	   the	   Scholastic	   and	   Christian	   metaphysics	  and	  was	  familiar	  with	  the	  works	  of	  Aristotle,	  Aquinas,	  Plato,	  Augustine,	  Duns	  Scotus,	  Eckhart	  and	  medieval	  mystics,	  Neo-­‐Kantianism	  and	  Neo-­‐Thomism	  as	  well	   as	   with	   the	   New	   Testament	   and	   the	   writings	   of	   the	   Church	   Fathers.	  Heidegger	  was	   attracted	  particularly	  by	   the	   concept	  of	   an	   early	   ‘primitive’	  Christianity,	   and	   its	   idea	   of	   an	   uncontaminated,	   positive	   and	   natural	  religiosity.	  	  
Among	   the	   philosophical	   books	   that	   Heidegger	   took	   an	   interest	   in,	  there	   were	   the	   two	   parts	   of	   Husserl’s	   Logical	   Investigations,	   which	   were	  published	   in	   1900	   and	   1901.	   He	   was	   also	   fascinated	   by	   the	   cognitive	  possibilities	   of	   logic	   and	   mathematics	   and	   decided	   to	   study	   the	   works	   of	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Heinrich	   Rickert	   and	   Heinrich	   Finke.	   After	   switching	   to	   philosophy,	   his	  theoretical	   interests	  became	  more	   substantial	   and	  he	  attempted	  a	   critic	  of	  Catholicism	   as	   a	   system,	   showing	   how	   it	   was	   lacking	   a	   real	   freedom	   of	  investigation	  and	  a	  scientific	  ideal.	  The	  choice	  of	  topics	  for	  his	  early	  articles	  and	   essays	   before	   1913	   demonstrated	   a	  wide	   ranging	   analysis	   of	   Catholic	  doctrine	   compared	   to	   some	   of	   the	  most	   contemporary	  movements	   of	   this	  time:	  liberalism,	  Darwinism,	  modernism	  and	  subjectivism.	  	  
The	  search	  for	  truth,	   intrinsic	  to	  his	  religious	  education,	  would	  then	  express	   itself	   in	   the	   systematic	   methodologies	   of	   mathematics	   and	  philosophy,	   particularly	   in	   the	   phenomenological	   method.	   His	   research	  interests	   lay	   in	   the	   ‘facticity’	   of	   life:	   life	   is	   ‘here	   and	   now’	   and	   cannot	   be	  understood	  according	  to	  the	  traditional	  body-­‐soul	  distinction.	  This	  intuition	  became	  even	  more	  acute	  after	  his	  encounter	  with	  Edmund	  Husserl	  and	  the	  phenomenological	   method,	   which	   planted	   the	   early	   seeds	   of	   a	   scientific	  foundation,	   a	   free	   research	   method	   that	   is	   only	   guided	   by	   its	   search	   for	  truth.	  	  
Until	   this	   time	   Heidegger	   was	   considered	   by	   Husserl	   to	   be	   mainly	   a	  ‘Catholic’	   philosopher,	   whose	   ‘appropriate	   religious	   affiliations’	   made	   it	  possible	   for	   his	   name	   to	   be	  proposed	   for	   the	   chair	   of	   Catholic	   philosophy,	  although	  he	  was	  ultimately	   rejected,	  much	   to	  his	   surprise.	  After	   the	   tragic	  fall	   of	   Adolf	   Reinach	   at	   the	   front	   in	   1917,	   Husserl	   started	   considering	  Heidegger	  as	  his	  “most	  valuable	  philosophical	  co-­‐worker”,	  also	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  his	  newly	  acquired	  freedom	  from	  “dogmatic	  Catholicism”,	  which	  allowed	  him	  to	  “cut	  himself	  off	  (from)	  the	  sure	  and	  easy	  career	  of	  a	   ‘philosopher	  of	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the	   Catholic	   worldview”	   (Kisiel,	   1993,	   p.	   75).	   Much	   speculation	   had	   been	  made	   as	   to	   whether	   the	   founder	   of	   phenomenology	   played	   a	   role	   in	  Heidegger’s	  religious	  break,	  to	  which	  Husserl	  himself	  felt	  the	  need	  to	  clarify	  in	   a	   letter	   to	   Otto	   written	   in	   1919	   “I	   have	   not	   exercised	   the	   least	   bit	   of	  influence	   on	   Heidegger’s	   and	   Ochsner’s	   [his	   other	   ‘religiously	   oriented’	  student]	   moves	   over	   to	   the	   ground	   of	   Protestantism,	   although	   I	   can	   only	  take	   great	   satisfaction	   in	   them	   as	   an	   ‘undogmatic	   Protestant’	   and	   a	   free	  Christian”	  (Kisiel,	  1993,	  p.	  75).	  	  
When,	  in	  1918,	  Stein	  left	  her	  position	  with	  Husserl,	  exhausted	  by	  the	  challenging	   work	   that	   wasn’t	   leaving	   her	   enough	   room	   for	   personal	  research,	   her	   position	   was	   offered	   to	   the	   young	   Heidegger,	   who	   had	  completed	  his	  habilitation	   thesis	   three	  years	  earlier.	  The	   journeys	  of	   these	  two	  philosophers	   separated:	   Stein’s	   new	   found	  meaning	   in	   life	   resulted	   in	  1921	   in	  her	  decision	  to	  become	  a	  catholic.	   In	   this	   time	  she	  started	  reading	  Christian	   authors,	   translated	   Thomas	   Aquina’s	   Questiones	   de	   Veritate	   into	  German,	   and	   wrote	   about	   the	   role	   of	   women	   in	   the	   Church	   along	   with	  keeping	  in	  touch	  with	  the	  other	  ex-­‐members	  of	  the	  phenomenological	  circle.	  It	   is	   interesting	   to	   note	   how	   the	   progression	   from	   phenomenology	   to	  Scholasticism	  did	  not	  represent	  an	  obstacle	  in	  Stein’s	  projects,	  but	  is	  in	  fact	  a	  coherent	  choice.	   In	   fact	  Stein’s	   first	  attempt	   to	  write	  about	  ontology	  was	  a	  dissertation	  on	  the	  ideas	  of	  potentiality	  and	  actuality	  and	  Finite	  and	  Eternal	  
Being	  (which	  she	  started	  as	  a	  revision	  of	  that	  work)	  was	  also	  intended	  as	  an	  attempt	   to	   build	   a	   bridge	   between	   Thomas	   and	   Husserl.	   Her	   decision	   to	  discuss	   Heidegger’s	   philosophy	   of	   existence,	   and	   to	   demonstrate	   the	  
	   61	  
consequences	  of	  following	  this	  philosophical	  trail,	  were	  a	  part	  of	  this	  project,	  as	  explained	  by	  Lebech:	  
“Stein	  needed	   to	   testify	   to	   the	   effect	   that	  phenomenology	   could	  have	  been	   taken	   in	   a	   direction	   different	   from	  Heidegger’s	   and	   that	   Heidegger’s	  influence	   on	   the	   direction	   it	   took	   in	   the	   minds	   of	   many	   of	   those,	   who	  popularised	   the	   movement	   left	   it	   truncated	   in	   the	   same	   way	   she	   thought	  Heidegger’s	   thought	   was.	   This	   is	   one	   reason	   to	   write	   about	   Heidegger.	  Another	  reason	  to	  write	  about	  Heidegger	  is	  that	  he	  had	  written	  about	  being	  in	   a	  manner	   characteristically	  different	   from	  hers,	   and	   that	   the	  analysis	  of	  his	   thought	   allowed	  her	   to	   explain	  why	   she	  had	  not	   chosen	   to	  work	  along	  the	   same	   lines	   as	   he.	   These	   two	   reasons	   amount	   to	   the	   same	   one	   if	   Stein	  conceived	  her	   latter	  work	   to	   continue	   the	  phenomenological	   tradition	   in	  a	  direction	  alternative	  to	  Heidegger’s.	  Perhaps	  she	  did.”	  (Lebech,	  quoted	  from	  draft	  paper,	  to	  be	  published	  with	  ICS	  Publications).	  	  After	   starting	   work	   with	   Husserl,	   Heidegger	   gained	   enormous	  popularity.	   His	  main	   area	   of	   interest	   was	   phenomenology	   of	   religion,	   and	  specifically	  he	  investigated	  the	  history	  of	  the	  Christian	  tradition	  and	  its	  ties	  with	   the	   scientific	   and	   theoretical	   world.	   His	   courses	   of	   this	   period	  addressed	   the	   relationship	   between	   real	   life	   and	   scientific	   attitude,	   more	  specifically	   the	   phenomenological	  method	   enhanced	   Heidegger’s	   idea	   that	  philosophy	  needed	  a	  strong	  scientific	  consciousness	  to	  return	  to	  the	  genuine	  origins	   of	   intellectual	   life.	   Heidegger	   however,	   saw	   the	   phenomenological	  attitude	   only	   as	   a	   starting	   point	   towards	   understanding	   the	   ‘facticity’	   of	  human	  life	  in	  the	  world.	  	  In	  his	  lecture	  of	  1919/20	  on	  The	  Basic	  Problems	  of	  
Phenomenology	  he	   remarked	   on	   how	  philosophy	   is	   essentially	   ontological:	  not	  only	  philosophy	  deals	  with	   the	  ultimate	  questions	  of	   life	   itself,	   such	  as	  the	   definition	   of	   nature,	   soul,	   freedom,	   but	   it	   also	   reflects	   on	   the	   ultimate	  meaning	  of	  knowledge	  and	  reason	   itself:	   “what	  can	   I	  know?	  What	  should	   I	  do?	  What	  is	  man?”	  (what	  Heidegger	  calls	  philosophy	  in	  a	  cosmic	  sense)	  and	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must,	   therefore,	   aim	   to	   the	   understanding	   of	   being:	   “Philosophy	   is	   the	  theoretical	   conceptual	   interpretation	   of	   being,	   of	   being’s	   structure	   and	   its	  possibilities.	  Philosophy	  is	  ontological.	  In	  contrast,	  a	  world-­‐view	  is	  a	  positing	  knowledge	   of	   beings	   and	   a	   positing	   attitude	   towards	   beings;	   it	   is	   not	  ontological	  but	  ontical”	  (Heidegger,	  1982,	  p.	  8).	  Philosophy	  itself	  is	  tied	  with	  human	  existence	  and	  investigates	  its	  very	  structure	  and	  reason	  to	  be.	  	  
At	  this	  stage	  Heidegger	  is	  embracing	  the	  phenomenological	  method,	  although	   he	   doesn’t	   recognise	   its	   originality.	   What	   the	   first	   stage	   of	   the	  phenomenological	   method,	   ‘reduction’,	   offers,	   is	   a	   prejudice	   free	  investigative	   attitude,	   that	   Heidegger	   simply	   described	   in	   his	   analysis	   as	  “leading	   one’s	   vision	   back	   from	   the	   apprehension	   of	   a	   being	   …	   to	   the	  understanding	  of	  the	  being	  of	  this	  being”.	  What	  matters	  is	  to	  view	  the	  being	  as	  unconcealed,	  out	  of	  human	   life	  and	   the	  natural	  world	   that	   surrounds	   it.	  Heidegger	   stressed	   here	   that	   the	   role	   of	   phenomenology	   is	   only	   as	   the	  scientific	  method	  for	  ontology	  itself:	  “scientific	  method	  is	  never	  a	  technique.	  As	   soon	  as	   it	   becomes	  one	   it	   has	   fallen	  away	   from	   its	  own	  proper	  nature”	  (Heidegger,	   1982,	   p.	   21).	   In	   Heidegger’s	   view	   phenomenology	   is	  merely	   a	  method	   and	   therefore	   cannot	   have	   a	   standpoint	   or	   pronounce	   any	   theses,	  but	  only	  describe	  and	  approach	  the	  object	  of	  research.	  	  
Along	   with	   Edith	   Stein,	   former	   members	   of	   Husserl’s	  phenomenological	   circle	   used	   to	   keep	   a	   close	   eye	   on	   Heidegger	   and	   the	  philosophical	   faculty	   in	  Freiburg:	   they	   seemed	   to	  have	  had	   the	   impression	  that	   Husserl,	   who	   had	   complete	   trust	   in	   Heidegger,	   was	   in	   fact	   being	  misunderstood,	  while	  Heidegger	  was	   gaining	   the	   attention	   of	   the	   students	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and	   progressing	   in	   a	   new	   direction	   of	   teaching	   that	   could	   not	   be	   more	  distant	  from	  Husserl’s	  one.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  however,	  none	  of	  them	  could	  remain	   oblivious	   to	   the	   incredible	   strength	   and	   originality	   of	   Heidegger’s	  philosophy,	  and	  many	  decided	  to	  analyse	  his	  works	  in	  depth.44	  	  
Stein	  declared	  Being	  and	  Time	  to	  be	  one	  of	  the	  most	  significant	  efforts	  ever	  made	  in	  her	  time	  to	  arrive	  at	  a	  foundation	  for	  metaphysics.	  Heidegger’s	  masterpiece	   first	   appeared	   in	   Husserl’s	   yearbook	   (JPPF)	   in	   1927	   and	  immediately	  put	  Heidegger	  into	  a	  position	  of	   international,	   intellectual	  and	  academic	   visibility	   and	   respect.	   The	   creation	   of	   a	   personal	   philosophical	  terminology	   contributed	   to	   forming	   a	   difficult	   and	   tormented	   language,	  which	   is	  often	   the	  result	  of	   idiomatic	  words	  and	  of	  phrases	   in	   the	  German	  language,	  mostly	  because	  he	  struggled	  to	  find	  the	  appropriate	  name	  for	  new	  concepts	   in	   the	  conventional	  philosophical	  vocabulary,	  or	  –	  as	  others	  have	  put	   it	   –	   because	   his	   language	   “flees	   from	   history,	   yet	  without	   escaping	   it”	  (Adorno,	   2007,	   p.	   37)45,	   meaning	   that	   he	   refused	   a-­‐priori	   to	   acknowledge	  any	  influences	  from	  the	  historical	  philosophical	  tradition.	  While	  Stein	  found	  the	   natural	   completion	   to	   her	   philosophical	   training	   in	   the	   scholastic	  doctrine,	  Heidegger	  tried	  to	  deconstruct	  ancient	  ontology,	  and,	   in	  doing	  so,	  built	  the	  basis	  for	  an	  independent,	  prejudice-­‐free,	  questioning	  of	  being.	  	  
In	  1928	  Heidegger	  replaced	  Husserl	  at	  the	  philosophical	  faculty	  and	  published	   On	   the	   Phenomenology	   of	   the	   Consciousness	   of	   Internal	   Time	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  44	  See	  Stein’s	  letter	  to	  Roman	  Ingarden	  in	  ESGA	  4,	  letter	  78,	  100,	  101.	  45	  This	   is	  a	   famous	  definition	  which	  was	  given	  by	  Theodor	  W.	  Adorno	   in	   the	  essay	  Thesen	  
über	  die	  Sprache	  des	  Philosophen,	  written	  in	  the	  early	  1930s	  (See	  Adorno,	  2007).	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(Husserl,	   1928)	   consisting	   of	   Husserl’s	   lectures,	   which	   had	   been	  meticulously	   reworked	   by	   Stein	   for	   two	   years	  while	  working	   as	   Husserl’s	  assistant.	  Heidegger	  appeared	  as	   the	  editor	   for	   the	  volume	  and	  mentioned	  Stein’s	   contribution	   in	   the	   foreword	  only	   regarding	   the	   transcription	   from	  shorthand	  to	  written	  text	  and	  proofreading.	  The	  previously	  mentioned	  final	  meeting	   between	   Stein	   and	   Heidegger	   took	   place	   in	   1931	   when	   Stein	  travelled	   back	   to	   Freiburg	   one	   last	   time	   to	   discuss	   the	   possibility	   of	  ‘habilitation’	  work	  with	  her	  manuscript	  on	  Act	  and	  Potency.	  	  
Five	   years	   later,	   1933,	   Heidegger	   was	   elected	   as	   rector	   of	   the	  University	  of	  Freiburg:	  in	  his	  short	  time	  as	  rector	  he	  did	  partially	  cooperate	  with	   the	  new	  regime	  after	   the	  election	  of	  Adolf	  Hitler	   to	   chancellor.	   In	   the	  same	  year,	  Stein,	  whose	  teaching	  activities	  were	  forbidden	  due	  to	  her	  Jewish	  origins,	  entered	  the	  Carmelite	  convent	  in	  Cologne	  as	  a	  postulant.	  Heidegger	  resigned	  his	  position	  as	  rector	  in	  April	  1934.	  
	  
2.7. Philosophy	  and	  theology:	  the	  ‘square	  circle’	  
The	   struggle	   to	   reach	   an	   independent	   and	   intellectually	   honest	  research	   method	   and	   to	   establish	   himself	   as	   a	   un-­‐dogmatic	   philosopher	  clarifies	  to	  some	  extent	  the	  content	  of	  Heidegger’s	  previously	  quoted	  letter	  to	   Krebs:	   free	   research	   is	   only	   possible	   if	   one	   abandons	   the	   ‘system	   of	  Catholicism’,	   as	   a	   standpoint.	   In	   his	   lecture	   on	   the	   basic	   problems	   of	  phenomenology,	   Heidegger	   explained:	   “It	   has	   been	   said	   that	   my	   work	   is	  Catholic	   phenomenology	   –	   presumably	   because	   it	   is	   my	   conviction	   that	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thinkers	   like	  Thomas	  Aquinas	  and	  Duns	  Scotus	  also	  understood	  something	  of	  philosophy,	  perhaps	  more	  than	  the	  moderns.	  But	  the	  concept	  of	  a	  Catholic	  phenomenology	   is	   even	   more	   absurd	   than	   the	   concept	   of	   a	   Protestant	  mathematics.	   Philosophy	   as	   science	   of	   beings	   is	   fundamentally	   distinct	   in	  method	  from	  any	  other	  science”	  (Heidegger,	  1982,	  p.	  20).	  	  
Furthermore,	   in	   a	   letter	   to	   Karl	   Löwith	   in	   summer	   1921	   Heidegger	  described	  how	  he	  understands	  basic	  philosophy	  as	  the	  study	  of	  human	  life,	  and	   therefore	   it	  must	   be	   intended	   as	   vital	  experience	   and	   an	   un-­‐dogmatic	  prejudice	  free	  practise:	  
“To	   this	   facticity	   of	  mine	   belongs	  what	   I	  would	   in	   brief	   call	   the	   fact	  that	   I	   am	   a	   ‘Christian	   theologian	   [underscored	   in	   the	   original	   text].’	   This	  involves	   a	   particular	   radical	   personal	   concern,	   a	   particular	   radical	  scientificity,	   a	   strict	  objectivity	   in	   the	   facticity;	   […]	   the	  motive	  and	  goal	  of	  philosophizing	  is	  for	  me	  never	  to	  add	  to	  the	  stock	  of	  objective	  truths,	  since	  the	   objectivity	   of	   philosophy,	   as	   I	   understand	   it	   and	   by	  which	   I	   factually	  proceed,	  is	  something	  proper	  to	  oneself.	  This	  however	  does	  not	  exclude	  the	  strictest	  objectivity	  of	  explication;	  that	  for	  me	  is	  implied	  in	  the	  very	  sense	  of	  my	  existence.	  […]	  It	  is	  simply	  a	  matter	  of	  whether	  a	  purportedly	  impersonal	  stance	   accomplishes	  more	   than	   going	   after	   the	   things	   directly,	  where	  we	  
ourselves	  must	  obviously	  be	  involved	   –	   otherwise	   there	   is	  no	  engagement.	  We	   are	   then	   objectively	   one-­‐sided	   and	   dogmatic,	   but	   philosophically	   still	  ‘absolutely’	   objective	   and	   strict.	   […]	   We	   may	   be	   far	   apart	   in	   ‘system’,	  ‘doctrine’,	  or	  ‘position’,	  and	  yet	  together	  as	  only	  human	  beings	  can	  really	  be	  together:	  in	  existence.”	  (Kisiel,	  1993,	  p.	  78).	  	  A	   great	   help	   towards	   the	   understanding	   of	   Heidegger’s	   key	  definition	   of	   the	   research	   areas	   of	   philosophy	   and	   theology	   and	   the	  problems	  raised	  by	  the	  connection	  of	  the	  two	  can	  be	  found	  in	  his	  lecture	  
Phenomenology	   and	   Theology,	   which	   he	   delivered	   in	   March	   1927	   in	  Tübingen	   and	   repeated	   in	   Marburg	   in	   the	   following	   year	   with	   the	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addition	  of	  a	  second	  part	  on	  “The	  positivity	  of	  Theology	  and	  its	  Relation	  to	  Phenomenology”	  (Heidegger	  and	  McNeill,	  1998).	  
In	  this	  lecture	  he	  argued	  that	  theology	  as	  a	  positive	  science	  is	  not	  independent	  from	  philosophy,	  and	  he	  famously	  declared	  that	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  Christian	  philosophy	  is	  like	  ‘Holzendes	  Eisen’	  (lit.	  wooden	  iron,	  which	  is	  a	  German	  expression	  to	  indicate	  a	  logical	  contradiction,	  e.g.	  in	  English	  a	  ‘square	  circle’),	  meaning	  that	  it	  represents	  a	  contradictio	  in	  adjecto.	  
Heidegger	   distinguished	   between	   two	   types	   of	   science:	   one	   that	  investigates	  the	  Seienden	  (the	  human	  being)	  and	  is	  called	  ‘ontic	  science’;	  the	   other	   that	   investigates	   Sein	   (being	   itself)	   which	   is	   an	   ontological	  science	  -­‐	  philosophy.	  All	  real	  or	   just	   ‘possible’	  sciences	  of	   the	  Seienden	  are	   therefore	   positive	   sciences,	   describing	   how	   things	   are	   and	   only	  caring	   for	   a	   specific	   type	   of	   Seienden,	   and	   to	   this	   extent	   they	   are	  structurally	  different	  from	  ontology.	  According	  to	  Heidegger’s	  theology,	  being	  a	  positive	   science,	   is	   “absolutely	  different	   from	  philosophy”	   and	  consequently	   much	   closer	   to	   other	   positive	   sciences,	   such	   as	  mathematics	   or	   chemistry,	   than	   to	   philosophy.	   However	   it	   must	   be	  recognised	   that	   philosophy	   and	   theology	   share	   a	   special	   connection,	  mostly	  because	  both	  relate	  to	  the	  same	  objects	  of	  investigation:	  human	  beings	   and	   more	   generally	   natural	   beings.	   This,	   however,	   does	   not	  change	   the	   fact	   that	   each	   science	   is	   based	   on	   a	   completely	   different	  principle:	   theology	   is	   based	   on	   faith,	   philosophy	   on	   reason.	   Faith	   is	  considered	   to	   be	   an	   existential	   of	   the	   human	   being,	   which	   does	   not	  derivate	   from	   it,	   but	   is	   revealed	   to	   it	   by	   the	  object	   of	   belief.	   In	   saying	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this	  Heidegger	   is	  referring	  particularly	  to	  Christian	  theology,	  which	  he	  considers	  to	  be	  a	  positive	  science	  because	  his	  positum	  Christian-­‐ness	  is	  disclosed	   by	   faith,	   not	   reason	   (p.	   45).	   The	   scientific	   character	   of	  theology,	   however,	   needs	   the	   help	   of	   philosophy	   in	   order	   to	   grasp	  something	   conceptually	   that	   is	   ‘essentially	   inconceivable’:	   “something	  can	  very	  well	  be	  inconceivable	  and	  never	  primarily	  disclosable	  through	  reason	  without	   thereby	   excluding	   a	   conceptual	   grasp	   of	   itself.	   On	   the	  contrary:	   if	   its	   inconceivability	   as	   such	   is	   indeed	   to	   be	   disclosed	  properly,	   it	   can	   only	   be	   by	   way	   of	   the	   appropriate	   conceptual	  interpretation”	  (p.	  50).	  
Heidegger	   wondered	   how	   one	   can	   understand	   the	   essential	  elements	   of	   belief	   (the	  what,	   essence,	   and	  how,	   the	  mode	   of	   being,	   of	  Christian-­‐ness)	   through	   the	  positive	  evidence	  of	   the	  elements	  of	   faith.	  The	  act	  of	  belief	  has	  already	  been	   said	   to	  be	  a	   ‘how’,	   a	  mode	  of	  being	  (existential)	   of	   the	   human	   Dasein.	   In	   order	   to	   better	   clarify	   this,	  Heidegger	  compares	  the	  act	  of	  faith	  to	  a	  rebirth	  (Wiedergeburth)	  of	  the	  
Dasein,	   intended	   as	   modus	   of	   the	   historical	   existence	   of	   a	   believing	  human	   being.	   He	   quotes	   Luther:	   “Faith	   is	   permitting	   ourselves	   to	   be	  seized	  by	  the	   things	  we	  do	  not	  see”	  (Werke,	  Vol	  46).	  This	  stresses	   the	  role	  of	  human	  participation	  in	  the	  theological	  understanding	  of	  Dasein:	  “Thus	  faith	  understands	  itself	  only	  in	  believing.	  In	  any	  case,	  the	  believer	  does	   not	   come	   to	   know	   anything	   about	   his	   specific	   existence,	   for	  instance,	  by	  way	  of	  a	  theoretical	  confirmation	  of	  his	  inner	  experiences.	  Rather,	  he	  can	  only	  “believe”	  this	  possibility	  of	  existence	  as	  one	  which	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the	   Dasein	   concerned	   does	   not	   independently	   master,	   in	   which	   it	  becomes	  a	  slave,	  is	  brought	  before	  God,	  and	  is	  thus	  born	  again”	  (p.	  44).	  In	  the	  act	  of	  participation	  with	  a	  Seinsmodus,	  a	  permission	  to	  ‘be	  seized’	  by	  faith	  and	  understand	  human	  life	  in	  its	  light,	  Heidegger	  sees	  a	  defeat	  of	   reason	   and	   freedom,	   a	   Dasein	   that	   does	   not	   gain	   any	   further	  understanding	  of	  its	  human	  condition	  and	  instead	  entrust	  its	  existential	  meaning	   to	   faith.	   In	   doing	   so	   the	   human	   being	   chooses	   to	   live	   in	   the	  modus	  of	  existence	  of	  belief,	  the	  believing	  existence,	  which	  is	  only	  one	  of	   many	   modi,	   types	   of	   possible	   existence,	   and	   this	   is	   what	   is	  investigated	   by	   theology.	   Philosophy	   on	   the	   other	   hand	   is	   concerned	  with	   “the	   free	   questioning	   of	   a	   purely	   self-­‐reliant	   Dasein”,	   above	   the	  theological	  positive	  science	  as	  well	  as	  any	  other	  science	  investigating	  a	  particular	  form	  of	  existence.	  	  
Philosophy	   is	   therefore	   somehow	   taken	   for	   granted	   by	   theology	  because	   it	  provides	  a	  basic	  understanding	  of	  being	  and	  as	  such	  serves	  an	  “ontological	  corrective”	  of	  the	  ontic	  and	  allows	  theology	  to	  function	  correctly.	  Despite	  this	  special	  relationship:	  
	   “faith,	   as	   a	   specific	   possibility	   of	   existence,	   is	   in	   its	   innermost	  core	  the	  mortal	  enemy	  of	  the	  form	  of	  existence	   that	  is	  an	  essential	  part	  of	  philosophy	  and	  that	  is	  factically	  ever-­‐changing.	  Faith	  is	  so	  absolutely	  the	  mortal	  enemy	  that	  philosophy	  does	  not	  even	  begin	   to	  want	   in	  any	  way	  to	  do	  battle	  with	  it.	  This	  existentiell	  opposition	  between	  faithfulness	  and	   the	   free	   appropriation	   of	   one’s	  whole	   Dasein	   is	   not	   first	   brought	  about	  by	  the	  sciences	  of	   theology	  and	  philosophy	  but	   is	  prior	   to	   them.	  Furthermore,	  it	  is	  precisely	  this	  opposition	  that	  must	  bear	  the	  possibility	  
of	  a	  community	  of	  the	  sciences	  of	  theology	  and	  philosophy,	  if	  indeed	  they	  are	   to	   communicate	   in	   a	   genuine	   way,	   free	   from	   illusions	   and	   weak	  attempts	  at	  mediation.	  Accordingly,	  there	  is	  no	  such	  thing	  as	  a	  Christian	  philosophy;	  that	  is	  an	  absolute	  ‘square	  circle’”	  (Heidegger	  and	  McNeill,	  1998,	  p.	  53).	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2.8. The	  question	  of	  being	  in	  modern	  ontology	  
Stein	   was	   always	   interested	   in	   classical	   metaphysics,	   and	   she	   had	  previously	   searched	   for	   what	   she	   called	   a	   positive	   determination	   of	  metaphysics.	  In	  a	  letter	  to	  Conrad-­‐Martius	  from	  Munster	  on	  13th	  November	  1932	  (ESGA	  2,	  p.	  250)	  she	  explained	  that	  she	  understood	  metaphysics	  as	  a	  discipline	  based	  on	  both	  philosophy	  and	   theology,	  a	  discipline	   that	  has	   for	  its	  object	   the	  entire	  reality	  which	  results	   from	  the	  revealed	   truth.	  She	  also	  added	   that	   her	   perspective	   is	   the	   result	   of	   her	   studying	   the	   works	   of	  Aquinas.	  
This	  approach	  to	  the	  question	  of	  being	  is	  not	  a	  personal	  issue	  for	  Stein,	  but	  a	  philosophical	  question	  that	   is	  central	   to	  her	  time	  and	  therefore	  must	  be	   put	   into	   a	   wider	   context,	   a	   context	   that	   comprehends	   classical	  metaphysics.	  Both	  Stein	  and	  Heidegger	  tried	   in	  their	  works	  to	  solve	  one	  of	  philosophy’s	  most	  ancient	  questions,	   the	  question	  of	   the	  meaning	  of	  being,	  and	   they	   in	   doing	   so	   walked	   backwards	   along	   the	   path	   that	   previous	  philosophers	   have	  walked	  before	   them,	   and	   analysed	  how	   they	  dealt	  with	  the	  same	  question.	  We	  have	  already	  seen	  how	  Stein	  found	  in	  the	  scholastic	  doctrine	  a	  natural	  completion	  to	  her	  philosophical	  training	  and	  how	  her	  first	  attempt	   to	   write	   about	   ontology	   was	   a	   dissertation	   on	   the	   ideas	   of	  potentiality	   and	   actuality,	   she	   was	   therefore	   attempting	   to	   build	   a	   bridge	  between	  Thomas	  and	  Husserl,	  while	  Heidegger	  tried	  to	  deconstruct	  ancient	  ontology,	  and	  built	  the	  basis	  for	  an	  independent,	  prejudice-­‐free,	  questioning	  of	   being.	   Stein	   willingly	   placed	   herself	   into	   a	   philosophical	   tradition.	   She	  made	  her	   intentions	  clear	  regarding	  her	  research	  attitude	  in	  the	  preface	  of	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Finite	  and	  Eternal	  Being:	  she	  wanted	  to	  pursue	  a	  search	  for	  truth,	  to	  produce	  an	   attempt	   that	   may	   help	   others,	   to	   draw	   a	   doctrine	   of	   being	   and	   not	   a	  philosophical	   system.	   Such	   an	   investigation	   does	   not	   presume	   barriers	   or	  alliances.	  	  
When	   Stein	   chose	   Heidegger	   as	   a	   counterpart	   for	   her	   tractate	   on	   the	  problem	  of	  being,	  she	  read	  and	  commented	  on	  four	  of	  Heidegger’s	  works	  on	  this	  topic,	  all	  published	  between	  1927	  and	  1929:	  Being	  and	  Time;	  Kant	  and	  
the	   Problem	   of	   Metaphysics;	  The	   Essence	   of	   Reasons;	  What	   is	   Metaphysics?	  (Heidegger,	   2010;	   2004;	   2004).	   Many	   of	   the	   criticisms	   posed	   by	   Stein	   to	  Heidegger	   in	   this	   short	   essay	   concern	   his	   methodological	   inconsistencies:	  she	   remarks	  many	   times	   on	   how	   the	   final	   aim	   of	   Heidegger’s	   research	   is	  nothing	  more	  than	  to	  ask	  again	  the	  fundamental	  question	  of	  the	  meaning	  of	  being.	  But	  why	  is	  it	  that	  the	  question	  of	  being	  must	  be	  asked	  again,	  must	  be	  re-­‐awoken	  at	  all	  costs,	  according	  to	  Heidegger?	  Why	  does	  Stein	  describe	  it	  as	  a	  necessary	  question?	  
The	   attempt	   to	   grasp	   the	  meaning	   of	   being	   has	   roots	   in	   the	   classical	  ontology	   of	   Plato,	   Aristotle,	   Duns	   Scotus	   and	   Thomas	   Aquinas.	   Heidegger	  describes	  being	  as	  what	  determines	  beings	  as	  beings,	  that	  in	  terms	  of	  which	  beings	   are	   already	   understood	   (see	   SZ,	   p.	   24).	   As	   a	   concept	   it	   is	   the	  most	  general	   and	   self-­‐evident,	   furthermore	   because	   of	   its	   particular	   nature	   of	  always	   ‘being-­‐present’	   and	   ‘being-­‐such’,	   it	   was	   presupposed	   that	   it	   was	  impossible	  to	  define	  and	  that	  a	  definition	  was	  in	  fact	  not	  needed.	  	  However	  the	   impossibility	  to	  define	   it	  –	  as	  stated	  by	  Heidegger	  –	  does	  not	  elude	  the	  questioning	  of	  it,	  rather,	  it	  urges	  one	  to	  do	  so	  more	  than	  ever.	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The	   entire	   history	   of	   ontology	   has	   this	   vague	   and	   yet	   self-­‐evident	  understanding	  of	  being	   in	  the	  background,	  the	  most	   influential	  attempts	   in	  modern	  times	  being	  Descartes	  and	  Kant.	  Heidegger	  states	  that	  all	  ontology	  remains	   blind	   from	   its	   aim	   because	   it	   has	   not	   yet	   succeeded	   in	   its	  fundamental	   task,	   i.e.	   the	   clarification	   of	   being.	   The	   reason	   for	   this	   is	  attributed	   to	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   question	   of	   being	   was	   not	   asked	   in	   an	  appropriate	  manner.	  	  
In	  The	  Basic	  Problems	  of	  Phenomenology	  he	  approaches	  the	  problem	  of	  being	   phenomenologically,	   with	   the	   reduction	   of	   the	   problem	   to	   the	  following	  four	  theses:	  
-­‐ Kant’s	  thesis:	  Being	  is	  not	  a	  real	  predicate.	  
-­‐ Medieval	   ontology	   or	   Scholasticism,	   a	   thesis	   that	   is	   traced	   back	   to	  Aristotle:	   to	   the	   constitution	  of	   the	  being	   of	   a	   being	   there	  belong	   (a)	  ‘whatness’,	   essence	   (Was-­‐sein,	   essentia),	   and	   (b)	   existence	   or	  extantness	  (existentia,	  Vorandensein).	  
-­‐ Modern	  ontology:	  The	  basic	  ways	  of	  being	  are	  the	  being	  of	  nature	  (res	  
extensa)	  and	  the	  being	  of	  mind	  (res	  cogitans).	  
-­‐ The	  thesis	  of	  logic	  in	  the	  broadest	  sense:	  every	  being,	  regardless	  of	  its	  particular	  way	  of	  being,	  can	  be	  addressed	  and	  discussed	  by	  means	  of	  the	  “is”.	  The	  being	  of	  the	  copula	  (predicative).	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It	   is	   at	   this	   point	   that	   Heidegger	   shifts	   the	   main	   problem	   from	   the	  posing	  of	   the	  question,	   to	   the	  problem	  of	  whom	   such	  a	  question	  should	  be	  asked.	  As	  he	  states	  in	  the	  above	  lecture	  course,	  the	  problem	  of	  being	  cannot	  be	  adequately	  brought	  up	  if	  the	  question	  of	  the	  meaning	  of	  being	  in	  general	  is	  not	  answered	  first.	  This	  means	  that	  we	  cannot	  understand	  what	  ‘being’	  is	  in	  itself	  if	  we	  first	  don’t	  explain	  what	  it	  means.	  	  
Again	   Heidegger	   goes	   back	   to	   phenomenology	   and	   searches	   for	  ‘something	  like	  being’	  that	  belongs	  to	  our	  experience,	  in	  that	  it	  reveals	  itself	  in	   the	  present	   as	   a	   form	  of	  being	   and	   contributes	   to	  our	  understanding	  of	  being.	   This	   is	   of	   course	   the	   human	   being,	   in	   its	   present	   state	   the	   human	  
Dasein.	  In	  Being	  and	  Time	  it	  says	  that	  the	  very	  asking	  of	  this	  question	  is	  this	  entity’s	  ‘mode	  of	  being’,	  and	  that	  ‘this	  entity	  which	  each	  of	  us	  is	  himself	  and	  which	   includes	   inquiring	   as	   one	   of	   the	   possibilities	   of	   its	   being,	   we	   shall	  denote	  by	  the	  term	  Dasein’	  (SZ,	  p.	  27),	  which	  literally	  is	  translated	  as	  ‘being-­‐there’.	  Furthermore	  Dasein	   is	  initially	  described	  as	  not	  a	  ‘what’	  but	  a	  ‘who’,	  that	  being	  for	  whom	  the	  question	  of	  being	  is	  important,	  the	  being	  for	  whom	  being	  matters.	  	  
It	   is	  now	  possible	   to	  draw	  a	   first	   important	   conclusion,	  which	   is	   that	  Stein	   and	   Heidegger	   operated	   in	   a	   methodologically	   directly	   opposing	  manner:	   while	   Heidegger	   restricts	   and	   concentrates	   the	   entire	   ontological	  question	   of	   the	  meaning	   of	   being	   on	   the	  Dasein,	   the	   human	   being	   and	   his	  existence	   and	   facticity,	   Stein	   attempts	   to	  do	   the	   exact	   opposite,	   she	  places	  the	  problem	  of	  being	  in	  the	  widest	  philosophical	  perspective	  and	  therefore	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enlarges	  the	  concept	  of	   the	  human	  being	   to	  embrace	   the	  entire	  ontological	  horizon.	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  Chapter	  3.	  Understanding	  Being	  and	  Time	  
	   This	  chapter	   is	  an	  analysis	  of	  Stein’s	  critique	  of	  Heidegger.	   I	   examine	  key	   passages	   of	   Stein’s	   essay	   Martin	   Heidegger’s	   Philosophy	   of	   Existence,	  along	   with	   passages	   of	   Finite	   and	   Eternal	   Being,	   in	   which	   she	   directly	  discusses	   Heidegger’s	  Being	   and	   Time.	   	   I	   look	   at	   the	   key	   concepts	   behind	  Stein’s	  critique,	  particularly	  Heidegger’s	  refusal	  to	  use	  the	  concept	  of	  person	  and	   his	   reasons	   for	   doing	   so,	   the	   consequences	   that	   follow	   from	   the	  coincidence	  of	  being	  and	  existence	  for	  the	  definition	  of	  the	  human	  being	  in	  Heidegger’s	  work	  and	  his	  position	  towards	  traditional	  Christian	  ontology	  as	  expressed	   in	   Being	   and	   Time.	  Heidegger’s	   concept	   of	   Geworfenheit	   (being	  thrown)	   and	   Stein’s	   idea	   of	   Geborgenheit	   (being	   held	   securely)	   are	  compared.	  I	  also	  look	  at	  their	  different	  approach	  to	  the	  existential	  condition	  of	  the	  human	  being	  in	  relation	  to	  temporality	  and	  everydayness	  and	  the	  role	  of	  death.	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3.1. The	  analysis	  of	  Dasein	  
	   In	  the	  appendix	  on	  Heidegger’s	  philosophy	  of	  existence	  Stein	  analyses	  
Being	  and	  Time,	  which	   first	   appeared	   in	  Husserl’s	  Yearbook	   in	  1927	  along	  with	   three	  other	  writings	   that	  were	  published	   in	   the	   following	  years:	  Kant	  
and	  the	  Problem	  of	  Metaphysics	   published	   in	  1929;	  The	  Essence	  of	  Reasons,	  published	   in	   the	   1929	   yearbook	   which	   was	   a	   special	   issue	   dedicated	   to	  Husserl’s	   70th	   birthday;	   and	   What	   is	   Metaphysics,	   Heidegger’s	   inaugural	  lecture	   which	   he	   delivered	   to	   the	   combined	   faculties	   at	   the	   University	   of	  Freiburg	  in	  summer	  1929.	  The	  majority	  of	  the	  essay,	  however,	  is	  dedicated	  to	  Being	  and	  Time,	   and	   the	  other	   three	  works	  are	  discussed	  only	  briefly	  at	  the	  end,	  mostly	  in	  relation	  to	  Being	  and	  Time.	  Stein	  clarifies,	  for	  example	  at	  the	   beginning	   of	   her	   analysis	   of	  Kant	  and	   the	  Problem	  of	  Metaphysics,	   that	  she	   is	   not	   setting	   herself	   up	   to	   investigate	   whether	   Heidegger’s	  interpretation	   of	   Kant	   is	   truthful,	   she	   is	   only	   attempting	   to	   try	   and	   find	  further	   clarification	   of	   the	   questions	   raised	   in	   Being	   and	   Time	   (MHE,	   p.	  484)46.	  	  
	   The	  analysis	  of	  Being	  and	  Time	   is	  divided	  into	  two	  parts:	  the	  first	  one	  entitled	   “Outline	   of	   the	   Argument”	   offers	   a	   synthetic	   description	   of	  Heidegger’s	  investigations	  and	  focuses	  on	  the	  analysis	  of	  Dasein	  and	  on	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  46	  I	   have	   indicated	   in	   brackets	   the	   abbreviations	   of	   the	   original	   German	   titles	   (see	   also	  bibliographical	   note	   p.	   ii)	   as	   follows:	  Endliches	  und	  Ewiges	   Sein,	   transl.	   Finite	  and	  Eternal	  
Being	  (hereafter	  referred	  to	  as	  EES);	  Martin	  Heideggers	  Existentialphilosophie,	  trans.	  Martin	  
Heidegger’s	   Existential	   Philosophy	   (hereafter	   MHE);	   Sein	   und	   Zeit,	   trans.	   Being	   and	   Time	  (hereafter	  SZ).	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relationship	   between	   Dasein	   and	   temporality,	   where	   Stein	   discusses	  specifically	   Heidegger’s	   ‘being-­‐towards-­‐death’.	   In	   the	   second	   part,	  “Evaluation”	   she	   questions	   and	   criticises	   directly	   specific	   aspects	   of	  Heidegger’s	  argument	  before	  offering	  her	  response	  to	  his	  perspective.	  Again	  the	  focus	  and	  the	  main	  interest	  is	  the	  understanding	  of	  Dasein.	  Stein	  asks:	  1.	  What	  is	  Dasein?;	  2.	  Is	  the	  analysis	  of	  Dasein	  accurate?;	  3.	  Is	  this	  a	  sufficient	  foundation	   for	  posing	  the	  question	  of	   the	  meaning	  of	  being	   in	  an	  adequate	  manner?	  	  
	   It	   is	   difficult,	   of	   course,	   to	   view	  Heidegger’s	   thoughts	   at	   this	   point	   in	  time	  without	  taking	  into	  account	  the	  later	  development	  of	  his	  philosophy.	  A	  good	  example	  of	  a	   late	  work	   that	   could	  offer	  a	  helpful	   contribution	   to	   this	  debate	   is	   without	   doubt	   Heidegger’s	   “Letter	   on	   Humanism”	   from	   1949,	  where	  Heidegger	   returns	   to	   the	   issues	   of	   the	   essence	   of	   the	   human	   being	  and	   reiterates	   the	   occurrence	   of	   existence	   as	   ‘thrownness’	   and	   rejects	  Sartre’s	  statement	   that	  existence	  precedes	  essence	  as	  well	  as	   the	  Christian	  theological	   idea	   of	   existence	   as	   a	   realisation	   of	   essence47.	   It	   is,	   however,	  interesting	  to	  note	  how	  Stein	  already	  raises	  some	  of	  these	  objections	  more	  than	   ten	   years	   earlier	   and	   highlights	   those	   aspects	   of	   Heidegger’s	  investigation	  that	  need	  clarification	  in	  this	  short	  essay	  which	  she	  chooses	  to	  append	   to	   her	  major	   ontological	  work	   and	   that	  will	   now	  be	   considered	   in	  detail.	  
	   Stein’s	  first	  remark,	  which	  is	  repeated	  many	  times,	  is	  how	  the	  primary	  and	   final	   aim	   of	   Heidegger’s	   research	   is	   to	   raise	   anew	   the	   fundamental	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  47	  See	  Introduction	  1.4	  p.	  14.	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question	  of	  the	  meaning	  of	  being:	  “The	  goal	  of	  the	  entire	  work	  was	  nothing	  else	   but	   to	   ask	   the	   question	   of	   the	   meaning	   of	   being	   in	   an	   appropriate	  manner.	   Is	   thus	   the	  question	  with	  which	   the	  work	   rings	  out	   identical	  with	  this	  question	  that	  was	  put	  aside,	  or	  is	  a	  doubt	  expressed	  as	  to	  whether	  the	  way	   chosen	   was	   the	   right	   one?”	   (MHE,	   p.	   69).	   Later	   Stein	   concludes	   that	  
Being	  and	  Time	  is	  in	  fact	  a	  repetition	  of	  the	  Critique	  of	  Pure	  Reason	  because	  it	  attempts	  to	  found	  metaphysics	  anew.	  (MHE,	  p.	  83).	  	  
	   The	  central	  point	  for	  Heidegger	  quickly	  becomes	  ‘whom’	  the	  question	  of	   being	   should	  be	   asked	   to:	   he	   says	   that	   one	  must	   question	   that	   being	   to	  whose	  being	  the	  asking	  for	  the	  meaning	  of	  being,	  and	  a	  certain	  anticipatory	  (pre-­‐ontological)	  understanding	  of	  being,	  belongs:	   “The	  very	  asking	  of	   this	  question	   is	   an	   entity’s	   mode	   of	   Being;	   and	   as	   such	   it	   gets	   its	   essential	  character	   from	  what	   is	   inquired	   about	   –	   namely,	   being.	   This	   entity	  which	  each	  of	  us	  is	  himself	  and	  which	  includes	  inquiring	  as	  one	  of	  the	  possibilities	  of	  its	  being,	  we	  shall	  denote	  by	  the	  term	  ‘Dasein’”	  (SZ,	  p.	  27)	  This	  is	  the	  first	  definition	   of	  Dasein,	   where	   Heidegger	   clarifies	   that	   the	   analysis	   of	  Dasein	  should	  be	  carried	  out	   in	  order	   to	  prepare	   for	   the	  quest	   for	   the	  meaning	  of	  being.	  	  
	   The	   expression	   da-­‐sein	   (literally	   ‘to	   be	   there’)	   is	   often	   translated	   by	  ‘existence’	  and	  it	  has	  being	  used	  before	  in	  the	  history	  of	  philosophy	  with	  this	  meaning.	   For	   Kant	   Dasein	   is	   used	   to	   indicate	   the	   existence	   of	   an	   entity.	  However	  Heidegger	  restricts	  this	  particular	  term	  to	  indicate	  only	  the	  human	  being	  and	  highlights	  continuously	  the	  terminological	  and	  grammatical	  origin	  of	   the	   name	   and	   why	   it	   has	   to	   be	   distinguished	   by	   the	   traditional	   term	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‘existentia’,	  which	   should	  be	   reserved	   for	  other	  entities,	   called	   ‘present-­‐at-­‐hand.	  	  
	   In	   §	  9	  of	   ‘the	  Analysis	   of	  Dasein’	   it	   is	   said:	   “The	   ‘essence’	   [Wesen]	  of	  this	   entity	   lies	   in	   its	   ‘to	   be’	   [Zu-­‐sein].	   Its	   Being-­‐what-­‐it-­‐is	   [Was-­‐sein]	  (essentia)	  must,	  so	  far	  as	  we	  can	  speak	  of	  it	  at	  all,	  be	  conceived	  in	  terms	  of	  its	  Being	  (existentia)”	  (SZ,	  p.	  67)48.	  However	  Heidegger	  recognised	  the	  difficulty	  of	   using	   the	   traditional	   term	   ‘existence’	   to	   denote	   a	   being	   that	   is	  ontologically	  different	  from	  Dasein.	  Grammatically	  the	  essentiality	  of	  Dasein	  lies	  in	  its	  existence,	  as	  a	  coincidence	  of	  subject	  and	  predicate,	  so	  that	  “when	  we	   designate	   this	   entity	   with	   the	   term	   Dasein,	   we	   are	   expressing	   not	   its	  ‘what’	   (as	   if	   it	  were	   a	   table,	   house,	   or	   tree)	  but	   its	  Being”	   (SZ,	   p.	   67).	  This	  point	   will	   be	   further	   clarified	   while	   describing	   the	   classical	   definition	   of	  being.	   For	   the	   moment	   Heidegger	   concludes	   that	   “to	   avoid	   getting	  bewildered,	  we	  shall	  always	  use	  the	  interpretative	  expression	  ‘presence-­‐at-­‐hand’	  for	  the	  term	  ‘existentia’,	  while	  the	  term	  ‘existence’	  as	  a	  designation	  of	  being,	  will	  be	  allotted	  solely	  to	  Dasein”.	  
	   Stein	   rightly	   observes	   how	   Heidegger’s	   analytical	   process	   is	   ‘set	   up’	  from	   the	   beginning	   in	   order	   to	   demonstrate	   its	   premise,	   namely	   that	  existence	   is	   the	   basic	   constitution	   of	   the	   Dasein	   and	   that	   the	   difference	  between	   Dasein-­‐like	   and	   non-­‐Dasein-­‐like	   being	   has	   not	   actually	   been	  elucidated.	   Heidegger	   does	   speak	   about	   the	   forgetfulness	   of	   the	   ancient	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  48	  I	   follow	  here	  Lebech’s	   translation	   and	  avoid	  Macquarrie	   and	  Robinson	   capitalization	  of	  being	  as	  well	  as	  other	  capitalization	  in	  the	  English	  translation	  of	  the	  German	  words.	  I	  also	  chose	  to	  use	  the	  original	  expression	  Dasein	  instead	  of	  any	  proposed	  translation.	  For	  further	  alterations	  of	  original	  translation	  and	  bibliographical	  choices	  see	  Bibliographical	  notes	  p.	  ii.	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ontology	   that	   had	   omitted	   to	   consider	   the	   being	   in	   itself	   (Sein)	   and	   only	  speaks	  about	  the	  different	  types	  of	  beings	  (Seienden).	  	  He	  also	  recognizes	  in	  the	  Dasein	  the	  human	  being,	  with	  privileged	  access	  to	  solve	  the	  question	  of	  being,	   but	   in	   spite	   of	   this	   he	   still	   concentrates	   his	   entire	   analysis	   on	   the	  
Dasein	   rather	   than	   on	   the	   being	   itself.	   Primarily	   for	   this	   reason	   Stein	  wonders	   whether	   his	   analysis	   is	   sufficient	   foundation	   for	   posing	   the	  question	  of	  being	  in	  an	  adequate	  manner.	  	  
	  
2.9. Dasein	  and	  being	  
	  	   At	  the	  beginning	  of	  Being	  and	  Time	  it	  states	  that	  every	  type	  of	  enquiry	  is	  a	  ‘seeking’	  and	  it	  must	  be	  guided	  beforehand	  by	  what	  is	  sought	  (SZ,	  p.	  25).	  In	   the	   case	   of	   the	   enquiry	   about	   being	   it	   must	   be	   considered	   that	   the	  meaning	   of	   being	   is	   already	   available	   to	   us	   in	   a	   given	   way,	   although	  Heidegger,	  paraphrasing	  Plato,	  has	  already	  described	  how	  being	  is	  the	  most	  universal	   concept:	   “an	   understanding	   of	   Being	   is	   already	   included	   in	  conceiving	  anything	  which	  one	  apprehends	  as	  an	  entity”.	  The	   fact	   that	   the	  concept	  of	  being	  is	  universal	  doesn’t	  make	  it	  clearer;	  in	  fact	  it	  is	  described	  as	  the	   ‘darkest’	   concept	   of	   all	   and	   the	   most	   indefinable.	   It	   represents	   an	  ‘enigma’	  especially	  because	  of	  its	  self-­‐evidence,	  since	  even	  if	  we	  ask	  ‘What	  is	  Being?’	  we	  postulate	  a	  general	  understanding	  of	  the	  ‘is’;	  therefore	  Heidegger	  concludes	   that	   “the	   very	   fact	   that	   we	   already	   live	   in	   an	   understanding	   of	  Being	  and	  that	  the	  meaning	  of	  Being	  is	  still	  veiled	  in	  darkness	  proves	  that	  it	  is	  necessary	  in	  principle	  to	  raise	  this	  question	  again”	  (SZ,	  p.	  23).	  Because	  of	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its	   vague	   and	   imprecise	   nature	   it	   is	   necessary	   for	   Heidegger	   to	   avoid	  traditional	  theories	  or	  tracking	  back	  entities	  to	  other	  entities,	  and	  instead	  he	  must	  narrow	  down	  how	  being-­‐on-­‐his-­‐own	  manifests	  itself.	  This	  is,	  in	  a	  way,	  a	  phenomenological	  approach,	  which	  proves	  that	  Heidegger	  applies,	  at	  least	  theoretically	  although	   in	  personal	  manner,	  a	  method	  that	  derives	   from	  the	  phenomenological	  reduction.	  	  
	   The	  definition	  of	  being	  as	  what-­‐is	  (ens,	  Seiendes)	  is	  immediately	  rooted	  in	  its	  presence	  in	  the	  world:	  “Everything	  we	  talk	  about,	  everything	  we	  have	  in	   view,	   everything	   towards	   which	   we	   comport	   ourselves,	   in	   any	   way,	   is	  being;	  what	  we	  are	  is	  being,	  and	  so	  is	  how	  we	  are.	  Being	  lies	  in	  the	  fact	  that	  something	   is,	   and	   in	   its	   Being	   as	   it	   is;	   in	   Reality;	   in	   presence-­‐at-­‐hand;	   in	  subsistence;	   in	   validity;	   in	   Dasein;	   in	   the	   ‘there	   is’”	   (SZ,	   p.	   26).	   Once	   the	  direction	  of	  the	  quest	  has	  been	  clarified,	  Heidegger	  reiterates	  the	  ontological	  and	  ontical	  priority	  of	  the	  question	  of	  being.	  It	  will	  suffice	  to	  say	  here	  that,	  according	   to	   Heidegger,	   only	   philosophy,	   and	   specifically	   ontology,	  possesses	   the	   necessary	   distance	   and	   objective	   scientific	   priority	   to	  understand	  being	  as	  what	  it	  really	  is.	  	  
	   Heidegger	  enumerates	  and	  describes	  the	  most	  significant	  results	  of	  the	  history	   of	   ontology	   to	   conclude	   that	   the	   meaning	   of	   being	   has	   been	  misunderstood.	  Particularly	  the	  ancient	  ontology	  of	  Plato	  and	  Aristotle	  has	  mistakenly	   identified	  being	  as	   ‘present-­‐at-­‐hand’	  with	   ‘being-­‐as-­‐such’,	  while	  later	  the	  predominance	  of	  ancient-­‐Christian	  anthropology	  has	  deformed	  the	  objectivity	   of	   the	   ontological	   quest	   because	   religious	   concepts	   always	  provide	  the	  necessary	  support	  behind	  any	  unexplained	  human	  notions,	  such	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as	  soul	  or	  spirit,	  or	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  human	  being	  that	  reflects	  a	  higher	  perfect	  one	  (Genesis	  I:	  “Let	  us	  make	  man	  in	  our	  image,	  in	  our	  likeness”).	  	  
	   This	   observation	   is	   especially	   important	   when	   considering	   how	   a	  cumulative	  definition	  of	  the	  human	  being,	  as	  consisting	  of	  more	  substances,	  soul	   plus	   body,	   is	   excluded	   by	   Heidegger	   in	   advance	   as	   a	   metaphysical	  prejudice.	  His	  strong	  opposition	   to	  a	  positive	  metaphysic	   is	  called	  by	  Stein	  an	   ‘anti-­‐Christian	   feeling’,	  which	   allows	   for	   the	   assumption	   that	  Heidegger	  had	   maintained	   a	   critical	   attitude	   that	   could	   be	   connected	   to	   the	   reason	  behind	   his	   sudden	   break	  with	   Catholicism	   to	   favour	   the	   objectivity	   of	   his	  philosophy49.	  	  
	   Stein	   criticises	   Heidegger’s	   break	   with	   the	   existing	   philosophical	  tradition	  also	  on	  a	   terminological	   level:	   in	   the	  preface	  of	  Finite	  and	  Eternal	  
Being,	   after	   remarking	   on	   the	   great	   impact	   of	   Heidegger’s	   work	   and	   its	  significance	   for	   the	  debate	  on	   the	  problem	  of	  being	  which	  was	  dominating	  the	   philosophical	   scene,	   she	   raised	   concerns	   about	   the	   new	   language	   of	  
Being	   and	   Time,	   which	   she	   considered	   to	   have	   not	   been	   completely	  understood,	   or	   at	   least	   not	   in	   its	   fundamental	   meaning	   and,	   most	  importantly,	   in	   its	   incompatibility	   with	   the	   already	   existing	   ontological	  discussion.	  Both	  these	  comments	  demonstrate	  how	  she	  intended	  to	  evaluate	  not	   only	   Heidegger’s	   results,	   but	   also	   the	   direction	   of	   his	   investigation	   in	  significant	  depth.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  49	  See	  chapter	  2.7,	  p.	  64.	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   It	   is	  possible	  to	  ask	  if	  Heidegger’s	  methodological	   ‘honesty’	  should	  be	  seen	  as	   an	  extreme	  attempt	   to	   reduce	   the	  object	  of	  his	   investigation	   to	   its	  final	  part,	  faithful	  to	  the	  phenomenological	  reduction,	  or	  if	  instead,	  it	  favours	  the	  risk	  of	  defining	   the	  boundaries	  of	   the	   investigation	   in	  order	   to	  exclude	  certain	  undesirable	  conclusions,	  an	  analysis	  that	   is	  shutting	  out	   in	  advance	  what	  it	  doesn’t	  want	  to	  consider.	  	  
	   According	   to	   Heidegger	  Dasein	   stands	   out	   from	   all	   other	   manner	   of	  beings	  as	  identified	  by	  other	  sciences	  because	  the	  understanding	  of	  being	  is	  the	   definitive	   characteristic	   of	   its	   being.	   In	   this	   way	   Dasein	   is	   ‘ontically	  distinctive	  in	  that	  it	  is	  ontological’.	  This	  means	  that	  Dasein	  is	  ‘in	  such	  a	  way	  that	   it	   has	   an	   understanding	   of	   being’	   (SZ,	   p.	   32).	   Heidegger	   explains	  furthermore	  that:	  
	   “The	  kind	  of	  beings	  towards	  which	  Dasein	  can	  comport	  itself	  in	  one	  or	  another,	   and	   always	   does	   comport	   itself	   somehow,	   we	   call	   ‘existence’	  [Existenz].	  And	  because	  we	  cannot	  define	  Dasein’s	  essence	  by	  citing	  a	  ‘what’	  of	   the	   kind	   that	   pertains	   to	   a	   subject-­‐matter	   [ein	   sachhaltiges	   Was],	   and	  because	  its	  essence	  lies	  rather	  in	  the	  fact	  that	  in	  each	  case	  it	  has	  its	  being	  to	  be,	  and	  has	  it	  as	  its	  own,	  we	  have	  chosen	  to	  designate	  this	  entity	  as	  “Dasein”,	  a	  term	  which	  is	  purely	  an	  expression	  of	  its	  being	  [als	  reiner	  Seinsausdruck]”	  (SZ,	  p.	  32).	  	  	  
3.3. The	  rejection	  of	  personal	  connotations	  
	   In	  her	  outlining	  of	  Heidegger’s	  position	  Stein	  tries	  to	  achieve	  a	  deeper	  understanding	   of	   Dasein	   and	   what	   is	   hidden	   behind	   it.	   The	   three	   main	  elements	   of	   the	   Dasein’s	   being	   that	   she	   extrapolated	   from	   Heidegger’s	  investigations	  are:	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-­‐ Dasein’s	  being	   is	   in	   each	   case	  mine	   (i.e.	   is	   as	   such	   individual	   and	  not	  universal)	  
-­‐ It	  relates	  to	  itself	  
-­‐ Its	  being	  or	  its	  existence	  is	  also	  its	  essence	  (Wesen):	  what	  belongs	  to	  the	  structure	  of	  its	  being	  is	  designated	  as	  an	  ‘existential’.	  	  
	   Dasein	   appears	   to	   be	   therefore	   completely	   locked	   in	   itself,	   in	   self-­‐relation	   and	   self-­‐determination.	   It	   lives	   in-­‐the-­‐world	   which	   is	   not	  understood	  in	  a	  spatial	  way,	  “with	  world	  is	  not	  understood	  the	  totality	  of	  all	  objects	  present-­‐at-­‐hand”	  and	  also	  not	   intended	  as	   its	  natural	  environment,	  but	   it	   is	   an	   existential	   of	   the	  Dasein,	  which	  means	   that	   being-­‐in-­‐the	  world	  belongs	   to	   its	   mode	   of	   being	   as	   such.	   The	   Dasein	   has	   the	   possibility	   of	  dealing	  with	  things,	  which	  is	  said	  to	  be	  the	  fundamental	  structure	  of	  its	  in-­‐being,	  whereby	   things	   are	   only	   regarded	   as	   tools,	   as	   something	   that	   has	   a	  practical	  use.	  	  
	   Stein’s	   wonders	   at	   this	   point	   if	   any	   ‘personal’	   state	   of	   being	   can	   be	  attributed	  to	  the	  Dasein.	   In	  particular	  its	  state	  of	  being	  in	  the	  world	  should	  comprehend	   some	   sort	   of	   being-­‐with-­‐others,	   however	   it	   emerges	   that:	  “Being	   in	   the	  world	   is	   characterised	   by	   ‘concern’	   [Besorgen]	   (in	   the	  many	  senses	   of	   ‘enduring’,	   ‘achieving’,	   ‘obtaining’,	   and	   ‘being	   apprehensive’.	  Knowing	  is	  also	  a	  kind	  of	  concern.	  One	  falsifies	  its	  original	  character	  if	  one	  sees	  it	  as	  a	  relationship	  between	  present-­‐at-­‐hands	  (subject	  and	  object).	  It	  is	  a	  kind	  of	  in-­‐being”	  (SZ,	  p.	  58).	  The	  everydayness	  of	  the	  Dasein	  doesn’t	  leave	  the	  space	  to	  form	  a	  relationship	  with	  the	  world	  around	  it,	  whether	  this	  may	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be	  with	  objects	  or	  others.	  However	  it	  is	  unequivocal	  that	  the	  Dasein	  is	  in	  fact	  a	   subject,	   ‘not	   a	  what,	   but	   a	  who’	   and	   as	   such	   is	   in	   the	  world	  with	   others.	  Such	  a	  relationship	  however	  has	  no	  personal	  connotation,	  but	  once	  again	  it	  merely	  belongs	  to	  the	  form	  of	  existence	  of	  the	  Dasein.	  	  
	   Heidegger	  doesn’t	  deny	  that	  the	  Dasein	  is	  in	  fact	  the	  human	  being,	  but	  he	  states	  that	  its	  substance	  is	  not	  the	  spirit	  as	  a	  synthesis	  of	  soul	  and	  body;	  “it	  is	  rather	  existence”	  (MHE,	  p.	  69).	  Its	  existence	  has	  the	  form	  of	  being-­‐with	  other	  Dasein,	  which	  is	  a	  necessary	  existential	  of	  the	  Dasein	   for	  the	  purpose	  of	   understanding	   the	   world	   and	   others	   (not	   for	   knowledge	   as	   already	  clarified	   but	   as	   part	   of	   its	   primordial	   state	   of	   being-­‐in-­‐the-­‐world).	   Stein	  concludes	   that:	   “Dasein	   is	   from	   the	   start	  with-­‐being-­‐there-­‐in-­‐the-­‐world”	   (p.	  69).	  	  
	   The	   absence	   of	   personal	   connotation	   of	   human	   being	   is	   one	   of	   the	  major	  points	  of	  discordance	  between	  Stein	  and	  Heidegger.	  Stein	  remarks	  on	  how	   the	   Dasein	   means	   the	   man,	   the	   human	   being	   to	   whom	   belongs	   the	  questioning	   about	   the	   sense	   of	   its	   being,	   however	   Dasein	   “’has’	   no	  possibilities	   as	   ‘attributes’,	   but	   ‘is’	   its	   possibilities.	   Its	   proper	   being	   is	   its	  having-­‐to-­‐become-­‐itself.	   As	   Inwood	   rightly	   observes	   it	   is	   not	   an	  exaggeration	  to	  say	  that	  Dasein	  involves	  no	  ‘what’	  but	  consists	  wholly	  in	  its	  possibilities	  (Inwood,	  1997,	  p.	  24),	  which	  is	  why	  Heidegger	  chooses	  to	  speak	  in	  ‘existentials’	  of	  the	  Dasein	  rather	  than	  ‘categories’,	  as	  it	  would	  be	  for	  any	  other	  entity.	  	  
	   Stein	  also	   remarks	  on	   the	   fact	   that	   the	  choice	  of	   the	  name	  Dasein	   for	  human	   beings	   is	   positively	   founded	   because	   it	   relates	   to	   a	   positive	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understanding	   of	   human	   existence	   and	   generally	   of	   being-­‐in-­‐the-­‐world,	  which	   is	   always	   ‘directed’	   towards	   something.	   She	   would	   probably	   have	  hoped	  to	  see	  a	  substantial	  analysis	  of	  the	  circumstances	  and	  implications	  of	  human	   life	   in	   the	   world,	   among	   others,	   following	   this	   premise.	   Also	   she	  argues	  that	  Heidegger	  doesn’t	  dispute	  that	  “the	  human	  being	  has	  a	  body,	  but	  nothing	  further	  is	  said	  about	  it”	  (MHE,	  p.	  69).	  Neither	  is	  anything	  said	  of	  the	  soul,	   while	   Heidegger	   remarks	   that	   the	   spirit	   has	   priority	   and	   that	   the	  analysis	  of	  the	  Dasein	  should	  offer	  ‘the	  clarity	  that	  until	  now	  no	  ‘doctrine	  of	  the	  soul’	  has	  been	  able	  to”	  (p.	  69).	  Although	  Stein	  is	  clearly	  not	  hoping	  for	  a	  materialistic	  interpretation,	  she	  concludes	  that	  the	  expressions	  “I”,	  ‘subject’,	  ‘soul’,	  ‘person’,	  even	  ‘human	  being’	  and	  ‘life’	  are	  to	  be	  avoided”.	  	  
	   Heidegger	   explains	   his	   rejection	   of	   an	   anthropological,	   psychological	  or	  biological	  understanding	  of	  Dasein	   in	   §	  10	  of	  Being	  and	  Time,	  where	  he	  also	  attacks	  Scheler’s	  personalism	  and	  philosophy	  of	   life.	  This	   critique	   can	  shed	   a	   light	   on	   the	   reason	  behind	   the	   rejection	  of	   a	  personal	   terminology.	  After	   remarking	   that	   the	   analysis	   of	   the	   Dasein	   is	   superior	   to	   the	  phenomenological	   interpretation	   of	   personality	   and	   that	   ‘no	   matter	   how	  much	  Husserl	  and	  Scheler	  may	  differ	  in	  their	  respective	  inquiries	  …	  they	  are	  fully	  in	  agreement	  on	  the	  negative	  side	  of	  their	  interpretation	  of	  personality”	  (SZ,	   p.	   73),	   he	   praises	   Scheler’s	   description	   of	   the	   person	   as	   a	   unity	   of	  intentional	   acts	   bound	   together	   by	   a	   meaning.	   This	   precludes	   an	  understanding	  of	  the	  human	  person	  as	  a	  thing,	  a	  substance,	  a	  unity	  of	  body,	  soul	   and	   spirit,	   which	   are	   all	   traditional	   misunderstandings	   caused	   by	  Christian	   anthropology.	   However	   Scheler’s	   interpretation	   is	   not	   free	   from	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criticism	  since	  “psychical	  being	  has	  nothing	  to	  do	  with	  personal	  being.	  Acts	  get	   performed;	   the	   person	   is	   a	   performer	   of	   acts.	   (…)	   How	   is	   the	   kind	   of	  being	  which	  belongs	  to	  a	  person	  to	  be	  ascertained	  ontologically	  in	  a	  positive	  way?”	  (SZ,	  p.	  73).	  	  	  	  	  
	   Stein	  cannot	  get	  away	  from	  a	  clear	  definition	  of	  the	  parts	  that	  compose	  the	   human	   being	   and	   it	   is	   immediately	   evident	   that	   she	   understands	   the	  human	  being	   in	  a	  much	  wider	  theoretical	  context:	   this	   is	  not	  only	  because,	  unlike	  Heidegger,	  Stein	  ties	  her	  analysis	  to	  a	  philosophical	  tradition,	  but	  also	  because	  she	  has	  worked	  for	  many	  years	  investigating	  the	  different	  aspects	  of	  human	  life	  and	  has	  now	  reached	  an	  well-­‐rounded	  definition	  of	  human	  being,	  starting	  with	  the	  phenomenological	  investigation	  of	  the	  pure	  I	  (reines	  Ich)	  as	  immediately	   given	   in	   conscious	   experience	   and	   gradually	   moving	   to	  consider	   what	   constitutes	   the	   individual	   being	   and	   the	   structure	   of	   the	  person.	  	  
	   Stein	  also	  attempts	  to	  find	  a	  positive	  determination	  of	  what	  appears	  to	  be	   a	   not	   fully	   clarified	   and	   somewhat	   abstract	   concept	   of	   Befindlichkeit	  which	  Heidegger	  uses	  to	  describe	  the	  state-­‐of-­‐mind	  of	  the	  Dasein,	  its	  being-­‐found-­‐in-­‐the-­‐world	   (see	   3.6	   on	   the	   analysis	   of	   Heidegger’s	   ‘thrownness’).	  Stein	  comments:	  “Befindlichkeit	  seems	  particularly	  important	  to	  me	  in	  order	  to	  ascertain	  what	  is	  bodily	  and	  what	  is	  of	  the	  soul,	  and	  how	  these	  relate,	  but	  its	   full	   meaning	   cannot	   be	   completely	   clarified,	   if	   it	   is	   not	   seen	   in	   its	  unfolding	  as	  relating	  to	  the	  being	  of	  body	  and	  soul”	  (MHE,	  p.	  70).	  For	  Stein,	  firstly,	   Heidegger’s	   refusal	   of	   bodily	   characterisation	   of	   the	   Dasein	   and	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secondly,	   of	   the	   recognition	   of	   a	   psychical	   level	   of	   human	   being	   are	   not	  justified	  in	  the	  progression	  of	  its	  analysis.	  
	   It	   is	   also	   important	   to	   remember	   how	   Finite	   and	   Eternal	   Being	  represents	  the	  highest	  point	  of	  this	  ‘ascension	  to	  the	  meaning	  of	  being’,	  as	  in	  this	  work	  Stein	  not	  only	  presents	  her	  answer	  to	  the	  ontological	  question	  of	  the	  human	  being,	  but	  also	  investigates	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  human	  and	  the	  divine	  being.	  In	  order	  to	  do	  so	  she	  applies	  the	  formula	  of	  the	  analogy	  of	   being	   (lat:	  analogia	   entis),	   which,	   according	   to	   Thomas	   Aquinas,	   allows	  one	   to	   know	  God	   through	   analogy	  with	  his	   creation:	   in	   this	  way	   the	   finite	  being	  is	  not	  simply	  extrapolated	  from	  the	  eternal	  one,	  likewise	  the	  idea	  of	  an	  eternal	  God	  is	  not	  reduced	  to	  His	  creation.	  The	  understanding	  of	  an	  eternal	  being	  is	  in	  fact	  described	  as	  an	  encounter	  with	  the	  personal	  being	  of	  God.	  
	   For	   Stein	   a	   personal	   being	   can	   positively	   determine	   its	   actions,	  therefore	  a	  human	  person	  is	  defined	  as	  free	  and	  conscious	  and	  encloses	  the	  totality	  of	   its	  parts:	  body,	  soul	  and	  spirit.	  Stein	  recognises	  how	  the	  concept	  of	  ‘person’	  involves	  more	  than	  the	  phenomenological	  definition	  of	  pure	  ego	  and	  is	  ultimately	  a	  living,	  spiritual	  and	  personal	  I.	  She	  identifies	  the	  essence	  of	  the	  human	  being	  in	  life	  itself,	  defined	  as	  more	  than	  just	  existing:	  a	  body-­‐soul	   fullness	   in	   the	   free	   and	   conscious	   mode	   of	   life,	   a	   lively	   personal	  relationship	  with	   the	   inner	   and	   outer	   spheres	   of	   oneself,	   with	   others	   and	  with	  God.	  	  
	   After	   considering	   these	   elements,	   particularly	   the	   centrality	   of	   the	  bodily,	  psychical	  and	  relational	  aspect	  of	  the	  human	  being,	  it	  is	  easy	  to	  see	  a	  defined	   separation	   between	   the	   analysis	   of	   these	   two	   authors:	   Edith	   Stein	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had	  worked	  too	  deeply	  on	  the	  analysis	  of	  the	  person,	  from	  different	  points	  of	  view	   (sociological,	   psycho-­‐physical,	   anthropological)	   to	   accept	   a	   definition	  of	   the	   human	   being	   that	   based	   itself	   purely	   on	   the	   evidence	   of	   its	   being	  ‘there’.	   Such	   an	   investigation	   excludes,	   from	   the	   very	   beginning,	   other	  aspects	  that	  also	  contribute	  to	  the	  unity	  of	  what	  we	  can	  define	  as	  being,	  such	  as	  a	   living	  body	  (Leib)	  and	  soul	  (Seele).	   In	  order	   to	   fully	  grasp	  this	  point	   it	  will	  be	  necessary	  to	  answer	  two	  central	  questions:	  What	  is	  intended	  by	  the	  traditional	  definition	  of	  being	   ‘that	  which	  is’	  and	  how	  does	  Stein	  reach	  this	  definition?	  	   	  	  
	  
3.4. The	  separation	  of	  being	  and	  existence:	  Aquinas’	  way	  
	  	   Stein	  voices	  her	  concerns	  about	  the	  exclusion	  of	  the	  traditional	  duality	  of	  ‘body	  and	  soul’	  in	  a	  very	  trenchant	  way:	  	  
	   “What	  is	  left	  of	  the	  human	  being,	  when	  it	  is	  abstracted	  from	  body	  and	  soul?	  That	  another	  quite	  large	  volume	  could	  be	  written	  about	  this	  is	  perhaps	  the	  best	  proof	  of	   the	  distinction	  of	  essence	  and	  existence	   in	  human	  beings.	  That	   Heidegger	   does	   not	   get	   away	   from	   this	   distinction,	   even	   when	   he	  denies	   it,	   is	   shown	   by	   the	   fact	   that	   he	   constantly	   speaks	   of	   the	   ‘being	   of	  
Dasein’:	  something	  which	  would	  have	  no	  meaning	   if	  by	   ‘Dasein’	  was	  meant	  nothing	  else	  than	  the	  human	  kind	  of	  being”	  (MHE,	  p.	  70).	  	  	   The	  attempt	  to	  understand	  the	  being	  of	  Dasein	   in	  terms	  of	  reality	  and	  substantiality	   is	   for	   Heidegger	   a	   reversal	   of	   the	   order	   of	   being:	   as	   the	  understanding	   of	   being	   is	   something	   that	   belongs	   to	   Dasein,	   there	   is	  understanding	  of	  being	  only	  when	  Dasein	  is.	  For	  Heidegger	  what	  ultimately	  constitutes	  a	  human	  being,	  the	  essence	  of	  Dasein,	  is	  its	  existence,	  understood	  
	   89	  
as	   Sorge	   (care	   for	   its	   being).	   However	   while	   declaring	   that	   Dasein	   is	   its	  existence	   he	   cannot	   get	   completely	   away	   from	   the	   separation	   between	  essence	  and	  Dasein.	  Stein	  notices	  that	  speaking	  of	  the	  being	  of	  Dasein	  (Sein	  
des	   Daseins)	   alone	   does	   not	   make	   sense	   if	   we	   refuse	   the	   traditional	  separation	   of	   essence	   and	   being.	   This	   is	   especially	   important	   when	  considering	   that,	   according	   to	   the	   philosophia	   perennis	   the	   coincidence	   of	  essence	  and	  being	  can	  be	  ascribed	  to	  God	  alone.	  By	  describing	  the	  essence	  of	  
Dasein	  as	  his	  existence,	   in	  effect	  Heidegger	  makes	  the	  man	  a	  small	  God:	  he	  has	  no	  substance;	  on	  the	  contrary	  he	  is	  his	  existence.	  	  
	   In	   order	   to	   fully	   understand	   Stein’s	   use	   of	   Aquinas	   it	   is	   necessary	   to	  briefly	  mention	  Aquinas’	  concepts	  as	  they	  are	  explained	  in	  the	  treatise	  Being	  
and	   Essence,	   which	   analyses	   the	   different	   types	   of	   being,	   as	   they	   present	  themselves	   to	   the	   human	   intellect	   and	   to	   sense	   perception.	   Aquinas’s	  differentiations	   proceed	   from	   the	   categories	   of	   being	   emphasised	   by	  Aristotle	   in	   the	   book	   Δ	   of	  Metaphysics.	  When	   it	   comes	   to	   define	  what	   the	  ‘essence’	  of	  something	  is,	  for	  instance,	  what	  makes	  a	  human	  being	  a	  human	  being,	  Stein	  remarks	  on	  how	  the	  concept	  of	  essence	  in	  Aquinas	  is	  in	  fact	  very	  close	  to	  what	  Aristotle	  called	  substance	  (ousia)	  and	  what	  other	  authors	  have	  named	   in	   different	   ways	   	   (‘form’,	   ‘nature’).	   What	   is	   meant	   here	   is	   what	  modern	  philosophy	  will	   call	   the	   ‘quiddity’,	  what	  makes	   something	   ‘what	   it	  is’.	   Aquinas	   deals	  with	   the	   formal	   definition	   of	   being	  which	   translates	   the	  original	  Greek	  expression	  for	  the	  type	  of	  being	  that	  answers	  the	  question	  of	  ‘what	  is	  it’:	  “This	  is	  what	  the	  Philosopher	  (Aristotle)	  often	  calls	  that-­‐which-­‐
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something-­‐was-­‐to-­‐be,	  i.	  e.	  that	  to	  which	  something	  owes	  it	  that	  it	  is	  what	  it	  is”50.	  	  
	   It	   is	   very	   important	   to	   proceed	   with	   caution	   regarding	   the	  disambiguation	  of	   the	  term.	  Being	  [Sein,	  esse]	  has	  a	  nominative	   form	  and	  a	  verbal	   form	   being	   as	   ‘what	   it	   is’,	   which	   is	   the	   present	   participle	   of	   the	  infinitive	  form	  [Seiendes,	  ens].	  The	  latter	  can	  traditionally	  be	  attributed	  only	  to	  God,	  who	  is	  being,	  as	  actus	  purus,	  meaning	  that	  being	  is	  his	  essence	  (God	  declares	  “I	  am	  who	  I	  am”).	  	  It	  is	  in	  this	  regard	  that	  Heidegger	  attributes	  the	  full	   actuality	   of	   being	   to	   the	   human	   being	   in	   saying	   that	   Dasein	   is	   its	  existence,	  not	  as	  Sein	  but	  as	  its	  participle	  form.	  In	  fact	  there	  is	  no	  description	  of	  the	  structure	  of	  a	  form	  of	  an	  actual	  form	  of	  Sein	  outside	  Dasein.	  	  	  
	   In	   her	   ‘tenacious’	   battle	   to	   fully	   grasp	   Aristotle’s	   ‘ousia’	   Stein	   brings	  together	  her	  secure	  understanding	  of	  Aquinas’	  doctrine	  of	  act	  and	  potency	  along	  with	  a	  clear	  aim	  to	  find	  a	  solid	  base	  for	  the	  constitution	  of	  beings.	  As	  she	  discovers	  in	  her	  analysis	  ‘form’	  is	  often	  intended,	  in	  a	  general	  manner,	  to	  indicate	   ‘the	  stable	  element	   in	  a	   thing’.	  When	  one	  considers	  the	  traditional	  duality	   of	   ‘matter’	   and	   ‘form’,	  matter	   is	   intended	   as	   an	   indeterminate	   that	  can	  only	  exist	  under	  some	  form	  in	  its	  actual	  way.	  Essence	  is	  not	  pure	  form,	  but	   the	   essence	   of	   something	   comprehends	   its	   matter	   as	  well	   as	   its	   form	  (“The	  esse	  of	  a	  composite	  substance	  belongs	  not	  to	  the	  form	  alone	  nor	  to	  the	  matter	  alone,	  but	  to	  the	  composite	  itself;	  and	  the	  essence	  is	  that	  in	  respect	  of	  which	  a	   thing	   is	  said	  to	  have	  esse”).	   ‘Quiddity’	  relates	  to	  the	  terminological	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  50	  “Hoc	  est	  etiam	  quod	  Philosophus	  frequenter	  nominat	  quod	  quid	  erat	  esse,	  id	  est	  hoc	  per	  
quod	  aliquid	  habet	  esse	  quid”	  (Chapter	  I.	  31,	  see	  Aquinas,	  1987,	  p.	  6)	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part	   of	   the	   definition,	   the	   link	   between	   essence	   and	   esse	   (‘essence’	   is	  grammatically	  what-­‐has-­‐‘esse’,	  where	  esse	  is	  the	  infinitive	  form	  of	  the	  Latin	  verb	   to	  be,	   ‘ens’	   is	   the	  present	  participle	  and	   ‘essentia’	   the	  abstract	  noun).	  Finally	  Stein	  considers	  existence	  as	  opposite	  to	  what	  is	  merely	  intellectually	  conceived	   and	   follows	   Aristotle	   to	   distinguish	   between	   what	   can	   exist	  autonomously	   [das	   Selbständige]	   and	   what	   exists	   in	   dependency	   [das	  
Unselbstständige]	  (EES,	  p.	  175).	  	  
	   Stein	  regards	  the	  possibility	  of	   ‘becoming’:	  “The	  possible	  is	  not	  yet	  an	  existence	   in	  the	  full	  sense.	  But	  wherever	  there	   is	  a	  preliminary	  stage	  there	  must	  also	  be	  an	  ascent	  to	  a	  higher	  stage,	  and	  the	  passing	  from	  possibility	  to	  reality	   is	   becoming	   or,	  more	   precisely,	   this	   passing	   from	   one	   stage	   to	   the	  other	  pertains	   to	  becoming.	  For	  we	  have	  previously	   seen	   that	  becoming	   is	  truly	  a	  being	  lifted	  out	  of	  nothingness	  into	  existence”	  (p.	  175).	  This	  remark	  is	  particularly	   interesting	   in	  view	  of	  Stein’s	  criticism	  of	  Heidegger’s	   idea	  of	  ‘thrownness’	  into	  existence,	  which	  will	  be	  analysed	  in	  detail	  below.	  	  
	   In	   view	   of	   these	   preliminary	   observations	   is	   it	   possible	   to	   conclude	  that	  essence	  for	  Stein	  belongs	  to	  a	  natural	  unity	  but	  does	  not	  refer	  to	  a	  third	  party,	  a	  surplus	  added	  to	  the	  original	  matter	  and	  form	  relationship.	  Aquinas	  remarks	  for	  instance	  that	  the	  only	  essence	  we	  can	  find	  of	  a	  human	  being	  is	  its	  humanity.	  (2.	  291)	  (Aquinas,	  1987,	  p.	  30).	  This	  means	  that	  essence	  is	  not	  necessarily	  something	  abstract,	  but	  the	   ‘material’	  aspect	  of	  –	   for	   instance	  –	  the	  human	  being	  (its	  body)	  plays	  a	  role	  in	  the	  definition	  of	  it.	  However,	  for	  Aquinas	  there	  is	  an	  added	  difficulty:	  “In	  the	  definition	  of	  human	  being	  what	  occurs	   is	   indeterminate	  matter;	   for	  the	  definition	  of	  human	  being	  does	  not	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contain	  this	  flesh	  and	  these	  bones,	  but	  flesh	  and	  bone	  in	  the	  abstract,	  which	  are	  the	  indeterminate	  matter	  of	  human	  beings”	  (2.	  80)	  (p.	  14).	  
	   It	   is	   now	   necessary	   to	   explore	   further	   Heidegger’s	   definition	   of	  ‘essence’	  and	  the	  consequences	  that	  its	  exclusion	  leads	  to.	  	  
	  
3.5. Consequences	  of	  Heidegger’s	  understanding	  of	  existence	  for	  
the	  classical	  definition	  of	  being	  
	  	   Stein	   summarises	   the	   problems	   that	   arises	   from	   Heidegger’s	  coincidence	  of	  essence	  and	  Dasein	  as	  follows:	  	  
	   “It	  can	  hardly	  be	  doubted	  that	  Heidegger	  wants	  to	  understand	  Dasein	  as	   the	   human	   kind	   of	   being.	  We	   could	   also	   say:	   human	   beings,	   as	  Dasein	  often	   is	   called	   ‘a	   being’	   [Seindes,	   ens]51	  without	   opposing	   the	   being	   [Sein,	  
esse],	   as	   ‘that	  which	   is’	   [das,	  was	   ist,	  quod	  quid	   ist],	  with	   being	   itself	   [Sein,	  esse].	   It	   is	  also	  directly	  said	   that	   the	  essence	  of	  human	  beings	   is	  existence.	  That	  means	  nothing	  else	   than	   that	   something	   is	   claimed	   for	  human	  beings	  which	  according	  to	  the	  philosophia	  perennis	  is	  reserved	  for	  God:	  the	  identity	  of	  essence	  and	  being”	  (MHE,	  p.	  69).	  	  	  	   In	   Finite	   and	   Eternal	   Being	   Stein	   describes	   the	   human	   person	   as	   a	  ‘carrier’	   of	   the	   essence.	   She	  underlines	  how	  what	   is	   alive,	   not	   only	  human	  but	  also	  animal	  and	  vegetative	  beings,	  has	  a	  living	  centre	  of	  its	  being,	  which	  ultimately	   is	   the	   centre	   of	   life	   itself.	   For	   the	  human	  being	   this	   vital	   centre	  takes	   the	  name	  of	   living	  soul.	  Her	   final	  goal	   is	   to	  define	  an	  ontology	  of	   the	  person,	   in	   which	   she	   overcomes	   the	   traditional	   Aristotelian	   separation	   of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  51	  In	  the	  English	  translation	  of	  MHE	  Lebech	  usefully	  avoids	  capitalisations	  and	  renders	  Sein	  with	  ‘the	  being’	  and	  Seiendes	  with	  ‘a	  being/beings’.	  Although	  I	  agree	  with	  this	  system,	  I	  have	  also	   indicated	   in	  brackets	   the	  original	  German	  and	   the	  Latin	  expressions	   to	  help	  with	   the	  most	  difficult	  terminologically	  distinctions.	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form	  and	  matter	  with	   the	   triad	  of	   sentient	  body	   (Leib)	   –	   soul	   –	   spirit:	   ‘the	  form	  is	  then	  a	  living	  form	  or	  a	  soul	  …	  Its	  being	  is	  life	  and	  life	  is	  a	  progressive	  forming	  of	  matter	  and	  therewith	  a	  progressive	  actualisation	  of	  the	  essence’	  (EES,	  p.	  275).	  
	   Within	   the	   discussion	   of	   form	   and	   essence,	   Stein	   explains	   how	   the	  essence	  of	  material	  objects	  cannot	  be	  explained	  in	  itself,	  but	  opens	  instead	  a	  connection	   to	   something	   else:	   what	   we	   call	   ‘alive’	   is	   never	   finished,	   it	   is	  forever	  on	  the	  way	  to	  its	  own	  self.	  The	  soul	  contains	  the	  principle	  of	  forming	  itself,	  with	  Stein’s	  words	  die	  Fülle	  des	  Seins,	  which	   indicates	  the	  abundance	  of	   being.	   The	   fullness	   of	   the	   human	   being	   cannot	   be	   reduced	   to	   simply	  ‘being’	  there;	  to	  explain	  this	  Stein	  chooses	  to	  use	  the	  term	  Existenz,	  the	  same	  that	  Heidegger	   has	   used	   in	   a	   general	  manner	   to	   indicate	   all	   entities	   other	  than	  Dasein.	   Stein	   uses	   it	   in	   a	   positive	  manner	   that	   reflects	   its	   traditional	  meaning,	  to	  explain	  what	  is	  added	  to	  the	  essence.	  	  In	  this	  way	  she	  is	  able	  to	  define	   a	   richer	   meaning	   of	   being:	   Dasein	   in	   the	   sense	   of	   real	   being	   is	  something	   more	   than	   essential	   being	   (not	   indeed	   something	   ‘higher’,	   but	  something	   other	   or	   different):	   “something	   that	   is	   ‘placed	   into	   Dasein,	  something	  whose	   real	   being	   has	   a	   temporal	   beginning.	   But	  what	   it	   is	   (its	  
quid,	   understood	   as	   pure	   whatness,	   not	   as	   actual	   essence)	   prior	   to	   its	  realisation	  has	  no	  temporal	  beginning”	  (EES,	  p.	  326).	  
	   It	   is	   necessary	   to	   emphasize	   how	   the	   three	   parts	   of	   the	   formal	  definition	   of	   being	   (according	   to	  Thomas	  Aquinas:	   ‘something	   that	   is’)	   are	  reduced	  by	  Heidegger	  to	  a	  duality;	  instead	  of	  the	  triad:	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Being	  in	  existence	  (Seiende)	   essence	   	  Being	  itself	  (Sein);	  
-­‐ we	  have	  the	  duality:	  
existence	  (Dasein)	   Being	  itself	  (Sein).	  
	   Heidegger	  never	  really	  solves	  the	  problem	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	   two	   parts,	   actually	   the	   being	   itself	   seems	   to	   become	   one	   with	   pure	  existence,	  and	  ultimately	  with	  time52.	  	  
	   In	   his	   lecture	   course	   of	   1927,	   The	   Basic	   Problem	   of	   Phenomenology,	  Heidegger	   clarifies	   his	   position	   in	   relation	   to	   the	   traditional	   distinction	  between	   essential	   and	   existential:	   “The	   fact	   of	   this	   distinction	   between	  essential	  and	  existential	  has	  been	  well	  known	  since	  Aristotle	  and	  taken	  for	  granted	   as	   something	   self-­‐evident.	   (…)	   In	   the	   description	   of	   the	   Kantian	  thesis	  we	  were	  told	  that	  existence	  belongs	  to	  God’s	  essence,	  to	  the	  essentia	  
dei.	  This	  is	  a	  proposition	  that	  Kant,	  too,	  does	  not	  dispute.	  What	  he	  contests	  is	  solely	   that	  human	  beings	  are	   in	  a	  position	   to	  posit	  absolutely	  a	  being	  such	  that	  existence	  belongs	   to	   its	  essence,	   that	   is,	   to	  perceive	   it	   immediately,	   in	  the	  broadest	  sense	  to	  intuit	  it.	  God	  is	  a	  being	  who,	  by	  it	  essence,	  cannot	  not	  be.	   The	   finite	   being,	   however,	   can	   also	   not	   be.	   This	   means	   that	   existence	  does	   not	   necessarily	   belong	   to	   what	   the	   finite	   being	   is,	   its	   realitas.”	  (Heidegger,	  1988,	  p	  109).	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  52	  I	  have	  explained	  this	  structure	  in	  my	  article	  Sein,	  Wesen	  und	  Existenz	  bei	  Edith	  Stein	  und	  
Martin	  Heidegger	  (Ripamonti,	  2006).	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   It	  is	  a	  legitimate	  question	  to	  ask	  if	  the	  existentials	  (the	  basic	  features	  of	  the	  Dasein)	  could	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  sort	  of	  substitute	  for	  what	  essence	  represents	  in	   the	   traditional	   ontological	   view.	   Stein	   solves	   the	   relationship	   between	  (human)	   existence	   and	   being	   with	   the	   middle	   term	   –	   the	   connection	  between	  both	  -­‐	  represented	  by	  the	  living	  body	  and	  the	  soul.	  Proceeding	  from	  her	  initial	  assumption	  that	  the	  human	  person	  ‘carries’	  its	  life	  and	  that	  this	  is	  what	  ‘makes	  the	  human	  being	  a	  human	  being’,	  she	  investigates	  the	  structure	  of	   the	   human	   soul	   in	   its	   natural	   and	   spiritual	   components.	   She	   concludes	  that	   temporal	   life	   belongs	   to	   the	   essence	   of	   the	   human	   being	   but	   that	   the	  human	   soul	   at	   its	   core	   also	   shares	   the	   fulfilment	   of	   eternity:	   “The	   person	  cannot	  live	  as	  a	  pure	  ego.	  It	  sustains	  its	  life	  out	  of	  that	  fullness	  of	  the	  essence	  [Wesensfülle]	   which	   is	   resplendent	   in	   the	   awakening	   of	   life,	   without	   ever	  being	  fully	  illumined	  or	  fully	  mastered.	  The	  person	  carries	  this	  fullness	  and	  is	  simultaneously	  carried	  or	  sustained	  by	  this	  dark	  and	  deep	  ground”	  (EES,	  p.	  377).	  
	   Edith	   Stein’s	   approach	   aims	   to	   separate	   temporality	   and	   eternity	   as	  well	  as	  Dasein	   and	  being	  (Sein):	   the	  human	  being	   lives	  and	  needs	   the	   time	  for	  his	  relative	  fulfilment,	  but	  he	  will	  become	  complete	  only	  in	  eternity.	  Stein	  attempts	   to	   enlarge	   the	   borders	   of	   the	   human	   finitude	   to	   embrace	   the	  possibility	  of	  its	  ontological	  horizons.	  Heidegger	  does	  the	  exact	  opposite:	  he	  restricts	  and	  concentrates	  the	  entire	  ontological	  question	  on	  the	  Dasein,	  his	  existence	  and	  ultimately	  his	  finitude.	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3.6. Human	  being	  and	  temporality	  	  
	   Edith	   Stein	   argues	   against	   Heidegger’s	   concept	   of	   thrownness	  (Geworfenheit)	   in	   the	   second	   chapter	   of	   her	  work	  Finite	  and	  Eternal	  Being	  where	   she	   compares	  Heidegger’s	  Dasein	   to	   the	  pure	  ego.	   This	   is	   a	   concept	  that	  she	  borrows	   from	  Husserl’s	  phenomenology	  and	   it	  helps	  her	  with	  her	  first	  steps	  into	  the	  investigation	  of	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  human	  being.	  Ego	  is	  the	  self	  as	  given	  in	  the	  immediate	  conscious	  experience,	  in	  other	  words	  the	  ‘I’	  subject	  of	  any	  immediate	  human	  experience	  ‘I	  perceive’,	  ‘I	  think’,	  ‘I	  wish’,	  ‘I	   experience	   joy’.	   It	   is	   not	   however	   a	   personal	   subject	   but	   an	   empty	   shell	  with	   no	   content	   of	   its	   own.	   The	   first	   question	   therefore	   is	   where	   is	   the	  content	  of	  the	  ego	  coming	  from?	  In	  the	  case	  of	  “I	  experience	  joy,	  for	  instance,	  the	   joy	   is	   said	   to	   originate	  within	   the	   ego,	   but	  not	   from	   the	   ego	   itself.	   The	  only	  certain	  content	  of	  the	  pure	  ego	  is	  that	  it	  is	  alive	  “the	  pure	  ego	  is	  alive	  in	  every	  experience	  and	  cannot	  be	  eliminated	   from	  it	   [the	  experience]”,	   since	  the	  ego	  is	  not	  part	  of	  the	  content	  of	  the	  experience	  (i.e.	  joy)	  but	  rather	  “every	  experience	  is	  part	  of	  the	  pure	  ego;	  the	  pure	  ego	  is	  alive	  in	  every	  experience;	  its	   life	   is	   that	   very	   flux	   in	  which	   ever	   new	   structures	   of	   experiential	   units	  arise”	   (EES,	   p.	   48).	  Stein	   concludes	   that	   life	   itself	   is	   the	  being	   [Sein]	   of	   the	  ego	   and	   this	   life	   is	   described	   as	   a	   continuous	   stream	  of	   living	   experiences	  and	  changing	  contents.	  This	  analysis	   is	   therefore	  within	  phenomenological	  territory	  (Stein	  describes	  the	  stream	  of	  consciousness	  as	  experienced	  from	  the	   first-­‐person	   point	   of	   view).	   The	   ego	   therefore	   knows	   itself	  simultaneously	   as	   a	   living,	   actually	   present	   existence	   and	   as	   one	   that	  emerges	  from	  a	  past	  and	  lives	  further	  into	  a	  future.	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   The	  knowledge	  of	  the	  ego’s	  existence	  in	  time	  is	  described	  as	  a	  factual	  one.	   In	   the	   same	   chapter,	   paragraph	  2,	   Stein	   starts	   her	   enquiry	   explaining	  that	  “The	  Fact	  of	  Our	  Own	  Being”	  is	  an	  inescapable	  fact.	  Of	  the	  life	  of	  the	  ego	  ‘here	   and	   now’	   as	   it	   emerges	   after	   the	   eidetic	   reduction	   there	   can	   be	   no	  doubt:	   “I	   may	   doubt	   whether	   the	   conclusions	   which	   I	   draw	   from	   certain	  premises	  are	  correct,	  but	  my	  syllogistic	  reasoning	  as	  such	  is	  an	  indubitable	  fact.	  And	   the	   same	  applies	   to	   all	  my	  desires	   and	  volitions,	  my	  dreams	  and	  hopes,	  my	  joys	  and	  griefs	  –	  to	  everything,	  in	  short,	  in	  which	  I	  live	  and	  am,	  to	  everything	  that	  manifests	  itself	  as	  part	  of	  the	  being	  of	  the	  self-­‐conscious	  ego”	  (EES,	  p.	  36).	  It	  is	  a	  primordial	  knowledge	  that	  Stein	  compares	  to	  the	  ‘I	  live’	  in	  Augustine,	  the	  Cartesian	  cogito	  and	  the	  pure	  I	  of	  Husserl.	  	  	  
But	   how	   is	   the	   living	   I	   connected	   to	   temporality?	   It	   is	  worthwhile	   to	  quote	  this	  passage	  fully	  because	  of	  its	  importance	  for	  later	  investigations.	  In	  the	  same	  chapter	  it	  states:	  
	  “When	  I	  turn	  toward	  being	  as	   it	   is	   in	   itself,	   it	  reveals	  to	  me	  as	  a	  dual	  aspect:	  that	  of	  being	  and	  that	  of	  not-­‐being.	  The	  ‘I	  am’	  is	  unable	  to	  endure	  this	  dual	  perspective:	  that	  in	  which	  I	  am	  is	  subject	  to	  change	  and	  since	  being	  and	  the	  intellectual	  movement	  (“in	  which”	  I	  am)	  are	  not	  separated,	  this	  being	  is	  likewise	  subject	  to	  change.	  The	  “former”	  state	  of	  being	  is	  past	  and	  has	  given	  way	  to	  the	  “present”	  state	  of	  being.	  This	  means	  that	  the	  being	  of	  which	  I	  am	  conscious	  as	  mine	  is	  inseparable	  from	  temporality.	  An	  actual	  being	  –	  that	  is,	  as	  actually	  present	  being	  –	  it	  is	  without	  a	  temporal	  dimension	  [punktuell]:	  it	  is	  a	  now	  in	  between	  a	  “no	  longer”	  and	  a	  “not	  yet”.	  But	  by	  its	  breaking	  apart	  in	  its	  flux	  into	  being	  and	  not-­‐being,	  the	  idea	  of	  pure	  being	  is	  revealed	  to	  us.	  In	   pure	   being	   there	   is	   no	   longer	   any	   admixture	   of	   not-­‐being,	   nor	   any	   “no	  longer”	  and	  “not	  yet”.	  In	  short,	  pure	  being	  is	  not	  temporal	  but	  eternal.”	  (EES,	  p.	  37).	  	  Stein	  has	  reached	  this	  point	   in	  her	   investigation	  with	  an	  independent	  use	   of	   the	   phenomenological	   reduction,	   however	   she	  makes	   heavy	   use	   of	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Aquinas’	   doctrine	   of	   act-­‐potency	   and	   of	   Pzywara’s	   analogia	   entis.	   Eternal	  being	  is	  understood	  as	  pure	  actuality	  and	  pure	  fullness	  of	  being,	  where	  the	  “no	  longer”	  and	  “not	  yet”	  can	  be	  present.	  In	  this	  sense	  she	  reaches	  a	  different	  conclusion	   from	   Conrad-­‐Martius’s	   idea	   of	   actuality	   as	   a	   non-­‐dimensional	  (pure)	  existence	  in	  her	  essay	  Die	  Zeit	  which	  Stein	  refers	  to	  while	  writing	  this	  passage.	   The	   hidden	   dialogue	   with	   Heidegger,	   although	   not	   quoted,	   is	  another	   source	   behind	   this	   section,	   as	   the	   following	   pages	   of	   Finite	   and	  
Eternal	  Being	  demonstrate.	  	  
	   Pure	  actuality	  is	  for	  Stein	  eternal	  immutable	  being,	  as	  opposed	  to	  the	  temporal	   and	   mutable	   being	   of	   here	   and	   now.	   Through	   this	   relationship	  something	  of	   the	  eternal	  being	   can	  be	   revealed	  as	  an	  analogue	   though	   the	  temporal	   being,	  which	   is	  more	   than	   an	   image	  of	   it	   because	   it	   contains	   the	  possibility	   of	   potentiality:	   “my	   present	   being	   is	   simultaneously	   actual	   and	  potential	  being;	  and	  insofar	  as	  it	   is	  actual,	   it	   is	  the	  concrete	  realisation	  of	  a	  possibility	   which	   antecedes	   my	   present	   actuality”	   (EES,	   p.	   39).	   Stein	  concludes	   that	   being	   is	   in	  need	  of	   time	  because	  of	   its	   ‘always	   remaining	   a	  becoming’.	  However	  what	   is	   ‘separated	   in	  human	  nature’	   is	   united	  only	   in	  the	   highest	   being,	   which	   is	   God	   (following	   Augustine’s	   analysis),	   who	   is	  ‘eternal	  and	   immutable’,	   full	  actualisation	  of	  his	  being	  and	   ‘his	  existence	   is	  his	   essence.	   He	   is	   who	   is,	   is’	   (EES,	   p.	   41).	   The	   terminological	   critique	   of	  Heidegger,	  which	  was	   previously	   presented,	   can	   now	  be	   viewed	   in	   its	   full	  light.	  	  
Both	  authors	  have	  emphasized	   in	   their	  works	   the	   temporal	  aspect	  of	  
my	   ‘being	   aware’:	   the	   undeniable	   evidence	   that	   I	   am	   being	   and	   how	   this	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awareness	   of	   being	   is	   limited	   by	   temporality	   and	   characterised	   by	   its	  flowing	  aspects.	  Also	  because	  of	  this	  evidence	  it	  is	  apparent	  that	  the	  idea	  of	  temporal	  being	  opens	   the	  possibility	  of	   the	   idea	  of	   full	   unlimited	  being,	   as	  well	  as	  containing	  the	  possibility	  of	  not-­‐being.	  This	  reveals	  itself	  not	  only	  by	  what	   is	   not	   anymore	   (past)	   but	   also	   by	   the	   eventuality	   of	   no-­‐more-­‐being	  (death).	  While	  Stein	  takes	  both	  elements	  into	  consideration,	  Heidegger	  only	  limits	  his	  analysis	  to	  temporal	  being	  and	  to	  not-­‐being.	  	  
	  
3.7. ‘Being	   thrown’	   (Geworfenheit)	   or	   ‘being	   secure’	  
(Geborgenheit)	  in	  existence	  
	   Let’s	   go	   back	   to	   Stein’s	   description	   of	   the	   pure	   ego	   once	   she	   had	  clarified	  that	  the	  ego	  lives	  in	  the	  moment	  and	  life	  is	  its	  being.	  Life,	  however,	  does	   not	   belong	   to	   it,	   since	   the	   ego	   itself	   does	   not	   have	   any	   fullness	   or	  content,	   rather	   the	   ego	   receives	   it:	   “all	   its	   fullness	   derives	   from	   the	  experiential	  contents.	  The	  ego	  can	  experience	  present	  or	  past	  contents,	  such	  as	   a	   feeling	   relating	   to	   an	   experience	   that	   is	   now	   past	   but	   lives	   in	   the	  memory	  of	   the	  subject:	  does	  this	  mean	  that	  a	   long-­‐gone	   joy	   is	  alive	   for	  the	  subject	   now?	   At	   what	   time	   is	   the	   ego	   really	   alive?	   Is	   it	   alive	   from	   one	  moment	   to	   the	   next?	   ‘Has	   its	   being	   also	   had	   a	   beginning”	   or	   ‘has	   the	   ego	  risen	  from	  nothingness?’	  (EES,	  p.	  53).	  
	   Stein	  incorporates	  in	  this	  analysis	  her	  investigations	  into	  the	  problem	  of	   empathy	   (1916),	   with	   particular	   emphasis	   on	   the	   case	   of	   the	   present	  occurrence	   of	   a	   past	   experience.	   This	   example	   helped	   her	   reach	   the	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conclusion	  that	  although	  a	  past	  content	  can	  be	  present	  ‘potentially’,	  the	  ego	  can	  only	  live	  in	  full	  actuality	  in	  the	  present.	  The	  joy	  that	  is	  felt	  can	  relate	  to	  a	  present	   or	   past	   experience	   but	   it	   originates	   from	   a	   place	   within,	   a	  “transcendent	   depth,	   which	   discloses	   itself	   in	   the	   conscious	   experience	   of	  joy,”	  (EES,	  p.	  54).	   It	   is	  clear	  that	  the	  ego	  not	  only	   is	  not	  a	  source	  of	   life	  but	  also	   cannot	   originate	   or	   sustain	   itself	   in	   being	   through	   these	   contents	   of	  experience:	  
“The	   ego	   knows	   itself	   as	   a	   living,	   actually	   present	   existent	   and	  simultaneously	  as	  one	  that	  emerges	  from	  a	  past	  and	  lives	  into	  a	  future;	  itself	  and	  its	  being	  are	   inescapably	  there:	   it	   is	  a	  being	  thrown	  into	  existence	  [ins	  
Dasein	  geworfen].	  This,	  however,	  marks	   this	  being	  as	   the	  extreme	  opposite	  of	  an	  autonomous	  and	  intrinsically	  necessary	  being	  a	  se	  (by	  itself)”.	  (EES,	  p.	  54).	  	   	  This	   critical	   comment	   raises	   two	   important	   points:	   1.	   How	   does	  Heidegger	  come	  to	  the	  image	  of	  the	  ‘throwness’	  of	  the	  Dasein?	  and	  2.	  What	  does	  this	  say	  about	  the	  autonomy	  and	  self-­‐sufficiency	  of	  the	  Dasein?	  	  	  
	   Heidegger	  emphasizes	   the	  matter	  of	  my	  being	   in	   the	   fact	  of	  my	  being	  ‘there’:	   being-­‐in-­‐the-­‐world	   is	   the	   basic	   state	   of	   being,	   and	   is	   a	   priori.	  Previously	   it	   was	   explained	   that	   this	   concept	   has	   nothing	   to	   do	   with	  spatiality	   and	   to	   further	   clarify	   this	   point	   Heidegger	   introduced	   gradually	  the	   complicated	   and	   crucial	   concept	   of	   Befindlichkeit	   of	   the	   Dasein	  (Macquarrie	   and	   Robinson	   translate	   this	   with	   the	   much-­‐criticised	  expression	   ‘state-­‐of-­‐mind’,	   to	   better	   relate	   it	   to	   the	   concept	   of	   ‘Stimmung’,	  which	   is	   rendered	  with	   ‘mood’.	  Kisiel	   (2002)	  uses	   ‘Disposedness’	   to	  better	  highlight	   the	   idea	   of	   ‘having-­‐been-­‐thrown’.	   I	   will	   use	   here	   the	   original	  
	   101	  
German):	  this	  is	  one	  of	  the	  three	  basic	  parameters	  of	  human	  existence	  (the	  other	  two	  are	  understanding	  and	  speech).	  	  
	   Befindlichkeit	  is	  initially	  explained	  as	  the	  ordinary	  ‘being	  in	  a	  mood’,	  as	  a	  feeling	  or	  affect,	  more	  generally	  intended	  as	  the	  state	  in	  which	  one	  may	  be	  found.	   In	   the	  German	   language	   this	   expression	   (sich	  befinden)	  means	  both	  feeling	   and	   where	   one	   finds	   oneself.	   	   However,	   Heidegger’s	   concept	   of	  
Befindlichkeit	  offers	  a	  radically	  different	  way	  of	  thinking	  about	  this	  ordinary	  experience.	  It	  refers	  to	  the	  kind	  of	  beings	  that	  humans	  are:	  they	  suffer	  under	  the	   weight	   of	   being,	   a	   weight	   that	   they	   must	   carry,	   because	   they	   cannot	  choose	   otherwise.	   Day	   after	   day	   as	  Dasein	  goes	   through	   life	   it	   breaks	   out	  with	   the	   naked	   knowledge	   that	   ‘it	   is	   and	   has	   to	   be’.	   This	   existential	   state	  doesn’t	  offer	  any	  elucidation	  with	  regard	  to	  any	  other	  type	  of	  being	  above	  it	  or	  from	  whom	  it	  may	  receive	  its	  being.	  	  
	   If	  Stein	  described	  the	  human	  being	  as	  a	  carrier,	  by	  Heidegger	  the	  image	  is	  one	  of	  a	  heavy	  burden:	  	  “Being	  has	  become	  manifest	  as	  a	  burden.	  Why	  that	  should	  be,	  one	  does	  not	  know.	  And	  Dasein	  cannot	  know	  anything	  of	  the	  sort	  because	   the	   possibilities	   of	   disclosure	  which	   belong	   to	   cognition	   reach	   far	  too	   short	   a	   way	   compared	   with	   the	   primordial	   disclosure	   belonging	   to	  moods,	  in	  which	  Dasein	  is	  brought	  before	  its	  Being	  as	  ‘there’	  (SZ,	  p.	  173).	  	  
	   As	  Stein	  pointed	  out,	  the	  existential	  state	  of	  Dasein,	  which	  was	  initially	  introduced	  as	  an	  elected	  being	  among	  beings,	  in	  so	  far	  it	  was	  the	  one	  whom	  the	  question	  of	  the	  meaning	  of	  being	  should	  be	  asked	  to,	  not	  only	  reveals	  its	  absence	  of	  self-­‐sufficiency	  but	  also	  proves	  that	   it	  cannot	  offer	  any	  answers	  to	  such	  questions	  for	  the	  simple	  reason	  that	  any	  knowledge	  of	  other	  forms	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of	  being	  are	  precluded	  from	  it	  on	  the	  grounds	  of	  its	  Befindlichkeit.	  The	  idea	  of	   thrownness	   of	   the	   Dasein	   does	   not	   represent	   an	   example	   of	   its	  sovereignty,	  but	  is	  instead	  the	  concrete	  proof	  that	  there	  is	  a	  ‘there-­‐to-­‐come’	  and	   a	   ‘there-­‐after’	   that	  must	   be	   investigated,	   since	   for	   Heidegger	   only	   the	  pure	  ‘now’	  of	  the	  Dasein’s	  being	  shows	  itself,	  the	  ‘where	  from’	  and	  ‘where	  to’	  are	  hidden	  in	  darkness.	  	  
	   It	  is	  worth	  emphasising	  how	  the	  image	  and	  the	  terminological	  choices	  by	  Heidegger	  contain	  a	  certain	  dynamic	  energy:	  Dasein	  is	  not	  placed	  in	  being	  but	  thrown;	  it	  is	  not	  a	  passage,	  a	  transformation	  or	  a	  birth,	  but	  a	  hard	  break-­‐in,	  its	  life	  experience	  is	  one	  characterised	  by	  negative	  feelings	  only:	  	  burden,	  ignorance	   (as	   the	   possibility	   of	   knowing	   is	   precluded),	   anxiety	   and	   fear.	  Because	  of	  the	  negative	  nature	  of	  this	  understanding,	  Stein	  finds	  Heidegger’s	  description	   of	   the	  Dasein	   a	   circular	   argument:	   because	   of	   its	   finitude	   the	  
Dasein	   finds	   itself	   being	   thrown	   into	   existence	   with	   no	   possibility	   of	  connecting	  itself	  with	  something	  outside	  of	  it	  or	  of	  explaining	  its	  being	  from	  itself.	  At	  the	  same	  time	  it	  cannot	  motivate	  its	  being	  or	  have	  any	  control	  of	  its	  beginning	  or	  end:	  time	  slides	  over	  it,	  and	  it	  is	  not	  able	  to	  grasp	  it.	  	  Its	  life	  is	  ultimately	  reduced	  to	  a	  run	  from	  moment	  to	  moment,	  to	  escape	  nothingness	  and	   no-­‐more-­‐being	   that	   eventually	   catches	   up	   with	   it,	   a	   running	   from	  nothing	   to	   nothing.	   It	   cannot	   either	   stop	   it	   or	   avoid	   it,	   and	   in	   this	  way	   its	  being	  is	  never	  in	   its	  possession.	   	   It	  never	  rests	   in	  being	  and	  never	  has	  true	  self-­‐possession.	  	  
	   In	   confrontation	  with	   such	  a	   limited	  view,	   Stein’s	  question	   is	  what	   is	  the	   difference	   between	   being	   thrown	   and	   being	   held	   in	   being?	   Her	   initial	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analysis	  of	  the	  ego,	  which	  has	  the	  same	  basic	  characteristics	  of	  the	  Dasein,	  is	  concluded	  with	  the	  following	  remarks:	  	  
	   “The	  being	  of	  the	  ego	  is	  alive	  only	  from	  moment	  to	  moment.	  It	  cannot	  be	  quiescent	  because	  it	  is	  restlessly	  in	  flight.	  It	  thus	  never	  attains	  true	  self-­‐possession.	   And	  we	   are	   therefore	   forced	   to	   conclude	   that	   the	   being	   of	   the	  ego,	  as	  a	  constantly	  changing	  living	  present,	  is	  not	  autonomous	  but	  received	  being.	   It	  has	  been	  placed	   into	  existence	  and	   is	   sustained	   in	  existence	   from	  moment	  to	  moment”	  (EES,	  p.	  54).	  	  	  	   This	   initial	   difference	  between	  being	   thrown	  and	  being	  placed	   is	   not	  without	   significance,	   as	   it	   opens	   the	   road	   to	   Stein’s	   questioning	   of	   the	  whereabouts	   of	   the	   Dasein,	   she	   wonders	   particularly	   how	   would	   it	   be	  otherwise	   possible	   to	   conceive	   of	   a	   flinging	   of	   something,	   without	   also	  conceiving	  of	  the	  person	  or	  the	  force	  that	  flings	  it?	  Is	  it	  not	  a	  fact	  -­‐	  that	  we	  
are	  here	  and	  now,	  aware	  of	  our	  very	  personal	  being,	  but	  without	  being	  able	  to	   justify	   it	   in	  our	   finitude	  –	   that	  can	  be	  even	  better	  defined	  with	  the	  term	  ‘received’?	   And	   if	   so,	  what	   is	   the	   difference	   between	   ‘thrownness’	  and	   the	  gift	  of	  being?	   In	   fact	   the	  acceptance	  of	   the	  existential	   state	  of	   ‘thrownness’	  does	  not	  elude	  from	  the	  question	  concerning	  one’s	  origin:	  “One	  might	  try	  by	  whatever	   power	   to	   silence	   it	   [the	   question]	   till	   it	   dies	   or	   to	   prohibit	   it	   as	  meaningless	   –	   it	   always	   inevitably	   arises	   again	   from	   the	   displayed	  distinctiveness	   of	   the	   human	   being	   and	   requires	   a	   something	   which	   is	  founding	   without	   being	   founded,	   something	   which	   founds	   itself:	   One	   that	  throws	  the	  ‘thrown’.	  Thus	  thrownness	  reveals	  itself	  as	  creatureliness”	  (MHE,	  p.	  71).	  
	   To	   further	   explain	   this	   type	  of	   safety	  Stein	   compares	   it	   to	   the	   secure	  feeling	  of	  a	  child	  who	  is	  carried	  in	  the	  arms	  of	  its	  mother.	  It	  is	  not	  a	  ‘rational’	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security,	   based	   on	   a-­‐priori	   evidence	   or	   self-­‐assurance,	   but	   a	   sort	   of	   inner	  serenity.	   Nevertheless	   she	   asks	   if	   it	   would	   be	   considered	   rational	   for	   the	  child	  to	  live	  in	  the	  constant	  fear	  that	  his	  mother	  might	  let	  it	  fall.	  Stein	  opens	  the	  door	  to	  the	  possibility	  of	  an	  eternal	  being	  that	  is	  ‘support	  and	  ground	  of	  my	  own	  being’.	  Is	  this	  a	  religious	  answer?	  	  
	   Does	  the	  idea	  of	  an	  eternal,	  never	  ending	  and	  everlasting	  being,	  arising	  in	  the	  human	  being	   ‘naturally’	  automatically	  put	   the	  question	  of	  being	   into	  the	   territory	   of	   belief	   or	   is	   the	   experience	   of	   the	   security	   of	   being	   a	  phenomenon	   that	   is	   possible	   to	   experience?	   Stein	   provides	   a	   theory:	   ‘the	  way	  of	  faith’,	  which	  is	  different	  from	  the	  way	  of	  philosophical	  reasoning,	  and	  suggests	  that	   it	  could	  be	   ‘the	  answer	  of	  another	  world	  to	  a	  question	  which	  philosophy	  poses’.	  However,	  how	  is	  it	  possible	  to	  pin	  down	  the	  experience	  of	  the	   security	   of	   being,	   an	   experience	   that	   is	   said	   to	   be	   ‘a	   rather	   dim	   and	  indefinite	  feeling	  that	  can	  hardly	  be	  called	  knowledge’?	  	  
	   The	   philosophical	   way	   offers	   traditional	   arguments	   to	   prove	   God’s	  existence	   according	   to	   Aquinas:	   in	   her	   discussion	   with	   Heidegger	   about	  ‘thrownness’	   Stein	   has	   already	   introduced	   the	   idea	   of	   God	   as	   ‘unmovable	  mover’,	   she	   goes	   on	   to	   comment	   on	   Aquinas’	   thesis	   of	   God	   as	   first	   cause,	  necessary	  being	  and	  necessary	  existence.	  Later	  she	  would	  also	  introduce	  the	  idea	  of	  God	  as	  order	  and	  truth.	  	  
Stein	  described	  the	  experience	  of	  the	  security-­‐of-­‐being	  with	  the	  same	  world	  Geborgenheit	  in	  one	  of	  her	  early	  works,	  which	  she	  wrote	  immediately	  after	  her	  working	  with	  Husserl	  in	  Freiburg	  from	  1918	  to	  1920	  (Einführung	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in	   die	   Philosophie)53.	  This	   is	   the	   time	   in	   which	   her	   decision	   to	   convert	   to	  Catholicism	  matured	  and	  also	  the	  years	  that	  are	  generally	  referred	  to	  by	  her	  biographies	   as	   a	   time	   of	   deep	   personal	   crisis.	   From	   early	   1918,	  when	   she	  received	  the	  news	  of	  the	  death	  of	  her	  teacher	  Reinach,	  Stein	  started	  to	  face	  a	  series	  of	  difficulties	   in	  her	  professional	   and	   sentimental	   life	   that	   shattered	  the	   grounds	   of	   her	   previous	   beliefs,	   threw	   her	   plans	   for	   the	   future	   into	  confusion	   and	   consumed	   her	   mental	   and	   physical	   energies.	   Among	   these	  difficulties	  was	  the	  decision	  to	  leave	  her	  position	  of	  personal	  assistant	  with	  Husserl	  and	  the	  disappointment	  about	  the	  impossibility	  of	  working	  together	  in	   an	   intellectual	   collaboration,	   the	   negative	   response	   of	   the	   university	   in	  Göttingen	  where	  she	  applied	  for	  a	  habilitation	  and	  two	  close	  friendships	  that	  did	  not	  develop	  into	  romantic	  relationships,	  as	  she	  would	  have	  wished.	  It	  is	  easy	   to	   see	   how	   Stein	   anchors	  many	   of	   the	   philosophical	   remarks	   of	   this	  time	  to	  her	  life	  experiences.	  
What	  she	  describes	   is	  a	   sense	  of	   security	  which	   “seize	  us	  especially	  when	  we	  are	   in	  doubt,	  when	  our	   reason	  doesn’t	   see	  any	  way	  out	  or	  when	  nobody	   in	   the	  world	   has	   the	  will	   or	   the	   power	   anymore	   to	   advise	   us	   and	  help	  us”	  (ESGA	  8,	  p.	  171	  –	  172)54.	  	  Geborgenheit,	  the	  feeling	  of	  being	  secure-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  53	  The	   same	   expression	   ‘Sich-­‐Geborgenfühlen-­‐in-­‐Gott’	   is	   also	   used	   by	   Adolf	   Reinach	   to	  describe	  one	  of	  the	  possible	  ways	  of	  religious	  experience	  (see	  Beckmann,	  2003,	  p.	  124).	  54	  This	   is	   a	   personal	   translation	   since	   the	   English	   translation	   of	   this	   work	   is	   not	   yet	  available.	   This	   is	   the	   original	   text:	   In	   dem	   Gefühl	   der	   Geborgenheit,	   das	   uns	   oft	   gerade	   in	  
‚verzweifelter’	  Lage	  ergreift,	  wenn	  unser	  Verstand	  keinen	  möglichen	  Ausweg	  mehr	   sieht	  und	  
wenn	  wir	  auf	  der	  ganzen	  Welt	  keinen	  Menschen	  mehr	  wissen,	  der	  den	  willen	  oder	  die	  Macht	  
hätte,	   uns	   zu	   raten	   und	   zu	   helfen:	   in	   diesem	   Gefühl	   der	   Geborgenheit	   werden	   wir	   uns	   der	  
Existenz	  einer	  geistigen	  Macht	   inne,	  die	  uns	  keine	  äußere	  Erfahrung	   lehrt.	  Wir	  wissen	  nicht,	  
was	  weiter	  aus	  uns	  werden	  soll,	  vor	  uns	  scheint	  ein	  Abgrund	  zu	  gähnen	  und	  das	  Leben	  reißt	  
uns	  unerbittlich	  hinein,	  denn	  es	  geht.	  vorwärts	  und	  duldet	  keinen	  Schritt	  zurück;	  aber	  indem	  
wir	   zu	   stürzen	  meinen,	   fühlen	  wir	  uns	   "in	  Gottes	  Hand",	  die	  uns	   trägt	  und	  nicht	   fallen	   lässt,	  
Einführung	  in	  die	  Philosophie,	  ESGA	  8,	  Freiburg	  2004,	  S.	  171-­‐172.	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in-­‐being	   is	   connected	   to	   an	   ‘inner	   force’,	   which	   cannot	   be	   gained	   by	   any	  outside	  experiences	  but	  arises	   in	   the	  core	  of	   the	  person	  and	   is	   simply	   felt,	  like	  an	  awareness:	  “we	  still	  don’t	  know	  what	  will	  become	  of	  us,	  it	  looks	  like	  there	  is	  an	  abyss	  opening	  in	  front	  of	  us,	  and	  life	  keeps	  inexorably	  pushing	  us	  on,	  going	  on	  and	  not	  allowing	  any	  step	  back;	  but	  just	  when	  we	  are	  about	  to	  fall,	  we	  feel	  that	  we	  are	  ‘in	  God’s	  hands’,	  and	  he	  carries	  us	  and	  is	  not	  letting	  us	  fall”	  (ESGA	  8,	  p.	  171).	  	  
	   This	   passage	   has	   an	   even	   greater	   significance	   when	   one	   considers	  that	  Stein	  was	  not	  yet	  openly	  religious,	  although	  she	  had	  become	  nearer	  to	  the	  church	  and	  she	  had	  started	  considering	  conversion.	  	  In	  fact	  it	  is,	  for	  the	  first	   time	   in	   1918	   that	   Stein	   described	   in	   Sentient	   Causality	   the	   state	   of	  ‘resting	  in	  God’	  as	  follows:	  
“Compared	  to	  the	  cessation	  of	  activeness	  from	  the	  lack	  of	  life-­‐power,	  resting	   in	   God	   is	   something	   completely	   new	   and	   unique.	   The	   former	   was	  dead	   silence.	   Now	   its	   place	   is	   taken	   by	   the	   feeling	   of	   being	   safe,	   of	   being	  exempted	   from	   all	   anxiety	   and	   responsibility	   and	   duty	   to	   act.	   And	   as	   I	  surrender	  myself	  to	  this	  feeling,	  new	  life	  begins	  to	  fill	  me	  up,	  little	  by	  little,	  and	   impels	  me	  –	  without	  any	  voluntary	  exertion	  –	   toward	  new	  activation”	  (Stein,	  2000,	  p.	  84-­‐85).	  	  
	  
This	  analysis	  of	  an	   inner	   force	  and	  the	  way	  that	   it	   takes	  hold	  of	   the	  person	   and	   refills	   it	   with	   new	   energy	   is	   an	   important	   element	   of	   the	  structure	  of	  the	  human	  soul.	  Even	  more	  important	  are	  the	  presuppositions	  for	  this	  force	  to	  be	  able	  to	  act:	  the	  trustful	  and	  sincere	  opening	  of	  the	  human	  being	  to	  receive	  this	  force	  as	  a	  gift	  and	  in	  doing	  so	  collaborating	  in	  its	  action.	  All	  of	  this	  will	  be	  considered	  at	  a	  later	  point	  in	  this	  work.	  For	  the	  moment	  it	  is	   important	   to	   comment	   on	   how	   in	   Stein’s	   description	   of	   the	   state	   of	  
	   107	  
security-­‐in-­‐being,	   which	   is	   diametrically	   opposite	   to	   Heidegger’s	  thrownness,	   a	   series	   of	   positive	   personal	   feelings	   play	   an	   important	   role:	  security,	   trust	   and	   empowerment,	   against	   Heidegger’s	   emptiness,	  endangeredness,	  anguish	  and	  anxiety.	  Finally,	  according	  to	  Stein,	  the	  human	  being	  actively	  welcomes	  a	  positive	   force	  and	   in	  doing	   so	   facilitates	   it.	  This	  	  also	  contrasts	  with	  the	  position	  of	  the	  Dasein,	  which	  is	  thrown	  into	  existence	  without	  meaning	  or	  hope.	  	  
	  
3.8. Everydayness	   and	   inauthenticity:	   the	   Characterisation	   of	   ‘das	  
Man’	  
	  There	   is	   a	   further	   element	   that	   characterises	   the	  Dasein’s	   being-­‐in-­‐the-­‐world.	  The	  subject	  of	  the	  everyday	  Dasein	  is	  said	  to	  be	  inauthentic,	  not	  a	  proper	   self,	   but	   a	   ‘man-­‐selbst’	   [They-­‐self] 55 .	   Heidegger	   expresses	   this	  concept	  with	  the	  use	  of	  the	  neutral	  undetermined	  pronoun	  ‘man’:	  the	  ‘man’	  is	  a	  possibility	  of	   the	  Dasein’s	  being	  and	   it	   is	  used	  to	  stress	   the	   idea	  that	   it	  lives	  an	  existence	  that	  is	  not	  authentic.	  It	   is	  correct	  to	  say	  that	  the	   ‘who’	  of	  the	  Dasein	  ‘answer	  itself	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  ‘I’	  itself,	  the	  ‘subject’,	  the	  ‘self’	  (SZ,	  p.	  151).	  Heidegger	  does	  not	   dispute	   therefore	   the	   giveness	   of	   the	   I,	   however	  “the	   question	   arises	  whether	   giving	   the	   ‘I’	   in	   the	  way	  we	   have	  mentioned	  discloses	  Dasein	  in	  its	  everydayness,	  if	  it	  discloses	  Dasein	  at	  all”	  (p.	  151).	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  55	  To	   translate	   the	  use	  of	   the	  German	   ‘man’	   that	  has	   the	  meaning	  of	  a	  general	   impersonal	  subject	   (man	   glaubt	   =	   one	   believe,	   they	   believe,	   it	   is	   believed)	  many	   English	   translations	  chose	  to	  use	  ‘they’.	  I	  will	  use	  the	  original	  German	  expression.	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The	  fact	  that	  the	  Dasein	  is	  said	  to	  be	  in	  a	  world	  with-­‐others	  must	  not	  be	  understood	  in	  a	  relational	  intersubjective	  way.	  Heidegger’s	  remarks	  that	  the	  world	  is	  simply	  already	  given	  ‘with-­‐others’	  and	  that	  these	  others	  are	  not	  ‘everyone	  else	  but	  me’,	  but	  rather	  ‘those	  from	  whom,	  for	  the	  most	  part,	  one	  does	  not	  distinguish	  oneself	   –	   those	  among	  whom	  one	   is	   too’	   (SZ,	  p.	   154).	  The	  dimension	  of	  the	  Dasein’s	  solitude	  starts	  now	  to	  become	  clearer.	  “With’	  and	   ‘too’	  are	   to	  be	  understood	  existentially,	  not	  categorically.	  By	  reason	  of	  this	  with-­‐like	   [mit-­‐haften]	   being-­‐in-­‐the-­‐world,	   the	  world	   is	   always	   the	   one	  that	   I	   share	   with	   others.	   The	   world	   of	   Dasein	   is	   a	   with-­‐world	   [Mit-­‐welt].	  Being-­‐in	  is	  being-­‐with-­‐others.	  Their	  being-­‐in-­‐themselves	  within-­‐the-­‐world	  is	  Dasein-­‐with	   [Mit-­‐dasein].	   What	   emerges	   is	   the	   image	   of	   a	   human	   being	  which	   is	   mostly	   in	   the	   world	   as	   an	   impersonal	   ‘it’,	   where	   others	   don’t	  represent	   the	   possibility	   of	   connections	   or	   relations	   but	   are	   only	   ‘given-­‐with’.	  	  
Stein	   wonders	   at	   this	   point	   if	   there	   is	   a	   state	   in	   which	   Dasein	   is	  disclosed	  to	  itself.	  This	  is	  said	  to	  be	  “anguish	  that	  brings	  the	  ‘world’	  as	  such	  in	  sight.	   It	   is	  anguish	   ‘for’	  being-­‐alone-­‐in-­‐the-­‐world	   (as	   ‘solus	   ipse’),	   i.e.	   for	  an	   authentic	   being	   from	   which	   Dasein	   in	   its	   deterioration	   flees	   into	   the	  world	  and	  the	  ‘man’”	  (MHE,	  p.	  61).	  It	  appears	  therefore	  that	  the	  basic	  state	  of	  anguish	  (Angst)	  has	  two	  sides:	  the	  in-­‐front-­‐of-­‐what	  (Wovor)	  and	  the	  what-­‐for	  (Worum).	  The	  Dasein	  does	  not	  fear	  something	  outside	  but	  it	  fears	  itself.	  It	  is	   afraid	   of	   being-­‐in-­‐the-­‐world-­‐itself	   (in-­‐der	   Welt-­‐sein-­‐als-­‐solches).	   In	   its	  attempt	   to	   escape	   this	   condition,	   it	   falls	   back	   into	   the	   world	   and	   in	   the	  impersonality	   of	   the	   ‘man’.	  As	   a	   consequence	   of	   this	   the	  world	   and	   its	   life	  
	   109	  
loses	  sense	  and	  comes	  to	  mean	  nothing.	  Stein	  argues	  that	  no	  sense	  or	  order	  is	  to	  be	  found	  in	  a	  life	  that	  has	  finitude	  as	  the	  only	  possible	  end.	  Heidegger’s	  attempts	   to	   understand	  Dasein	   from	   itself	   rather	   than	   from	   the	   world	   or	  from	   nature	   eliminates	   any	   possible	   way	   out	   of	   finitude,	   solitude	   and	  meaninglessness.	  	  
When	  the	  world	  appears	   to	  have	  nothing	  more	   to	  offer,	  not	  even	   in	  the	   presence	   of	   others	   or	   in	   the	   possibility	   to	   truly	   understand	   itself,	   the	  
Dasein	   is	   rejected	   into	   itself	   again.	   The	   consequence	   of	   this	   is	   the	  
Unheimlichkeit	  of	  the	  Dasein:	  the	  feeling	  of	  ‘not	  being	  at	  home’,	  being	  on	  its	  own,	  being	  a	  stranger	  to	  the	  world.	  	  
The	  main	  element	  that	  Stein	  highlights	  is	  the	  disclosure	  of	  the	  nullity	  of	   the	  Dasein.	   She	  discusses	   very	  directly	  Heidegger’s	   theory	   of	   existential	  anxiety	  in	  the	  second	  chapter	  of	  Finite	  and	  Eternal	  Being	  where	  she	  refers	  to	  it	  as	  the	  ego	  that	  refuses	  the	  idea	  of	  eternal	  being,	  which	  is	  an	  idea	  that	  once	  grasped	  must	  necessarily	   become	   the	  measure	  of	   its	   own	  being.	  However,	  the	  ego	  that	  lives	  in	  fear	  of	  its	  transiency	  will	  hide	  its	  superficial	  view	  of	  life	  “under	  the	  veil	  of	  multiple	  ‘cares’	  [Sorgen]”	  to	  hide	  “the	  sight	  of	  life’s	  nullity”	  (EES,	  p.	  57	  –	  58).	  	  
Stein	   is	   lapidary	   in	   her	   criticism:	   anxiety	   cannot	   under	   any	  circumstances	  be	  considered	   to	  be	   the	  ordinary	  dominant	  mood	  of	  human	  life;	  rather	  it	  is	  a	  pathological	  condition.	  To	  support	  this	  thesis	  she	  describes	  with	  analytic	  objectivity	  the	  most	  general	  feelings	  of	  the	  human	  being,	  who	  goes	  through	  life	  ‘almost	  as	  securely’	  as	  if	  it	  has	  control	  over	  its	  existence.	  I	  believe	  that	  this	  statement	  must	  be	  read	  in	  the	  light	  of	  everyday	  experience:	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whilst	   everyone	   would	   agree	   that	   we	   are	   not	   in	   total	   control	   of	   our	  existence,	  which	   can	   end	   or	   be	   endangered	   at	   any	   time	   (one	   could	   be	   the	  victim	  of	  a	  car	  accident	  or	  any	  number	  of	  unpredictable	  fatal	  events),	  what	  Stein	  is	  trying	  to	  say	  is	  that	  a	  person	  who	  worries	  constantly	  about	  the	  fact	  that	  he	  could	  die	  is	  generally	  recognised	  to	  be	  suffering	  from	  some	  form	  of	  pathological	   depression	   or	   phobia.	   Constant	   worry,	   although	   due	   to	   the	  specific	  character,	  history	  and	  personality	  of	  each	  one	  of	  us,	  is	  evidently	  not	  to	  be	  considered	  the	  ordinary	  healthy	  state	  of	  a	  person.	  
In	  this	  instance	  Stein	  opposes	  the	  fear	  and	  insecurity	  of	  existence	  and	  the	   experience	   of	   a	   living	   present	   that	   never	   rests.	   This	   leads	   her	   to	   a	  consideration	  of	  death	  and	  to	  the	  necessary	  idea	  of	  an	  eternal	  being,	  which	  she	  describes	  in	  terms	  of	  inexplicable	  but	  irrefutable	  certainty:	  	  
	   “The	   undeniable	   fact	   that	   my	   being	   is	   limited	   in	   its	   transience	   from	  moment	   to	  moment	   and	   thus	   exposed	   to	   the	   possibility	   of	   nothingness	   is	  counterbalanced	  by	  the	  equally	  undeniable	  fact	  that	  despite	  this	  transience,	  I	  am,	  that	  from	  moment	  to	  moment	  I	  am	  sustained	  in	  my	  being	  and	  that	  in	  my	  fleeting	  being	  I	  share	  in	  enduring	  being.	  In	  the	  knowledge	  that	  being	  holds	  me,	  I	  rest	  securely”	  (EES,	  p.	  58).	  	   At	   this	   point	   Stein	   progresses	   to	   analyse	   in	   depth	   what	   Heidegger	  introduces	  as	  the	  only	  possibility	  of	  authenticity,	  which	  discloses	  itself	  to	  the	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3.9. Death	  as	  fulfilment?	  
	  The	  last	  element	  of	  Stein’s	  critique	  of	  Heidegger	  is	  the	  analysis	  of	  the	  end	   of	   being:	   Heidegger’s	   understanding	   of	   death	   and	   dying	   and	   his	  description	  of	  being-­‐towards-­‐death.	  Stein	  introduces	  this	  important	  topic,	  to	  which	  she	  dedicates	  the	  largest	  portion	  of	  her	  critique,	  as	  follows:	  “If	  Dasein	  is	   concerned	   with	   its	   own	   possibility,	   this	   obviously	   entails	   that	   there	   is	  something	  which	  is	  not	  yet.	  In	  order	  to	  be	  grasped	  in	  its	  totality,	  also	  its	  end	  –	   death	   –	   must	   be	   grasped,	   something	   which	   is	   only	   possible	   in	   being	  towards	  death”	  (MHE,	  p.	  62).	  
The	  question	   of	   the	   end	  of	  Dasein	   leads	   according	   to	   Stein	   to	  more	  common	  questions	  on	   the	  meaning	  of	   being	   and	   its	   end:	  where	  do	   I	   come	  from?	  Where	  do	  I	  go?	  What	  is	  the	  meaning	  of	  my	  being	  (life,	  existence)	  and	  of	   my	   death?	   The	   pre-­‐reflexive	   attitude	   of	   the	   phenomenological	   method	  tries	   to	   experience	   and	   to	   study	   objects	   in	   the	   way	   that	   they	   ‘reveal	  themselves’:	  to	  accept	  them.	  With	  the	  same	  attitude	  Stein	  described	  the	  fact	  that	  in	  my	  being	  I	  experience	  not	  only	  fear	  and	  anxiety,	  but	  also	  security	  and	  strength:	  “At	  every	  moment	  I	  find	  myself	  face	  to	  face	  with	  nothingness,	  and	  from	  moment	   to	  moment	   I	  must	  be	   endowed	  and	   re-­‐endowed	  with	  being.	  And	  yet	  this	  empty	  existence	  that	  I	  am	  is	  being,	  and	  at	  every	  moment	  I	  am	  in	  touch	  with	  the	  fullness	  of	  being”	  (EES,	  p.	  55).	  
According	   to	   Heidegger	   death	   means	   neither	   completion	   nor	  fulfilment.	  It	  merely	  demonstrates	  the	  Da	  (there)	  of	  the	  Dasein:	  it	  dies	  due	  to	  its	  mortality.	  Death	  does	  not	  refer	  to	  the	  ending	  of	  a	  human	  life;	  it	  is	  rather	  a	  
	   112	  
condition	  in	  which	  the	  Dasein	  can	  find	  itself.	  It	   is	  also	  not	  clear	  how	  and	  to	  what	  depth	  Heidegger	  describes	  the	  event	  of	  the	  end	  of	  life.	  In	  §	  49	  of	  Being	  
and	  Time	  it	  states:	  	  
“Death,	   in	   the	  widest	  sense,	   is	  a	  phenomenon	  of	   life.	   (…)	  Dasein	  too	  ‘has’	  its	  death,	  of	  the	  kind	  appropriate	  to	  anything	  that	  lives;	  and	  it	  has	  it	  not	  in	  ontical	   isolation,	  but	  as	  codetermined	  by	   its	  primordial	  kind	  of	  being.	   In	  so	   far	   as	   this	   is	   the	   case,	  Dasein	   too	   can	   end	  without	   authentically	   dying,	  though	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  qua	  Dasein,	  it	  doesn’t	  simply	  perish.	  We	  designate	  this	   intermediate	   phenomenon	   as	   its	   demise	   [Ableben].	  Dying	   is	   instead	   a	  name	  for	  the	  way	  of	  being	   [Seinsweise],	   in	  which	  the	  Dasein	   is-­‐for-­‐his-­‐death	  [zu	   seinem	  Tode	   ist].	   Accordingly	  we	  must	   say	   that	   Dasein	   never	   perishes.	  Dasein,	  however,	  can	  demise	  only	  as	  long	  as	  it	  is	  dying”	  (SZ,	  p.	  290	  –	  291).	  	  	  	  It	   is	   correct	   to	   say	   that	  Heidegger’s	   understanding	  of	   death	  has	   the	  precise	   aim	   to	   provide	   the	   ground	   for	   the	   three	   characteristics	   of	   the	  structure	  of	  Dasein	   (Inwood,	  1997,	  p.	  69	   -­‐	  70).	   I	  will	   follow	  here	   Inwood’s	  differentiation	   although	   I	  will	   focus	   only	   on	   certain	   aspects	   in	   the	   light	   of	  Stein’s	  analysis:	  	  
-­‐ The	  first	  one	  is	  that	  the	  Dasein’s	  awareness	  that	  it	  will	  die	  shapes	  its	  whole	   life.	   Dasein	   is	   constantly	   ahead	   of	   itself	   because	   of	   its	  impending	   end	   and	   this	   is	   the	   hidden	   reason	   behind	   the	   Dasein’s	  resolutions.	   In	   fact	   Heidegger	   states	   that	   ‘being-­‐at-­‐hand’	   implies	  existentially	  being-­‐toward-­‐death	  (SZ,	  p.	  293).	  However	  it	  is	  confusing	  as	  to	  how	  this	  existential	  state	  rather	  than	  opening	  more	  possibility	  for	   the	   life	   of	   the	   Dasein,	   perhaps	   serves	   as	   motivation	   and	   drive,	  seems	  to	  represent	  instead	  the	  Dasein’s	  ownmost	  potentiality-­‐to-­‐be:	  “If	   Dasein	   stands	   before	   itself	   as	   this	   possibility,	   it	   has	   been	   fully	  assigned	  to	  its	  ownmost	  potentiality-­‐for-­‐being.	  When	  it	  stands	  before	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itself	   in	   this	   way,	   all	   its	   relations	   to	   any	   other	   Dasein	   have	   been	  undone.	  This	  ownmost	  non-­‐relational	  possibility	  is	  at	  the	  same	  time	  the	  uttermost	  one”	  (SZ,	  p.	  294).	  These	  remarks	  open	  the	  way	  to	  the	  next	   characteristic	   of	   the	   Dasein	   that	   is	   highlighted	   by	   death:	   it’s	  solitude.	  
-­‐ Heidegger	   is	   adamant	   in	   his	   interpretation	   that	   death	   is	   always	  ‘mine’:	  “No	  one	  can	  take	  the	  other’s	  dying	  away	  from	  him”	  and	  “death	  signifies	   a	   peculiar	   possibility-­‐of-­‐being	   in	   which	   the	   very	   being	   of	  one’s	  own	  Dasein	  is	  an	  issue.	  In	  dying,	  it	  is	  shown	  that	  mineness	  and	  existence	   are	   ontologically	   constitutive	   for	   death.	   Dying	   is	   not	   an	  event;	  it	  is	  a	  phenomenon	  to	  be	  understood	  existentially”	  (SZ,	  p.	  284).	  The	  possibility	  of	  death	  breaks	  up	  the	  inauthenticity	  of	  the	  Dasein:	  it	  is	  not	  ‘man’	  or	  ‘they’	  that	  dies,	  but	  it	  is	  I.	  In	  refusing	  the	  possibility	  of	  experiencing	  the	  death	  of	  others	  Heidegger	  remarks	  on	  how	  the	  only	  death	   that	   Dasein	   can	   possibly	   know	   and	   experience	   is	   its	   own	  because	   it	   can	   only	   belong	   to	   its	   being:	   “the	   dying	   of	   others	   is	   not	  something	  which	  we	  experience	   in	  a	  genuine	  sense;	  at	  most	  we	  are	  always	  just	  ‘there	  alongside’”	  (SZ,	  p	  282).	  	  
-­‐ The	   last	   characteristic	   is	   the	   insistence	   on	   the	   temporality	   of	   the	  
Dasein	   and	   the	   understanding	   of	   time	   itself.	   Heidegger	   asks	   if	   time	  does	   go	   on	   after	   the	  Dasein’s	   death	   and	   if	   so	   ‘can	   there	   not	   be	   an	  unlimited	   number	   of	   things	  which	   still	   lie	   ‘in	   the	   future’	   and	   come	  along	   out	   of	   it?’	   (SZ,	   p.	   378)	   and	   he	   answers	   affirmatively.	   Having	  stated	  that	  Dasein’s	  being	  is	  essentially	  ‘futural’,	  Heidegger	  describes	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here	  what	   he	   names	   the	   three	   ‘ecstasies’	   of	   temporality,	   which	   are	  past	  (have-­‐been),	  present	  and	  future.	  He	  then	  remarks	  on	  how	  future	  is	  the	  one	  that	  has	  primacy,	  although	  only	  the	  present	  of	  the	  moment	  can	  bring	  the	  Dasein	  to	  its	  authentic	  self.	  In	  this	  resolution	  the	  Dasein	  comes	  back	  to	  itself	  and	  discloses	  the	  ‘factical	  possibility	  of	  authentic	  existence’	  (SZ,	  p.	  435).	  It	  is	  clearly	  stated	  that	  time	  can	  go	  on	  forever,	  after	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Dasein,	  but	  what	  ultimately	  matters	  ends	  with	  the	  
Dasein.	  A	  possibility	  for	  the	  Dasein	  to	  authentically	  grasp	  its	  finitude	  and	   become	   ‘free-­‐for-­‐death’	   is	   offered	   by	   the	   concept	   of	   ‘fate’,	   in	  which	   the	   Dasein	   can	   project	   itself	   upon	   anxiety	   and	   guilt.	   The	  structure	  of	  fate	  is	  equivalent	  to	  the	  one	  of	  ‘care’	  and	  brings	  together	  the	   knowledge	   and	   acceptance	   of	   death,	   guilt,	   conscience,	   freedom	  and	   finitude.	   Stein	   quotes,	   in	   this	   regard,	   the	   following	   passage,	  without	   commenting	   on	   it	   explicitly:	   “Only	   an	   entity	   which	   in	   its	  being,	   is	  essentially	   futural	  so	  that	   it	   is	   free	  for	   its	  death	  and	  can	  let	  itself	   be	   thrown	   back	   upon	   its	   factical	   ‘there’	   by	   shattering	   itself	  against	  death	  (…)	  can	  …	  take	  over	  its	  own	  thrownness	  and	  be	  in	  the	  
moment	  of	  vision	  for	  ‘its’	  time”	  (SZ,	  p.	  437).	  Heidegger	  calls	  this	  state	  ‘authentic	   temporality’	   which	   is	   at	   the	   same	   time	   finite	   and	  historically	  authentic.	  However	  it	  remains	  unclear	  as	  to	  whether	  the	  
Dasein’s	  state	  of	  being-­‐free-­‐for-­‐death	  can	  offer	  any	  enlightenment	  on	  the	  phenomenon	  of	  death	  itself.	  	  
Let	   us	   now	   consider	   how	   Stein	   responds	   to	  Heidegger’s	   approach	   to	  the	   Dasein’s	   death.	   In	   her	   analysis	   she	   is	   immediately	   puzzled	   by	   the	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description	  of	  the	  phenomena	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  human	  life.	  In	  other	  words,	  she	   had	   followed	   Heidegger’s	   way	   and	   was	   disappointed	   by	   his	   final	  conclusions:	   it	  was	  to	  be	  assumed	  that	  the	  ultimate	  meaning	  of	  Dasein	  was	  to	  be	  clarified	  by	  the	  examination	  of	  its	  last	  possibility:	  death	  (and	  its	  ‘being	  towards	   death’);	   but	   ‘how	   is	   this	   possible:	   “if	   nothing	   else	   can	   be	   said	   of	  death	   except	   that	   it	   is	   the	   end	  of	  Dasein?	   Is	   this	  not	   a	   completely	   fruitless	  circularity?”	  (MHE,	  p.	  75).	  	  	  
Stein	   argues	   in	   particular	   that	   the	   analysis	   remains	   purely	   ‘of	   this	  world’,	  even	   if	   it	   is	  evident	   that	  what	  death	   is	  cannot	  really	  be	  clarified	  by	  the	  analysis	  of	  the	  Dasein	  as	  has	  been	  offered,	  as	  the	  possibility	  of	  life	  after	  death,	   or	   the	   hypothesis	   of	   a	   ‘passage’	   of	   the	  Dasein	   to	   a	   further	   state,	   is	  precluded	  from	  the	  beginning.	  In	  §49	  of	  Being	  and	  Time	  Heidegger	  declares:	  “If	   ‘death’	   is	   defined	   as	   the	   ‘end’	   of	  Dasein,	   that	   is	   to	   say,	   of	   Being-­‐in-­‐the-­‐world	   [in	  der	  Welt	   sein],	   this	   does	   not	   imply	   any	   ontical	   decision	  whether	  ‘after	   death’	   still	   another	   Being	   is	   possible,	   either	   higher	   or	   lower,	   or	  whether	  Dasein	  ‘lives	  on’	  or	  even	  ‘outlasts’	  itself	  and	  is	  ‘immortal’”	  and	  more	  clearly	  he	  concludes	  “our	  analysis	  of	  death	  remains	  purely	   ‘this-­‐worldly’	   in	  so	  far	  as	  it	  interprets	  that	  phenomenon	  merely	  in	  the	  way	  in	  which	  it	  enters	  into	   any	  particular	  Dasein	   as	   a	   possibility	   of	   its	   being.	  Only	  when	  death	   is	  conceived	   in	   its	   full	   ontological	   essence	   can	   we	   have	   any	   methodological	  assurance	  in	  even	  asking	  what	  may	  be	  after	  death”	  (SZ,	  p.	  292).	  Furthermore	  he	   does	   not	   consider	   as	   part	   of	   his	   current	   analysis	   the	   decision	   as	   to	  whether	  it	  is	  theoretically	  possible	  to	  pose	  this	  question.	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Heidegger	   investigated	   the	   possibility	   of	   one’s	   own	   death	   and	   the	  death	  of	  others,	  coming	  to	  the	  conclusion	  that	  one	  can	  only	  experience	  one’s	  own.	   Stein	   firstly	   argued	   with	   Heidegger’s	   exclusions	   a-­‐priori	   that	   the	  definition	   of	   death	   as	   ‘end	   of	  Dasein’	   could	   open	   up	   the	   possibility	   of	   life	  after	   death.	   This	   appears	   to	   be	   a	   decision	   that	   –	   once	   again	   –	   favours	   a	  precise	   direction	   of	   the	   investigation.	   The	   same	   is	   valid	   for	   Heidegger’s	  remarks	   on	   the	   theoretical	   legitimation	   of	   the	   question	   of	   life	   after	   death,	  which	  can	  only	  be	  rightfully	  asked	  once	  the	  meaning	  of	  death	  is	  clarified.	  It	  should	   therefore	   be	   possible	   to	   presume	   that	   ‘the	   being-­‐in-­‐the-­‐world	   of	  human	  beings	  ends,	  without	  them	  thereupon	  ceasing	  to	  be	  in	  another	  sense’,	  however	   this	   will	   de-­‐legitimise	   Heidegger’s	   previous	   analysis	   which	  ‘although	   underlining	   other	   existential	   besides	   being-­‐in-­‐the-­‐world,	   did	   not	  regard	  these	  as	  separable’	  (MHE,	  p.	  75).	  The	  possibility	  of	  a	  life	  of	  the	  Dasein	  beside	  or	  outside	  its	  being-­‐in-­‐the-­‐world	  is	  therefore	  analytically	  impossible.	  	  
One	   must	   agree	   with	   Antonio	   Calcagno’s	   opinion	   about	   Stein’s	  analysis	  of	  death	  (Calcagno,	  2007)56.	  It	  is	  true,	  in	  fact,	  that	  she	  makes	  great	  use	  of	  her	  own	  experience	  as	  a	  nurse	  during	  World	  War	  I,	  and	  refers	  to	  the	  impact	  that	  witnessing	  others	  die	  had	  on	  her.	  How	  can	  it	  be	  possible	  –	  she	  wonders	   -­‐	   to	   describe	   death	   in	   only	   one	   way,	   when	   there	   are	   so	   many	  deaths,	   each	   unique,	   and	   so	   many	   states	   of	   sufferance,	   peace,	   fear,	  acceptance,	  despair	  or	  faith,	  involved	  in	  the	  process?	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  56	  I	  refer	  to	  Calcagno’s	  analysis	  “Die	  Fülle	  oder	  das	  Nichts?	  Martin	  Heidegger	  and	  Edith	  Stein	  on	  the	  Question	  of	  Being”	  which	  appeared	  in	  American	  Catholic	  Philosophical	  Quarterly,	  Vol.	  LXXIV,	  No.	  2,	  also	  in	  The	  Philosophy	  of	  Edith	  Stein	  (Calcagno,	  2007).	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It	   is	   certainly	  correct	   to	  say	   that	  we	  cannot	  experience	   the	  death	  of	  others,	  not	  at	  least	  in	  the	  same	  way	  as	  that	  of	  our	  own,	  as	  Heidegger	  states,	  yet	  seeing	  these	  deaths	   is	   fundamental	   for	  our	  knowledge	  of	  what	  death	   is	  and	  means,	  and	  changes	  our	  understanding	  of	  it	  forever.	  It	  is	  also	  true	  that	  much	  of	  what	  dying	  means	  can	  be	  already	  anticipated	  in	  life.	  However	  Stein	  finds	   it	   important	   to	  distinguish	  between	   ‘anguish’,	  which	   is	   the	   state	   that	  precedes	   death	   and	   for	   Heidegger	   the	   state	   that	   reveals	   to	   human	   beings	  their	   finitude	   and	   imminent	   death	   in	   the	   ‘being	   toward	   death’,	   and	  ‘resoluteness’	   in	   which	   the	   human	   being	   reaches	   an	   understanding	   or	  acceptance	   of	   its	   ‘being	   toward	   death’.	   It	   is	   Stein’s	   opinion	   that	  Heidegger	  focuses	   only	   on	   the	   existential	   state	   of	   anguishing,	   without	   fully	   grasping	  what	  one	  anguishes	  about.	  
It	   clearly	   emerges	   from	  Heidegger’s	   investigation	   that	   the	   reason	   for	  the	  natural	   anguish	   of	   the	  human	  being	   is	   its	   being.	  However	   it	   is	   not	   the	  same	  ‘wherefore’	  and	  ‘where-­‐about’	  one	  is	  anguished:	  	  
“That	  wherefore	  one	  is	  anguished	  is	  the	  possibility	  not	  to	  be,	  to	  which	  anguish	   testifies:	   it	   is	   the	   experience	   of	   the	  nothingness	   of	   our	  being.	   That	  about	  which	  one	  is	  anguished,	  and	  likewise	  that	  about	  which	  human	  beings	  are	  concerned	  in	  their	  own	  being,	  is	  being	  as	  a	  fullness,	  which	  one	  would	  like	  
to	  preserve	  and	  not	  leave	  behind	  -­‐	  of	  which	  there	  is	  no	  mention	  in	  Heidegger’s	  
entire	   analysis	   of	  Dasein	  and	   through	  which	   it	   would	   nevertheless	   first	   be	  founded.	  If	  Dasein	  were	  simply	  not-­‐being,	  then	  no	  anguish	  would	  be	  possible	  
for	   the	   ability-­‐not-­‐to-­‐be	   and	  about	   the	   possibility	   to	   be.	   Both	   are	   possible	  because	  human	  beings	  share	  in	  a	  fullness	  from	  which	  something	  continually	  slips	  and	  something	  is	  continually	  won:	  both	  life	  and	  death”	  (MHE,	  p.	  76).	  	  	  It	  is	  hard	  to	  question	  the	  logic	  behind	  these	  thoughts:	  there	  is	  no	  doubt	  that	  humans	  fear	  for	  their	  lives	  and	  fight	  to	  conserve	  it,	  in	  the	  same	  way	  that	  it	   is	   evident	   that	   they	   suffer	   at	   the	   idea	   of	   relinquishing	   their	   life	   and	   if	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anything	   this	   proves	   that	   their	   being	   appears	   to	   be	   something	   they	   are	  concerned	  with.	  	  This	  concern,	  which	  is	  also	  recognised	  by	  Heidegger,	  stands	  in	   contradiction	   with	   the	   impossibility	   of	   asking	   about	   what	   comes	   after	  death.	  However,	  since	  Heidegger	  does	  not	  extend	  his	  analysis	  to	  a	  being	  that	  is	   full	   existence	  and	  also	   in	  possession	  of	   its	  being	   in	   time,	   i.e.	   eternal,	   the	  question	  is	  left	  unanswered.	  	  
	   Once	  again,	  Stein’s	  attention	  for	  the	  human	  feelings	  that	  characterise	  the	   state	   of	   the	   human	   being	   in	   its	   being-­‐toward-­‐death	   is	   notable.	   This	   is	  Stein’s	  ultimate	  criticism	  of	  Heidegger’s	  approach	   to	   the	  problem	  of	  being:	  after	  declaring	   that	   the	  question	  of	   being	  belongs	   to	  Dasein,	   to	   the	  human	  being,	  and	  that	  the	  analysis	  of	  death	  can	  disclose	  the	  real	  significance	  of	  the	  
Dasein	   and	   that	   from	   solving	   this	   problem	  we	   can	  define	  what	   the	  human	  being	  is,	  Heidegger	  arranges	  everything	  in	  his	  analysis	  in	  a	  way	  that	  can	  only	  lead	   to	   reduce	   it	   even	   more	   to	   its	   finitude	   and	   ultimately	   to	   its	   death.	  Although	  it	  should	  be	  about	  human	  life,	  his	  investigation	  ‘leaves	  no	  room	  for	  what	  gives	  human	  life	   fullness:	   joy,	  happiness,	   love’	  (MHE,	  p.	  80).	  The	  only	  human	   states	   which	   are	   investigated	   are	   fear,	   anguish,	   and	   care	   (for	  oneself).	   Can	   such	   an	   analysis	   be	   representative,	   and	   most	   importantly	  complete?	  Have	  all	  aspects	   that	  play	  a	  role	   in	   the	  being	  of	   the	  Dasein	  been	  taken	   into	   account?	   Stein’s	   answer	   is	   ‘no’:	   the	   life	   of	   the	   human	   being	  according	   to	  Heidegger	   appears	   as	   a	   rush	   from	  moment	   to	  moment,	   as	   an	  escape	  from	  itself	  and	  ultimately	  into	  death,	  as	  living	  discloses	  itself	  to	  be	  in	  fact	  already	  a	  ‘being	  for	  death’.	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It	   is	   important	   to	  highlight	  how	  Stein	  doesn’t	   fully	   reject	  Heidegger’s	  thesis,	   it	   is	   considered	   to	   be	   only	   a	   part	   of	   the	   full	   picture:	   “care	   and	  temporality	  are	  therefore	   in	  no	  way	  the	  final	  meaning	  of	   the	  human	  being,	  but	  rather	  –	  according	  to	  their	  own	  testimony	  –	  what	  must	  be	  surpassed	  as	  far	   as	   possible,	   in	   order	   to	   reach	   the	   fulfilment	   of	   the	   meaning	   of	   being”	  (MHE,	   p.	   80).	   In	   other	   words	   eternal	   life	   is	   described	   by	   Stein	   as	   the	   full	  possession	  of	  what	  can	  only	  be	  experienced	  partially	   in	   ‘this’	   life,	   the	  same	  being	  ‘about	  which	  human	  existence	  is’,	  only	  with	  no	  anguish,	  no	  limits	  and	  no	  tension.	  	  
After	  demonstrating	  how	  the	  human	  being	  is	  not	  in	  control	  of	  its	  being	  and	  how	  it	  struggles	  and	  desires	  that	  fullness	  that	  it	  can	  experience	  only	  in	  a	  limited	   way,	   Stein	   introduces	   Aquinas’	   idea	   of	   the	   vocation	   of	   the	   human	  being	  for	  eternal	  life:	  only	  so	  can	  it	  unfold	  its	  true	  essence.	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Chapter	  4.	  For	  an	  Ontology	  of	  the	  Person	  	  	   In	   this	   chapter	   I	   will	   present	   Stein’s	   response	   to	   Heidegger’s	  description	  of	  the	  human	  being	  as	  it	  has	  emerged	  from	  the	  analysis	  of	  Being	  
and	  Time	  and	  I	  will	  argue	  that	  Stein’s	  arguments	  against	  Heidegger’s	  theory	  and	   methodology	   have	   a	   deeper	   significance	   for	   the	   understanding	   of	  human	   life.	   To	   this	   end,	   Stein’s	   personal	   ontology	   will	   be	   extrapolated	   in	  
primis	  from	  Finite	  and	  Eternal	  Being	  and	  the	  appended	  essay	  on	  Heidegger;	  however,	   a	   few	   passages	   of	   Stein’s	   mature	   anthropological	   work	   and	  especially	  her	  description	  of	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  person	  (ESGA	  14)	  provide	  much	  needed	  support.	  	  
I	   will	   present	   four	   main	   concepts	   and	   themes	   that	   emerge	   from	  Stein’s	  confrontation	  with	  Heidegger’s	  work,	  and	  draw	  upon	  them	  to	  place	  her	  reflections	  into	  a	  wider	  ethical	  context.	  These	  themes	  offer	  not	  only	  an	  interesting	  and	  fruitful	  contribution	  to	  current	  studies	  of	  the	  philosophy	  of	  Edith	   Stein,	   but	   also	   demonstrate	   the	   importance	   and	   relevance	   of	   Stein’s	  philosophical	  theory,	  and	  especially	  the	  significance	  of	  her	  position	  towards	  Heidegger	  for	  contemporary	  ethics.	  	  
After	  a	  brief	  explanation	  of	  Stein’s	  evaluation	  of	  Christian	  philosophy	  and	  how	  faith	  plays	  an	  essential	  role	  in	  her	  philosophical	  investigation,	  I	  will	  investigate	   the	   following	   themes:	   a.	   The	   significance	   of	   Stein’s	   idea	   of	   the	  ‘fullness’	   of	   being	   and	   how	   this	   idea	   shapes	   the	   structure	   of	   the	   human	  person;	  b.	  The	  analysis	  of	  the	  ‘gift’	  of	  being	  and	  the	  discovery	  of	  ‘acceptance’	  as	   a	   structural	   moment	   of	   ‘being-­‐a-­‐person’;	   c.	   The	   definition	   of	   being	   as	  ‘received’	   and	   how	   a	   phenomenology	   of	   ‘givenness’	   can	   help	   clarify	   the	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relationship	  between	  the	  human	  person	  and	  the	  eternal	  being,	  and	  can	  offer	  an	  answer	  to	  the	  more	  general	  question	  of	   the	  meaning	  of	  being;	  d.	  Stein’s	  understanding	  of	  the	  phenomenon	  of	  death	  and	  dying	  and	  the	  question	  as	  to	  whether	   a	   genuine	   knowledge	   of	   mortality	   can	   constitute	   an	   important	  element	  of	  the	  human	  person.	  	  
In	   the	   final	   section	   of	   this	   chapter	   I	   draw	   upon	   Stein’s	   insights	   on	  end-­‐of-­‐life	  issues	  and	  outline	  how	  a	  positive	  acceptance	  and	  understanding	  of	   the	   experience	   of	   death	   as	   part	   of	   life	   can	   play	   an	   important	   role	   for	  contemporary	  medical	  ethics,	  especially	  regarding	  end-­‐of-­‐life	  care.	  In	  stating	  this	  I	  fully	  agree	  with	  Gerl-­‐Falkovitz’s	  opinion	  that	  not	  only	  was	  Stein	  ahead	  of	   her	   time	   in	   many	   theoretical	   insights,	   but	   also	   that	   her	   philosophy	  contains	   ‘deep	   impulses’	   that	   today	   –	   and	   perhaps	   only	   today	   –	   can	   be	  rightly	  viewed	  and	  valued	  for	  the	  profundity	  of	  their	  impact’	  (Gerl,	  1991,	  p.	  11).	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4.1.	  	   Faith	  and	  the	  search	  for	  truth	  
	   The	  main	   thrust	   of	   Stein’s	   arguments	   against	   Heidegger	   take	   issue	  with	  the	  following	  point:	  as	  Stein	  sees	  it,	  Heidegger	  puts	  the	  human	  being	  at	  the	  centre	  of	  his	  analysis	  but	  does	  not	  want	   to	   take	   into	  consideration	   the	  fact	  that	  this	  being	  has	  knowledge	  of	  other	  forms	  of	  beings	  around	  it	  along	  with	  understanding	  of	  a	  higher	  one.	  She	  wonders	  if	   it	   is	  correct	  to	  say	  that	  the	   being	   of	  Dasein	   is	   the	   only	   possible	   one,	   or	  whether	   it	   can	   also	  make	  sense	  –	  while	  still	  questioning	  the	  meaning	  of	  the	  human	  being	  -­‐	  to	  question	  other	  forms	  of	  being	  (eternal	  being)	  as	  well.	  	  
It	  is	  not	  the	  aim	  of	  this	  research	  to	  offer	  a	  comprehensive	  overview	  of	  Stein’s	   thoughts	  concerning	   the	  human	  person,	   since	  such	  a	   task	  would	  be	  outside	   the	   scope	  of	   this	  work.	  This	   is	   especially	  because	  Stein’s	   theory	  of	  the	   person	   extends	   into	   many	   different	   fields	   and	   touches	   multiple	  disciplines.	   It	   is	   however	   necessary	   at	   this	   stage	   to	   clarify	   Stein’s	  metaphysical	   position,	   which	   is	   influenced	   by	   both	   phenomenology	   and	  Christian	  philosophy.	  	  
Stein	  dedicates	  part	  of	  her	  introduction	  to	  Finite	  and	  Eternal	  Being	  to	  the	   question	   ‘Is	   there	   a	   Christian	   philosophy?’	   (EES,	   p.12).	   This	   is	   the	  question	   of	   whether	   a	   rigorous	   philosophical	   analysis	   should	   rely	  exclusively	   on	   reason	   and	   experience,	   or	   accept	   the	   additional	   light	   from	  revelation,	  as	  medieval	  philosophy	  does.	  Stein	  makes	  here	  an	  interesting	  use	  of	  Jacques	  Maritain’s	  distinctions	  between	  the	  nature	  of	  philosophy	  and	  the	  
	   123	  
actual	   situation	   or	   condition	   of	   philosophy57,	   which	   she	   quotes	   to	   explain	  how	   the	   philosophical	   thinking	   should	   be	   composed	   of	   both	   an	   enduring	  intellectual	  habit	  and	  a	  vital	  intellectual	  activity	  (p.	  14).	  As	  such	  philosophy	  is	   a	  Wissenschaft,	   a	   science,	   and	  presupposes	   the	   existence	  of	   an	  objective	  reality	   and	   of	   knowing	   intellects.	   Science	   tends	   towards	   knowledge,	   and	  “represents	   the	   total	   precipitate	   of	   the	   efforts	   of	   the	   human	   mind	   in	   its	  pursuit	  of	  truth”	  (p.	  15).	  	  
In	   light	   of	   this	   insight,	   Stein	   explores	   how	   philosophy	   is	   different	  from	   every	   other	   discipline,	   in	   the	   following	   sense:	   philosophy	   concerns	  itself	   with	   the	   ultimate	   clarification	   of	   the	   fundamental	   principles	   of	   all	  sciences.	  Christian	  revelation	  could	  in	  this	  sense	  enrich	  philosophy	  itself	  and	  offer	   contents	   of	   knowledge,	   which	   lie	   beyond	   the	   reach	   of	   a	   human	  experience	   based	   on	   a	   purely	   human	   foundation	   (Stein	   remarks	   that	  Maritain	  calls	  this	  possibility	  a	  ‘scandal’	  to	  human	  reason).	  Stein	  concludes:	  “there	  are	  existents,	  which	  are	  beyond	  the	  reach	  of	  natural	  experience	  and	  natural	   reason	  but	  which	  have	  been	  made	  known	   to	  us	  by	   revelation;	   and	  they	  confront	  the	  receptive	  human	  mind	  with	  entirely	  new	  tasks.”	  (p.	  21).	  	  
	   Sarah	  Borden	  explains	  Stein’s	  reasoning	  in	  the	  following	  passage:	  	  
“If	   something	   is	  made	  visible	   to	   the	   thinker	   through	  a	  higher	  Light,	  then	   it	   is	  unreasonable	   to	   attempt	   to	  understand	   the	  ultimate	   structure	  of	  reality	  depending	  only	  on	  what	  is	  known	  through	  one’s	  own	  light,	  especially	  when	  convinced	  that	  it	  is	  indeed	  a	  meagre	  light.	  What	  has	  been	  revealed	  is	  not	  simply	  incomprehensible.	  It	  is	  intelligible	  in	  itself	  and	  intelligible	  to	  us	  in	  the	  measure	  to	  which	  we	  have	  been	  given	  light	  to	  see.	  Thus,	  Stein	  argues,	  if	  a	  philosopher	  wishes	  to	  understand	  being	  in	  all	  its	  fullness	  and	  depth,	  then	  he	  or	   she	  cannot	   remain	  simply	  within	  mere	  natural	   reason	  but,	   rather,	  must	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  57	  Stein	  is	  referring	  to	  Maritain’s	  book,	  De	  la	  philosophie	  chrétienne,	  Paris,	  1933.	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enrich	   her	   philosophy	   with	   theology,	   without	   it,	   however,	   becoming	  theology.”	  (Borden,	  2003,	  p.	  96)	  	  At	   this	   stage	   it	   is	   important	   to	   stress	   that	   Stein’s	   methodology	   is	  strictly	   a	   philosophical	   one,	   in	   that	   she	   intends	   philosophy	   to	   be:	  collaboration	  between	  human	  reasoning,	   life	  experience	  and	  the	  search	  for	  truth.	   Stein	   highlights	   the	   necessity	   of	   conducting	   her	   search	   on	  philosophical	   ground;	   however	   she	   recognises	   that	   such	   a	   search	   is	  inevitably	   contextualized	   by	   Revelation:	   to	   reach	   the	   ultimate	   clarity	  philosophy	  must	  embrace	  the	  revealed	  truth.	  
Her	   investigation	   is	   undertaken	   at	   the	   limits	   of	   philosophical	  thinking,	  where	  many	  of	   the	   insights	  she	  explores	  are	  already	  crossing	  the	  line	   between	   reasoning	   and	   belief.	   She	   describes	   the	   knowledge	   of	   ‘an	  ultimate	   hold	   and	   ground’	   of	   my	   being	   as	   a	   ‘rather	   dim	   and	   indefinite	  feeling’,	  which	   can	  hardly	  be	   called	  knowledge.	   Such	  an	   investigation	  does	  not	   presuppose	   conceptual	   barriers,	   therefore	   she	   argues	   that	   in	  Heidegger’s	   analysis	   “a	   barrier	   is	   raised	   everywhere	   where	   a	   view	   could	  open	  onto	  the	  eternal,	  therefore	  there	  cannot	  exist	  an	  essence	  distinct	  from	  existence	   that	   could	   develop	   in	   existence,	   no	   meaning	   distinct	   from	  understanding	   that	   is	   grasped	   in	   understanding,	   no	   ‘eternal	   truth’	  independent	  of	  human	  understanding”	  (MHE,	  p.	  82).	  
According	   to	   Stein,	   the	   ultimate	   ground	   of	   the	   human	   person	   is	  ineffable.	   Even	  when	   language	   is	   at	   its	   limits,	   Stein	  uses	   images	   to	   further	  describe	   the	   connections	   between	   existing	   being	   and	   eternal	   being	   that	  appear	  almost	  poetic;	  and	  yet	  can	  be	  found	  in	  everyday	  life.	  In	  the	  same	  way	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that	  she	  compared	  the	  feeling	  of	   ‘being	  held	  securely	  in	  existence’	  with	  the	  security	   of	   the	   child	   in	   the	   arms	   of	   its	   mother,	   Stein	   uses	   similar	   simple	  images	   to	   describe	   the	   relationship	   between	   the	   human	   being	   and	   the	  eternal	  one:	  a	  mirror	   that	  offers	  a	  perfectly	   reflected	   image	  of	   the	  original	  object,	   or	   again	   the	   way	   a	   refracted	   ray	   of	   light	   reproduces	   un-­‐refracted	  light58.	  	  
What	  does	  this	  style	  of	  writing	  suggest?	  Stein	  has	  no	  desire	  to	  explain	  the	  human	  being	  completely:	  its	  soul	  maintains	  its	  mystery	  and	  is	  described	  as	   having	   a	   ‘dark’	   depth.	   Stein’s	   search	   for	   truth	   takes	   into	   account	   what	  revelation	   can	   offer:	   her	   philosophical	   investigation	   aims	   to	   ask	   questions	  whose	  answers	  may	  belong	  to	  another	  world,	  but	  must	  be	  asked	  in	  order	  to	  understand	  the	  human	  being	  along	  with	  other	  beings,	  which	  ‘will	  of	  course	  not	  answer	  in	  the	  same	  way	  as	  a	  human	  being	  answers’	  (MHE,	  p.	  82).	  	  
But	   what	   is	   the	   role	   of	   faith	   and	   how	   can	   it	   help	   the	   work	   of	  philosophy?	  Wolfe	  is	  right	  when	  she	  writes	  “for	  a	  Thomist	  thinker	  like	  Stein,	  a	   phenomenological	   analysis	   of	   human	   existence	   risks	   not	   merely	  incompleteness	  but	  incoherence	  by	  bracketing	  the	  divine”	  (Wolfe,	  p.	  157)59.	  However	   Stein	   overcomes	   the	   traditional	   understanding	   of	   Christian	  philosophy	  proposed	  by	  Przywara:	  	  she	  agrees	  with	  Przywara’s	  definition	  of	  philosophy	   as	   reduction	  ad	  mysterium	   (EES,	   p.	   25);	   however,	   she	   does	   not	  agree	  with	  the	  idea	  of	  philosophy	  and	  theology	  working	  together	  as	  equals	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  58	  “A	   better	   comparison	   that	   might	   be	   adduced	   is	   the	   relationship	   that	   exists	   between	   a	  refracted	  image	  and	  the	  object	  that	  is	  reflected,	  or	  between	  a	  refracted	  ray	  of	  light	  and	  the	  un-­‐refracted	   light.	   But	   even	   these	   are	   imperfect	   analogies	   with	   which	   we	   are	   trying	   to	  elucidate	  something	  which	  really	  allows	  of	  no	  comparison.”	  (EES,	  p.	  347).	  	  
59 In this passage Wolfe compares	   Stein’s	   Catholic	   Neo-­‐Scholasticism	   with	   Heidegger’s	  Lutheran	  eschatology,	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“within	  the	  frame	  of	  a	  metaphysics”.	  Stein	  hypothesizes	  that	  the	  philosophy	  could	   work	   with	   the	   help	   of	   theology,	   not	   as	   theology	   itself:	   “precisely	  because	   philosophy	   (not	   theology)	   must	   have	   its	   contents	   augmented,	   it	  faces	  the	  task	  of	  elaborating	  a	  unified	  and	  comprehensive	  doctrine”	  (EES,	  p.	  25),	  and	  furthermore	  “a	  Christian	  philosophy	  in	  this	  sense	  must	  aspire	  to	  a	  unity	   and	   synthesis	   of	   all	   the	   knowledge	   which	   we	   have	   gained	   by	   the	  exercise	  of	  our	  natural	   reason	  and	  by	  revelation”.	   	  The	  difference	  between	  Stein’s	   and	   Heidegger’s	   approach	   couldn’t	   be	   more	   striking,	   where	   he	  interprets	  the	  Seinsmodus	  of	  faith	  as	  a	  defeat	  for	  reason	  and	  freedom	  (see	  p.	  68).	  	  
Stein	   however	   does	   not	   describe	   the	   light	   of	   faith	   as	   a	   clarifying,	  explicatory	   enlightenment;	   on	   the	   contrary	   it’s	   a	   dark	   light,	   which	   places	  ‘everything	   intelligible’	   in	   a	   setting	  with	   an	   incomprehensible	  background.	  Faith	  cannot	  be	  processed	  and	  understood	  rationally,	  it	  is	  something	  that	  is	  received	   and	   accepted:	   its	   content	   is	   the	   gift	   of	   revealed	   truth.	   In	   her	   last	  book	   on	   the	  mystical	   theology	   of	   St	   John	  of	   the	  Cross,	  Stein	   reflects	   on	   the	  symbol	  of	   the	  dark	  night	   through	  which	   the	  human	  soul	  must	  pass	   to	   find	  God60.	   Faith	   is	   darkness	   for	   human	   reason:	   but	   at	   this	   stage	   Stein	   is	  more	  interested	   in	   the	  act	  of	   faith,	  which	   implies	   the	  acceptance	  of	  God:	   to	  have	  faith	  means	   to	   strive	   toward	  God:	   “Faith	   is	   thus	  a	   taking	  hold	  of	  God.	  This	  kind	   of	   seizure,	   however,	   presupposes	   a	   being	   seized.	   In	   other	  words,	  we	  cannot	  believe	  without	  divine	  grace.	  Once	  we	  open	  ourselves	   to	  grace	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  60	  Stein,	   Kreuzeswissenschaft	   (Scientia	   Crucis).	   Studie	   über	   Johannes	   vom	   Kreuz,	   ESGA	   18.	  While	   in	   the	   Echt	   Carmel	   Stein	   received	   the	   task	   of	   preparing	   a	   study	   on	   the	   mystical	  thoughts	   of	   St.	   John	   of	   the	   Cross	   to	   celebrate	   the	   fourth	   centenary	   of	   his	   birth.	   The	  manuscript	   of	   Kreuzwissenschaft,	   on	   which	   she	   worked	   between	   1940	   and	   1942,	   is	   left	  incomplete	  when	  Stein	  is	  deported	  in	  August	  1942.	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accept	  the	  gift	  of	  faith,	  we	  have	  ‘within	  us	  the	  beginning	  of	  eternal	  life’”	  (EES,	  p.	  27).	  	  
It	   is	   the	   description	   of	   an	   encounter,	   which	   could	   not	   be	   possible	  without	   the	  help	  of	  Revelation.	  God	   is	   already	  present	   in	   the	   innermost	  of	  the	  human	  soul,	  but	  the	  soul	  must	  open	  itself	  to	  him	  in	  a	  loving	  manner:	  it	  is	  an	  intimate	  union	  that	  requires	  the	  participation	  of	  each	  part.	  	  
	  
4.2.	  	   The	  fullness	  of	  being	  
	   The	   emptiness	   of	   the	  Dasein	   is	   opposed	   to	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   person	  experiences	   a	   ‘fullness	   of	   being’.	   The	   latter	   is	   initially	   described	   as	   having	  various	   degrees	   that	   allow	   the	   ego	   to	   come	   closer	   to	   absolute	   actuality	   of	  being.	  The	  ego	  is	  therefore	   ‘capable	  of	  arriving	  at	  the	  idea	  of	  eternal	  being’	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  its	  natural	  experience.	  	  
	   From	   Stein’s	   description	   of	   the	   human	   being	   the	   structure	   of	   an	  individual	   ‘I’	  that	  is	  also	  the	  ‘carrier’	  of	  being	  emerges	  –	  which	  is	  entrusted	  with	  being.	  In	  contradistinction	  to	  Heidegger,	  Stein	  explains	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  carrier	  and	  its	  content:	  it	  is	  true	  that	  the	  ego	  appears	  to	  be	  the	  ‘carrier	   of	   experiential	   fullness’,	   much	   like	   a	   ‘thingly’	   form	   carries	   the	  fullness	   of	   its	   contents,	   however	   the	   personal	   being	   is	   far	   from	   being	   an	  empty	   form,	   since	   in	   its	   case	   “empty	   form	   and	   its	   fullness	   are	   not	  merely	  externally	   conjoined	  but	  belong	   together	  essentially”	   (p.	  359),	   therefore	   in	  the	   case	   of	   the	   human	   person	   the	   ‘carrying’	   must	   be	   something	   different	  from	  what	  is	  generally	  understood.	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   Stein	   suggests	   that	   the	  person	   is	   the	   carrier	   (hypostasis)	   of	   rational	  nature	   as	   well	   as	   spiritual	   nature.	   This	   distinction	   is	   contained	   in	   the	  differentiation	  of	  spirit,	  which	  relates	  to	  both	  spirit	  and	  reason	  (EES,	  p.	  360).	  In	   her	   early	   essay	   Nature,	   Freedom	   and	   Grace	   Stein	   described	   spirit	   as	   a	  ‘going-­‐out-­‐of	  itself’,	  in	  the	  same	  way	  that	  life	  that	  ‘emanates’	  from	  the	  being	  of	  the	  person	  and	  makes	  the	  person	  aware	  that	  its	  own	  life	  is	  ‘its	  very	  own’	  (at	   this	   stage	   Stein	   is	   still	   describing	   the	   life	   of	   the	   ego).	   Now	   she	   can	  distinguish	  a	  further	  step,	  which	  is	  that	  “the	  personal	  ego	  must,	  in	  addition,	  be	  capable	  of	  understanding	  its	  own	  life	  and	  of	  moulding	  it	  freely	  out	  of	  its	  own	   self’	   (EES,	   p.	   362).	   From	   this	   description	   it	   is	   possible	   to	   extrapolate	  two	  important	  characteristics	  that	  belong	  to	  the	  personal	  being,	  reason	  and	  freedom,	  as	  explained	  in	  this	  passage:	  	  
“If	   then	   to	   being-­‐person	   there	   pertains	   the	   gift	   of	   rationality	   or	  intelligence,	   the	  person	  as	  such	  must	  possess	  reason	  and	  freedom.	  And	  we	  thus	   arrive	   at	   the	   distinction	   between	   ego	   and	   person	   and	   are	   justified	   in	  saying	  that	  not	  every	  ego	  need	  be	  a	  personal	  ego.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  every	  person	  must	  be	  an	  ego.	  […]	  Our	  understanding	  of	  the	  person	  as	  an	  ego	  and	  of	  the	  ego	  as	  the	  carrier	  of	  its	  own	  life	  has	  made	  it	  possible	  for	  us	  to	  describe	  the	   specific	  manner	   in	   which	   the	   person	   is	   the	   carrier	   of	   its	   life”	   (EES,	   p.	  363).	  	   	  But	  what	  is	  the	  aim	  of	  Stein’s	  analysis?	  It	  is	  stated	  that	  at	  the	  core	  of	  the	  human	  being	  there	  is	  what	  is	  firstly	  defined	  as	  its	  essence,	  or	  “quidditive	  determinateness	  [Wasbestimmheit],	  i.e.	  that	  which	  makes	  the	  human	  being	  a	  human	  being”	  (EES,	  p.	  363).	  This	  pertains	  to	  the	  soul	  of	  the	  person,	  the	  most	  intimate	  part	  that	  is	  described	  as	  allowing	  the	  human	  being	  to	  share	  eternal	  being,	   and	   also	   the	   conscious	   life	   of	   the	   person,	   in	   the	   way	   that	   it	  participates	   in	   the	  world	  around	   it.	  The	  relation	   that	   the	  human	  being	  has	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with	   eternal	   being	   is	   an	   intimate	   one,	   which	   is	   entirely	   based	   on	   the	  structure	  of	  personhood.	  
It	  is	  necessary	  to	  take	  a	  close	  look	  at	  the	  different	  parts	  that	  form	  the	  human	  person,	  which	  are	  very	  clearly	  stated	  as	  being	  body,	  soul	  and	  spirit,	  however	   not	   as	   a	   mere	   summary	   of	   elements,	   but	   rather	   as	   an	   living	  harmonious	  organism.	  Stein	  describes	  the	  human	  being	  as	  having	  different	  layers,	  from	  the	  outside	  to	  the	  inside:	  
	   “The	  human	  soul	  as	   spirit	  rises	   in	   its	  spiritual	   life	  beyond	   itself.	  But	  the	   human	   spirit	   is	   conditioned	   both	   from	   above	   and	   from	   below.	   It	   is	  immersed	  in	  a	  material	  structure,	  which	  it	  be-­‐souls	  and	  moulds	  into	  a	  bodily	  form.	  The	  human	  person	  carries	  and	  encloses	  ‘its’	  body	  and	  ‘its’	  soul,	  but	  it	  is	  at	   the	   same	   time	  carried	  and	  enclosed	  by	  both.	  The	   spiritual	   life	   [geistiges	  
Leben]	  of	   the	  human	  person	  rises	   from	  a	  dark	  ground.	   It	   rises	   like	  a	   flame	  that	  illumines,	  but	  it	  is	  a	  flame	  that	  is	  nourished	  by	  a	  non-­‐luminous	  matter.	  And	  it	  emits	  light	  without	  being	  light	  through	  and	  through”	  (EES,	  p.	  364).	  	  	   This	  wonderful	  passage	  helps	  explaining	  the	  way	  that	  the	  individual	  elements	   of	   the	   person	   relate	   to	   each	   other.	   The	   person	   has	   a	   undeniable	  bodily	  level	  as	  well	  as	  a	  soul/spiritual	  one,	  which	  must	  not	  be	  interpreted	  as	  similar	  to	  Russian	  dolls,	  where	  one	  simply	  exists	  inside	  the	  other,	  but	  rather	  ‘immersed	   and	  moulded’	   into	   one	   another.	   To	   clarify	   this	   point	   and	   to	   aid	  the	  explanation	  of	  the	  structure	  of	  Stein’s	  different	  levels	  of	  human	  activity	  we	  can	  refer	  to	  Marianne	  Sawicki,	  in	  the	  editor’s	  introduction	  to	  Philosophy	  
and	   Psychology	   of	   the	   Humanities:	   “Importantly,	   these	   divisions	   [the	  physical,	   the	   sensate,	   the	   mental	   and	   the	   personal	   level]	   are	   not	   to	   be	  reduced	  to	  the	  usual	  categories	  of	  ‘body’	  and	  ‘soul’.	  Rather,	  all	  four	  alike	  are	  localized	  within	  the	  body,	  where	  all	  four	  express	  what	  is	  ordinarily	  termed	  the	   soul	   as	   well.	   Stein	   holds	   that	   these	   realms	   are	   mutually	   permeable:	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influences	  travel	  across	  from	  one	  to	  another.	  Thus	  the	  human	  body	  itself	  is	  the	  interface	  of	  matter,	  sentience,	  and	  mind”	  (Stein,	  2000,	  p.	  XV).	  
	   This	  helps	  clarify	  how	  different	  levels	  are	  interconnected	  and	  merged	  together,	   the	   same	   is	   valid	   for	   the	   structure	   of	   the	   human	   soul,	   which	  pertains	  to	  all	  these	  different	  realms,	  but	  has	  an	  inexplicable	  ‘dark’	  ground.	  Stein	  remarks	  how	  the	  human	  person	  is	  more	  than	  its	  entire	  conscious	  life,	  and	  to	  understand	  it	  fully	  this	  depth	  must	  be	  penetrated.	  	  
	   The	  soul	  of	  the	  person	  is	  the	  centre	  of	  the	  body-­‐soul-­‐spirit	  unity	  and	  the	   foundation	   of	   spiritual	   life,	   rational	   actions	   and	   free	   decision.	   Stein	  engages	   in	   new	   imagery	   and	   definitions	   to	   describe	   the	   vivacity	   and	   the	  complexity	   of	   the	   human	   soul,	   a	   constitutive	   and	   undeniable	   part	   of	   the	  person,	  the	  absence	  of	  which	  she	  so	  strongly	  argued	  against	  in	  her	  criticism	  of	  Heidegger.	  The	  personal	  I	  feels	  ‘at	  home’	  inside	  the	  soul	  and	  lives	  in	  it	  like	  in	  a	  ‘castle’	  with	  many	  mansions	  “in	  which	  the	  I	  is	  able	  to	  move	  freely,	  now	  going	   outward	   beyond	   itself,	   now	   withdrawing	   into	   its	   own	   inwardness”.	  (EES,	  p.	  373).	   It	   is	  now	  completely	  clear	  why	  Stein	  chose	   to	  append	  to	  her	  great	   summa,	   along	  with	   the	   essay	   on	   Heidegger,	   the	   other	   text	   titled	  Die	  
Seelenburg	  (The	  Castle	  of	  the	  Soul),	  on	  the	  mystic	  of	  St.	  Teresa	  of	  Avila.	  	  
	   But	  how	  does	  the	  soul	  impact	  on	  human	  life	  and	  how	  can	  the	  person	  let	   itself	   be	   guided	  by	   it?	  Where	  do	   the	   inner	   life-­‐force	   and	   the	   fullness	  of	  being	  come	  from?	  And	  most	  importantly:	  when	  postulating	  an	  inner	  centre	  of	  guidance	  and	  motivation,	  that	  can	  provide	  support	  and	  direction	  and	  that	  at	  the	  same	  time	  fuel	  human	  life,	  can	  it	  be	  argued	  this	  minimizes	  the	  human	  being’s	   share	   in	   controlling	   his	   or	   her	   life	   and	   actions	   and	   defeats	   the	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person’s	  autonomy,	   	   relegating	   it	   to	   the	  status	  of	  a	   	  simple	  creature?	   If	   the	  fullness	  of	  life	  originates	  from	  a	  higher	  being	  and	  this	  is	  the	  hidden	  source	  of	  the	  human	  being’s	  energy,	  in	  which	  ways	  are	  personal	  freedom	  and	  human	  reason	  playing	  a	  role?	  	  
	   Stein	   gives	   an	   answer	   to	   these	   questions	   by	   clearing	   the	  interconnections	  between	  the	  I,	   the	  person	  and	  the	  soul.	   It	  was	  stated	  that	  the	   soul	   is	   a	   castle	   of	  many	   rooms,	  where	   the	   I	   freely	   lives:	   the	   I	   “is	   thus	  neither	  equivalent	  to	  the	  soul,	  nor	  to	  the	  body.	  It	  ‘dwells’	  in	  body	  and	  soul”	  (EES,	   p.	   374).	   Through	   the	   conscious	   life	   of	   the	   ‘I’,	   experiences	   and	  impressions	  can	  reach	   the	  depths	  of	   the	  soul.	  Here	  Stein	  makes	  distinctive	  use	   of	   the	   tools	   offered	   by	   phenomenological	   analysis,	   as	   well	   as	   her	  research	   on	   the	   empathic	   experience	   and	   the	   evidence	   of	   non-­‐original	  feelings,	  using	  a	  common	  example	  from	  everyday	  life:	  	  
	   “It	   may	   happen	   that	   I	   believe	   I	   have	   ‘overcome’	   some	   painful	  experience,	   and	   I	   have	   long	   since	   forgotten	   it.	   But	   suddenly	   some	   new	  experience	   brings	   it	   back	   to	   my	   memory,	   and	   the	   impression	   which	   this	  earlier	  experience	  now	  makes	  upon	  me	  as	  well	  as	  the	  thoughts	  which	  it	  now	  evokes	  make	  me	  realize	   that	   it	  has	  been	  working	  with	  me	  all	   the	   time	  and	  that,	   moreover,	   without	   it	   I	   would	   not	   be	   what	   I	   am	   today.	   This	   earlier	  experience	   has	   been	   working	   “within	  me”,	   i.e.	   within	  my	   soul,	   in	   a	   depth	  which	   is	   hidden	   most	   of	   the	   time	   and	   which	   only	   occasionally	   becomes	  overt”	  (EES,	  p.	  374).	  	  	   	  	   This	   resource	   of	   useful	   memories	   and	   experiences,	   good	   and	   bad,	  stays	   with	   the	   person	   and	   shapes	   its	   being,	   on	   an	   un-­‐reflected	   and	   non-­‐conscious	   level.	   Evidence	   shows	   how	   connections	   between	   lived	  experiences	  and	  behaviour	  and	   thoughts	   can	  coexist	   in	   the	  person,	  hidden	  from	   its	   consciousness,	   and	  only	   reveal	   themselves	  at	  a	   later	  point.	   In	   this	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way	   Stein	   describes	   how	   hidden	   life-­‐forces,	   such	   as	   a	   motivational	   force,	  determination,	   and	   will	   power,	   can	   suddenly	   operate,	   after	   the	   personal	  ones	  have	  run	  out	  of	  steam61.	  The	  same	  can	  be	  applied	  to	  positive	  events,	  for	  instance	  for	  the	  person	  that	  still	  feels	  hope	  beyond	  any	  reasonable	  hope	  or	  is	  capable	  of	  mercy	   in	   the	   face	  of	  an	  unforgivable	  wrong	   that	  has	  been	  done.	  Stein	   attributes	   all	   these	   situations	   to	   an	   energy	   that	   is	   beyond	   human	  energy	   or	   physical	   energy,	   but	   that	   is	   also	   not	   an	   unknown	   one.	   It	   is	   the	  shining	  of	  a	  force	  that	  overpower	  the	  one	  of	  the	  person,	  but	  one	  that	  agrees	  with	   its	  spirit,	  perfects	  and	  brings	   to	   full	  power	  what	   is	  already	  present	   in	  the	  inner	  world	  of	  that	  person	  in	  an	  unperfected	  state.	  	  
In	  the	   language	  of	  religious	  belief	  this	   is	  the	  power	  of	  God	  that	  only	  can	   give	   hope,	   courage	   and	   strength	   to	   the	   human	   being.	   In	   the	   case	   of	  negative	   forces	   however,	   uncontrollable	   pulses	   could	   turn	   a	   person	   into	   a	  degenerate	  form	  of	  itself,	  perhaps	  because	  of	  traumas	  that	  had	  their	  origins	  in	   past	   experiences,	  which	  were	   believed	   to	   be	   forgotten,	   but	   had	  worked	  against	   –	   and	   in	   this	   case	   eroded	   –	   the	   soul.	   Only	   a	   personal	   active	  participation	   in	   experience	   that	   we	   welcome	   and	   that	   we	   let	   settle	   and	  operate	   inside	   us	   can	   help	   direct	   the	   way	   that	   personality	   is	   shaped.	  However,	  it	  is	  essential	  to	  stress	  that	  for	  Stein	  the	  ‘dormant’	  powers	  that	  are	  hidden	   in	   the	   soul	   of	   the	   person	   are	   not	   seeds	   randomly	   present	   in	   each	  human	   being	   but	   only	   the	   results	   of	   the	   life	   experiences	   of	   each	   of	   us:	  “Whatever	   the	   person	   does	   freely	   and	   consciously	   is	   ego-­‐life,	   but	   person	  draw	  their	  ego-­‐life	  out	  of	  some	  greater	  or	   lesser	  depth”	  (EES,	  p.	  376).	  This	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  61	  See	  especially	  Stein,	  2000,	  p.	  79.	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means	   that	   the	   person	   is	   not	   a	   blind	   puppet	   in	   the	   power	   of	   instinct	   and	  external	   forces	   but	   plays	   an	   active	   part	   in	   shaping	   who	   he/she	   is	   and	   in	  directing	  his/her	  life	  according	  to	  his/her	  values,	  interests	  and	  talents.	  The	  necessary	   co-­‐action	   of	   the	   person	   is	   their	   prerogative	   for	   the	   fullness	   of	  being	  to	  act	  on	  the	  human	  soul.	  	  
The	  receptivity	  of	  the	  person	  is	  the	  sign	  of	  an	  open	  soul,	  as	  described	  in	  Nature,	  Freedom,	  Grace	  and	  in	  Finite	  and	  Eternal	  Being,	  this	  openness	  and	  capability	   to	   receive	   is	   a	   personal	   state	   which	   is	   characterized	   by	   trust,	  security,	  love	  and	  hope.	  	  
	  
4.3.	   Receiving	  being:	  acceptance	  as	  a	  fundamental	  element	  of	  ‘being-­‐
a-­‐person’	  	   The	  receptivity	  of	  the	  person	  is	  presented	  as	  a	  basic	  form	  of	  co-­‐action	  which	  is	  necessary	  for	  the	  received	  being	  to	  fully	  operate.	  Stein	  uses	  similar	  expressions	  in	  a	  much	  earlier	  treatise,	  Sentient	  Causality,	  published	  in	  1922	  in	   Husserl’s	   Yearbook.	   While	   describing	   the	   influx	   of	   mental	   and	   bodily-­‐sensory	  life	  power,	  she	  describes	  a	  different	  condition:	  the	  state	  of	  ‘resting-­‐in-­‐God’	  and	  relinquish	  all	  activities	  and	  decisions	  ‘to	  fate’,	  a	  state	  that	  can	  be	  encountered	  after	  all	  physical	  and	  mental	  forces	  have	  been	  exhausted	  by	  an	  energy	  depriving	  activity,	  an	  ‘experience	  that	  has	  consumed’	  all	  ‘mental	  life	  power	  and	  deprived’	  a	  person	  ‘of	  all	  activeness’.	  In	  such	  an	  instance	  one	  can	  experience	   ‘the	   feeling	   of	   being	   safe’	   in	   God,	   of	   not	   having	   to	   make	   any	  decisions	  or	  make	  any	  plans’,	  Stein	  describes	  these	  changes	  as	  follows:	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“As	   I	   surrender	  myself	   to	   this	   feeling,	   new	   life	   begins	   to	   fill	  me	  up,	  little	  by	  little,	  and	  impel	  me	  –	  without	  any	  voluntary	  exertion	  –	  toward	  new	  activation.	  This	   reviving	   infusion	   appears	   as	   an	   emanation	  of	   functionality	  and	   a	   power	   which	   is	   not	   my	   emanation	   and	   which	   becomes	   operative	  within	  me	  without	  my	  seeking	  for	  it.	  The	  sole	  prerequisite	  for	  such	  a	  mental	  rebirth	  seems	  to	  be	  a	  certain	  receptivity,	  like	  the	  receptivity	  supporting	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  person”	  (Stein,	  2000,	  p.	  85).	  	  	  Here	  Stein	  notes	  the	  centrality	  of	  the	  expression	  ‘surrender’;	  but	  how	  does	  human	  receptivity	  work?	  It	  is	  said	  to	  be	  a	  state	  of	  the	  person,	  however	  it	   can	   also	   be	   traced	   back	   to	   the	   basic	   psychophysical	   attitude	   of	   the	   ego,	  which	  experiences	  external	  objects.	  	  	  
In	   her	   lectures	   on	   philosophical	   anthropology62	  Stein	   identified	   the	  main	  characteristics	  of	  the	  personal	  structure	  of	  the	  human	  being	  as	  the	  fact	  that,	   when	   one	   looks	   in	   the	   eyes	   of	   another	   man,	   ‘his	   look	   answers	   me’	  (AMP,	  p.	  78).	  The	  ability	   to	  respond	  is	  set	  above	  all	  other	  elements	  of	  self-­‐affirmation	   and	   self-­‐conscience.	   Stein	   describes	   how	   when	   looking	   in	   the	  eyes	  of	  an	  animal,	  it	  will	  respond	  as	  well	  with	  a	  sort	  of	  assertion	  that	  it	  has	  noticed	  me,	  but	  its	  soul	  is	  the	  soul	  of	  a	  prisoner,	  it	  is	  aware	  of	  my	  presence	  but	  it	  cannot	  ‘possess	  itself’	  and	  it	  cannot	  freely	  ‘get	  out	  of	  itself	  and	  come	  to	  me’.	  With	  another	  person,	  however,	  when	  looking	  into	  its	  eyes,	  it	  can	  let	  me	  penetrate	  its	  ‘inner	  world’	  or	  reject	  me,	  it	  is	  the	  ‘lord	  of	  its	  soul	  and	  can	  open	  and	  close	  the	  doors	  of	  it’,	  and	  it	  can	  ‘go	  out	  of	  itself	  and	  come	  and	  penetrate	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  62	  Der	  Aufbau	  der	  menschlichen	  Person,	   later	   AMP	   (ESGA	   14)	   collects	   Stein’s	   lessons	   for	   a	  course	   on	   Philosophical	   Anthropology,	   which	   Stein	   taught	   at	   the	   German	   Institute	   for	  Scientific	  Pedagogy	  in	  Munster	  in	  1932/1933.	  This	  was	  to	  be	  her	  last	  public	  teaching	  work	  before	   joining	   the	  Carmelites	   in	  Cologne.	  Stein	  had	  originally	  planned	  a	   second	  course	  on	  theological	   anthropology	   for	   the	   following	   semester,	  which	   is	   now	   published	   in	   ESGA	   15	  
Was	  ist	  der	  Mensch?	  At	  this	  time	  Stein	  has	  also	  completed	  her	  work	  on	  Aquinas	  Potenz	  und	  
Akt	  and	  submitted	  it	  at	  the	  University	  of	  Freiburg	  to	  obtain	  her	  habilitation.	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other	   things’.	   She	   concludes	   by	   saying	   that	  when	   two	  men	   are	   in	   front	   of	  each	  other	   an	   encounter	  occurs,	   and	   the	  other	   ‘I’	   becomes	  a	   ‘Thou’.	   In	   the	  same	   chapter	   Stein	   describes	   the	   depth	   of	   the	   soul	   and	   uses	   the	   image	   of	  ‘being	  at	  home’	  inside	  the	  soul,	  an	  intimate	  home	  that	  can	  be	  opened	  up	  and	  let	  something/someone	  else	  in	  (AMP,	  p.	  86).	  	  
	   This	  analysis	  shows	  how	  Stein	  was	  already	  building	  the	  basis	  for	  her	  ontological	   understanding	   of	   the	   human	   person	   between	   1930	   and	   1932.	  The	  effect	  of	   this	  analysis	   can	  be	   traced	   to	  Finite	  and	  Eternal	  Being,	  where	  Stein	   uses	   the	   word	   ‘encounter’	   to	   describe	   the	   way	   that	   the	   soul	   can	  experience	   things	   outside	   of	   it	   and	   be	   shaped	   by	   them:	   “Everything	   that	   I	  consciously	   experience	   issues	   from	  my	   soul.	   It	   is	   an	   encounter	   of	  my	   soul	  with	  something	  that	  ‘impresses’	  it”	  (EES,	  p.	  375).	  	  
	   Stein	   gives	   great	   importance	   to	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   person	   has	   the	  capability	  of	  directing	  and	  choosing	  which	  direction	  to	  take	  in	  its	  life.	  God’s	  grace	  is	  described	  as	  a	  gift,	  and	  as	  such	  the	  person	  can	  accept	  it	  or	  refuse	  it.	  It	   is	   important	   to	   clarify	   that	   even	   without	   being	   fully	   touched	   by	   the	  fullness	   of	   being	   the	   person	  does	   not	   live	   a	   semi-­‐life	   but	   a	   fully	   conscious	  and	  morally	  awake	  life	  that	  resembles	  the	  perfect	  life	  of	  the	  eternal	  being.	  It	  is	  the	  choice	  of	  the	  person	  to	  let	  itself	  be	  touched,	  illuminated	  by	  the	  ‘flame’	  that	  arises	   from	   its	  depth.	  The	  act	  of	   surrender	   is	  not	   to	  be	  understood	  as	  passive	  but	  as	  a	  free	  choice.	  	  
To	  use	  again	  Stein’s	  image	  of	  the	  castle	  of	  the	  soul,	  the	  I	  can	  choose	  to	  live	   in	   the	   outside	   rooms,	   closer	   to	   external	   experiences	   and	   pulses,	   or	  withdraw	   in	   its	   inner	   centre	   and	   dedicate	   itself	   to	   a	   more	   intimate	   and	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reserved	   life,	   cultivating	   the	  ability	  of	  knowing	   itself,	   getting	   in	   touch	  with	  its	   spiritual	   level.	   Only	   if	   the	   soul	   is	   open	   and	   lets	   itself	   be	   awoken	   by	   an	  external	   force,	   can	   the	   life	   of	   the	   person	   be	   fully	   actuated.	   This	   is	   not	   a	  complete	  transformation	  but	  only	  the	  full	  actuation	  of	  what	  is	  already	  there	  in	  potentia.	  	  
Because	   the	   human	   soul	   is	   not	   passively	   hit,	   but	   chooses,	   it	   is	  essential	  that	  it	  answers	  to	  any	  external	  forces	  operating	  on	  it.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  great	   life-­‐changes	  these	  can	  happen	  on	  such	  an	  intimate	  level	  that	  perhaps	  even	   the	   conscious	   person	   does	   not	   realise	   the	   effects	   until	   the	   change	   is	  complete	  and	   the	  person	  becomes	  aware	  of	   it.	   Let’s	   consider,	   for	   instance,	  Stein’s	   conversion:	   before	   being	   able	   to	   name	   it,	   she	   described	   a	  world	   of	  ‘phenomena’	  that	  was	  opening	  up	  in	  front	  of	  her	  eyes	  (i.	  e.	  the	  existing	  signs	  of	  God’s	   love	   and	   grace	   in	   the	   events	   of	   her	   life	   and	   in	   the	   lives	   of	   people	  around	  her).	  Would	  it	  be	  correct	  to	  argue	  that	  such	  events	  suddenly	  started	  to	  happen	  or	  would	  it	  not	  be	  more	  appropriate	  to	  say	  that	  these	  or	  similar	  events	  were	  always	  present	   in	  her	   life	  and	  she	  was	   the	  one	  who	  suddenly	  started	  noticing	  them	  because	  of	  her	  stronger	  interest	  in	  them,	  because	  her	  soul	   was	   ready	   for	   it,	   having	   reached	   the	   necessary	   ability	   of	   being	   open	  without	  preconceptions,	  or	  simply	  because	  she	  felt	  inside	  that	  she	  needed	  to	  search	   for	   something	   to	   fill	   her	   life	   completely	   and	   faith	   was	   the	   right	  answer?	   Is	   this	   not,	   in	   a	   way,	   a	   path	   that	   originates	   from	   an	   honest	  questioning,	  a	   free	  decision	  and	  a	  reasonable	  searching,	  where	  at	  a	  certain	  point	  she	  encountered	  something,	  an	  undeniable	  evidence,	  a	  presence	   that	  changed	   her?	   Stein	   recapitulates	   this	   process	   in	   her	   comprehensive	  description	  of	  the	  human	  person:	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“The	   person	   –	   understood	   as	   I,	   which	   encompasses,	   cognitively	  illuminates	   and	   freely	   governs	   body	   and	   soul	   –	  we	   have	   described	   as	   the	  carrier	   that	   stands	   behind	   and	   above	   the	   body-­‐soul	   totality,	   or	   as	   the	  comprehensive	  form	  of	  body-­‐soul	  fullness.	  […]	  It	  sustains	  its	  life	  out	  of	  that	  fullness	  of	  the	  essence	  [Wesensfülle],	  which	  is	  resplendent	  in	  the	  awareness	  of	   life,	   without	   ever	   being	   fully	   illuminated	   or	   fully	  mastered.	   The	   person	  carries	  this	  fullness	  and	  is	  simultaneously	  carried	  or	  sustained	  by	  this	  dark	  and	  deep	  ground”	  (EES,	  p.	  377).	  	  	  	   This	  description	  echoes	  again	  the	  dimension	  of	  the	  ‘being-­‐secure-­‐in-­‐being’	   [Geborgenheit],	   which	   has	   already	   been	   clarified	   as	   a	   positive	   state	  when	  the	  human	  person	  experiences	  strength,	  security,	  trust	  and	  hope.	  It	  is	  not	   a	   reduction	   of	   the	   person	   to	   a	   mere	   creature,	   a	   reaffirmation	   of	   its	  dependence	   on	   the	   creator,	   but	   has	   instead	   the	   characteristics	   of	   an	  encounter.	   In	   the	   feeling	  of	   security	   and	   resting	   in	  God	   the	  human	  person	  encounters	   a	   higher	  being,	   this	  Other	   can	  be	  described,	  with	   the	  words	  of	  Martin	  Buber,	  as	  what	  is	  a	  ‘complete	  stranger’	  but	  at	  the	  same	  time	  obvious	  and	   ‘present’63.	   In	   this	  encounter	   the	  person	   is	  asked	   to	  put	  his/her	   life	   in	  God’s	  hands.	  This	  is	  not	  forced,	  but	  it	  is	  a	  possibility	  for	  its	  being,	  it	  is	  at	  all	  times	  a	  free	  decision	  and	  in	  this	  way	  it	  has	  the	  structure	  of	  a	  gift.	  	  
Only	   with	   a	   free	   act	   of	   a	   given	   gift	   the	   giver	   and	   the	   receiver	   are	  disclosed	   in	   their	   respective	   roles,	   since	   they	   do	   not	   exist	   outside	   of	   this	  structure,	  they	  do	  not	  exist	  without	  the	  gift.	   In	  fact	  both	  giver	  and	  receiver	  only	   become	   active	   in	   their	   respective	   roles	   in	   the	  moment	   of	   acceptance,	  since	  it	  is	  this	  free	  acceptance	  that	  qualifies	  the	  gift	  as	  such.	  If	  the	  object	  that	  is	   freely	   given	  was	   refused,	   or	   if	   it	  was	   taken	   rather	   than	  asked,	   or	   forced	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  63	  “Das	  ganz	  Anderen	  und	  doch	  das	  Selbstverständliche	  und	  Gegenwärtige“,	  Martin	  Buber,	  
Ich	  und	  Du,	  1923.	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upon	  rather	   than	   freely	  given,	   it	  would	  not	  be	  possible	   to	  recognize	   it	  as	  a	  gift.	  A	  gift	  does	  not	  exist	  a	  priori	  as	  such	  but	  it	  reveals	  itself	  as	  a	  gift	   in	  the	  moment	  of	  acceptance.	  	  
	  
4.4.	  	   The	  gift	  of	  being	  
	   What	  can	  a	  phenomenology	  of	  ‘givenness’	  offer	  to	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  human	   person?	   Stein	   succeeds	   in	   completing	   what	   both	   Husserl	   and	  Heidegger	   left	   incomplete.	   Husserl	   postulated	   a	   world	   of	   ‘Gegebenheiten’,	  given	   entities	   that	   are	   there	   to	   grasp	   for	   the	   consciousness.	   However	   he	  never	  solved	  the	  question	  of	  the	  giver,	  in	  a	  similar	  way	  Stein	  rightly	  pointed	  out	   that	   in	   Heidegger’s	   structure	   of	   the	   facticity	   of	   the	   human	   being,	   its	  ‘thrownness’,	   there	   is	   no	   mention	   of	   a	   ‘thrower’.	   This	   of	   course	   does	   not	  mean	   that	   Stein	   completes	   the	   circle	   simply	   by	   postulating	   a	   higher	   being	  that	  acts	  as	  ‘giver’.	  Much	  more	  important	  is	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  simple	  evidence	  of	  my	  life	  and	  existence,	  my	  being	  and	  everything	  that	  I	  am,	  is	  understood	  by	  Stein	  as	  a	   ‘gift’.	   If	   I	   love	  somebody	   I	  will	   automatically	  welcome	   them	  as	  a	  gift	  in	  my	  life.	  This	  means	  that	  it	  is	  because	  my	  being	  has	  the	  characteristic	  of	  a	  gift	  that	  I	  am	  revealed	  to	  myself	  as	  a	  receiver	  and	  that	  an	  eternal	  being	  that	  has	  control	  of	  its	  being	  is	  disclosed	  to	  me	  as	  a	  giver,	  and	  not	  the	  other	  way	  round.	  The	  gift	  has	  priority.	  
	   Because	  of	  this	  particular	  structure	  of	  giver-­‐gift-­‐receiver,	  the	  moment	  of	  receiving	  being	  has	  the	  characteristics	  of	  a	   loving	  relation	  with	  a	  similar	  structure	   composed	   by	   lover-­‐love-­‐loved.	   This	   is	   because	   of	   the	   inner	  structure	  of	  love,	  which	  much	  like	  a	  gift	  cannot	  be	  taken,	  stolen,	  requested,	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or	  forced,	  otherwise	  it	  will	  lose	  is	  inner	  structure.	  Its	  essence	  depends	  on	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  must	  be	  freely	  given,	  and	  even	  more	  importantly,	  freely	  accepted.	  	  
It	  gradually	  became	  evident	  that	  Stein’s	  centrality	  of	  the	  gift	  of	  being	  discloses	  a	   third	  way	  between	   the	   traditional	   choices	  of	  an	  almighty	  being	  that	   rules	   the	  world	  and	   its	   creatures	  or	   the	  existential	   idea	  of	  a	   finite	   life	  that	   cannot	   offer	   any	   further	   explanations	   for	   the	   being	   of	   the	   human	  person.	  While	  keeping	  in	  mind	  the	  structure	  of	  giver-­‐gift-­‐receiver,	  let	  us	  first	  analyse	  these	  two	  possibilities:	  
-­‐	   In	   the	   first	   case,	   the	   classical	   theory	   of	   an	   almighty	   creator	   and	   a	  receiving	  creature,	  the	  focus	  is	  on	  the	  ‘giver’,	  a	  higher	  being,	  God,	  a	  universal	  force	  that	  provides	  order	  and	  purpose	  for	  human	  life.	  The	   latter	   inevitably	  loses	   importance	   and	   meaning,	   because	   human	   life	   appears	   to	   be	   only	   a	  corrupted	   and	   limited	   version	   of	   the	   perfection	   of	   the	   eternal	   being.	  Why	  should	   life	   be	   worth	   living	   when	   there	   is	   no	   truth	   in	   it,	   no	   possibility	   of	  authentic	   experiences,	   and	   it	   is	   dependent	   on	   the	   continuous	   support	   of	   a	  higher	   being?	   This	   seems	   to	   be	   a	   return	   to	   a	   God-­‐centred	   and	   idealistic	  understanding	  of	  life	  and	  time,	  with	  the	  human	  being	  as	  the	  passive	  element	  of	  this	  unbalanced	  relationship.	  
-­‐	   In	   the	  second	  case	  the	   focus	   is	  on	  the	   ‘receiver’,	   the	  human	  being	   is	  not	  interested	  in	  finding	  a	  ‘giver’,	  it	  explains	  its	  life	  only	  by	  itself	  and	  its	  life	  ends	   because	   of	   its	   mortality:	   this	   explanation,	   however	   negative	   and	  nihilistic,	  attempts	  to	  investigate	  finitude	  as	  the	  only	  possible	  part	  of	  human	  life	  that	  can	  be	  experienced	  and	  therefore	  that	  can	  be	  known.	  	  Any	  possible	  form	  of	  control	  and	  self-­‐affirmation	  for	  the	  human	  being	  is	  rejected,	  because	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it	   is	   helpless	   in	   time,	  without	   being	   able	   to	   explain	   its	  wherefrom	   and	   its	  destination,	   with	   no	   meaning	   and	   no	   purpose.	   This	   is,	   of	   course,	   an	  existential	   interpretation	  of	   the	  human	  being,	  much	   like	   it	   can	  be	   found	   in	  Heidegger,	  and	  as	  such	  does	  not	  offer	  any	  real	  enlightenment	  concerning	  the	  definition	  of	  human	  life	  except	  describing	  its	  limits.	  	  
Stein	   solves	   this	  dilemma	  by	   concentrating	  on	   the	  middle	   term,	   the	  gift	  of	  being.	  This	  leads	  the	  way	  to	  an	  understanding	  of	  the	  human	  being	  as	  a	  receiver,	   entrusted	  with	  being	   and	   in	   control	   of	   its	   life	  decisions,	   called	   to	  live	  its	  life	  to	  the	  full.	  The	  human	  being	  can	  experience	  the	  eternal	  origin	  of	  its	  being	   through	   its	  experiences,	   through	  signs	  of	  a	  higher	   force,	  a	  deeper	  motivation,	   an	   unconditional	   love,	   that	   calls	   it	   to	   live	   in	   a	   positive	   and	  meaningful	  way	  to	  its	  full	  vocation.	  It	  can	  think	  and	  understand	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  never-­‐ending	   being	   and	   a	   life	   after	   death	   that	   it	   can	   relate	   to.	   With	   this	  structure	  of	  a	  personal	  life	  which	  originates	  in	  the	  moment	  of	  the	  acceptance	  of	  being,	  Stein	  describes	  a	  life	  that	  is	  meaningful,	  trustful	  and	  joyful	  despite	  its	   temporal	   being	   and	   its	   limited	   existence,	   in	   fact,	   it	   is	   so	   because	   of	   its	  limits.	  	  
What	   Stein	   missed	   most	   in	   Heidegger’s	   philosophy	   was	   the	  hypothesis	   of	   an	   immutable	   component	   of	   being,	   a	   sign	   of	   truth	   and	  authenticity	   that	   remains	   unchangeable	   and	   does	   not	   perish.	   There	   is	   no	  transcendence	   in	   the	   life	   of	   the	   Dasein,	   neither	   is	   there	   any	   real	  comprehension	   of	   anything	   outside	   of	   its	   finitude.	   Even	   the	   possibility	   of	  resoluteness,	   of	   an	   authentic	   moment	   of	   being	   can	   only	   last	   for	   the	  immediate	  present	  and	  cannot	  be	  carried	  forward.	  Can	  Heidegger’s	  call	  from	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consciousness	  be	  compared	  to	  a	   force	   from	  a	  deep	  place	   inside	  the	  human	  being,	   a	   call	   from	   the	   soul?	   The	   answer	   is	   no,	   because	   Heidegger’s	  conscience	   is	  not	   grounded	   in	   any	  meaningful	   structure,	   as	   Stein	   explains:	  “[Heidegger]	   recognises	   a	   meaning	   distinct	   from	   understanding,	   but	  dissolves	   meaning	   into	   understanding	   –	   although	   meaning	   is	   related	   to	  understanding.	  […]	  In	  fact	  the	  human	  being	  is	  caricatured	  already	  in	  what	  it	  shares	   with	   the	   being	   of	   things:	   in	   the	   deletion	   of	   its	   essentiality	   and	  substantiality”	  (MHE,	  p.	  82).	  	  
	   Calcagno	  opposes	  Heidegger’s	  emptiness	  to	  Stein’s	   fullness	  of	  being,	  since	  there	   is	  a	  striking	  conflict	  concerning	  the	  absence	  of	  contents	   for	  the	  structure	   of	   the	   Dasein	   when	   compared	   to	   the	   great	   importance	   and	  significance	  given	   to	   the	  abundance	  of	  being	   that	   characterises	   the	  human	  person	   in	  Stein.	  Furthermore,	   I	  must	  agree	  here	  with	   the	   interpretation	  of	  Angela	  Ales	  Bello,	  who	  rightly	  highlights	  how	  Stein’s	  philosophy	  describes	  a	  harmonic	  system,	  where	  order	  and	  truth	  illuminates	  the	  finitude	  of	  human	  life	  (Ales	  Bello,	  2009,	  p.	  10).	  	  
The	   word	   ‘harmony’,	   although	   not	   often	   used	   by	   Stein,	   seems	  appropriate	   in	   this	   instance:	   Ales	   Bello	   stresses	   Stein’s	   capacity	   to	  investigate	  many	  different	  areas	  of	  knowledge	  and	  her	  particular	  sensitivity	  that	  allows	  her	  to	  have	  a	  special	  eye	  for	  all	  types	  of	  ‘phenomena’.	  In	  the	  true	  spirit	   of	   the	   phenomenological	   approach,	   Stein’s	   research	   attitude	   is	  characterised	   by	   a	   lack	   of	   preconception,	   an	   ability	   to	   ‘wonder’	   and	   be	  impressed,	  without	  rhetoric,	  and	  with	  impressive	  realism	  and	  critical	  ability.	  In	   Stein	   there	   is	   no	   ‘satisfaction	   of	   finding	   negative	   things,	   but	   instead	   a	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great	  intellectual	  and	  moral	  effort	  to	  highlight	  what	  is	  positive,	  to	  search	  for	  balance,	   to	   search	   for	   harmony’,	   this	   is	   particularly	   evident	   when	  considering	  the	  many	  dichotomies	  that	  are	  present	   in	  Stein’s	  philosophical	  thought	  and	  that	  cooperate	  to	  build	  an	  honest	  but	  sympathetic	  ontology	  of	  the	   human	   person:	   body	   and	   soul,	   individual	   and	   community,	   male	   and	  female,	  faith	  and	  reason,	  philosophy	  and	  mystic.	  
The	   person	   that	   emerges	   from	   Stein’s	   findings	   doesn’t	   run	   from	  moment	  to	  moment	  like	  in	  Heidegger,	  but	  lives	  fully,	  experiences	  joy,	  learns	  and	   understands,	   builds	   connections	   to	   others	   that	   can	   be	   authentic	   and	  truthful,	  discovers	  itself	  through	  live	  experiences	  that	  change	  its	  personality	  and	  shapes	   its	  values,	   is	  open	   to	   the	  possibility	  of	  a	   life	  after	  death,	   to	   the	  idea	  of	  a	  loving	  giving	  being	  that	  supports	  its	  life	  and	  from	  whom	  it	  receives	  life	  itself.	  It	  is	  not	  just	  an	  idyllic	  portrait:	  in	  Stein	  there	  is	  a	  clear	  analysis	  of	  death,	   sufferance,	   decay	   and	   the	   human	   being	   is	   far	   from	   perfection	   and	  must	  work	  and	  learn	  to	  improve	  itself.	  But	  its	  death	  is	  not	  the	  last	  word,	  and	  neither	  is	  solitude,	  suffering	  or	  fear.	  
It	   is	   to	   these	   difficult	   aspects,	   Stein’s	   understanding	   of	   death	   and	  suffering,	  that	  the	  analysis	  should	  now	  turn,	  to	  gain	  a	  complete	  picture	  of	  all	  aspects	  of	  human	  life.	  	  	  
	  
4.5.	  	   Life	  and	  its	  ends:	  how	  do	  we	  experience	  death?	  
	   In	   the	   final	   section	   of	   this	   research	   I	  will	   discuss	   a	   particular	   issue	  related	   to	   Stein’s	   critique	   of	   Heidegger:	   how	   and	   if	   we	   understand	   and	  
	   143	  
experience	  death.	  I	  argue	  that	  some	  of	  Stein’s	  remarks	  are	  extremely	  fruitful	  for	  today’s	   lively	  debate	  regarding	  the	  way	  that	  society	  should	  care	  for	  the	  ill,	   and	   especially	   the	   way	   that	   we	   should	   accompany	   and	   care	   for	   the	  terminally	  ill.	  	  
It	   is	  more	  and	  more	  often	   the	  case	   that	  modern	  medical	   treatments	  offer	   the	   possibility	   of	   prolonging	   life	   without	   providing	   a	   cure;	   and	  individuals,	   as	  well	   as	   practitioners	   and	   policy-­‐makers,	   are	   faced	  with	   the	  decision	   of	   whether	   to	   withhold	   or	   withdraw	   treatment.	   There	   are	   many	  philosophical	  and	  ethical	  issues	  that	  are	  part	  of	  this	  dilemma,	  including	  the	  definition	   of	   human	  dignity;	   the	   need	   to	   respect	   the	  wishes	   of	   the	   patient	  and	  his	  or	  her	  family,	  and	  the	  necessity	  for	  the	  medical	  and	  nursing	  staff	  to	  care	   in	   a	   compassionate	   and	   sensitive	  way	  while	   remaining	  professionally	  efficient	  and	  law-­‐abiding.	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4.5.1.	  The	  ambiguity	  of	  death	  
	   Let	   us	   start	   by	   considering	   how	   death	   is	   perceived	   and	   why	   this	  perception	   affects	   us.	   In	   a	   book	   centred	  on	   the	   interpretations	  of	   death	   in	  contemporary	  philosophy,	  Bernard	  Schumacher	  analyses	  the	  understanding	  of	  death	  in	  the	  works	  of,	  among	  others,	  Max	  Scheler,	  Martin	  Heidegger	  and	  Jean-­‐Paul	   Sartre,	   and,	   most	   importantly,	   speculates	   whether	   death	   is	  regarded	  as	  a	   ‘nothingness’,	   in	   the	  epicurean	   sense,	   a	  necessary	  evil,	   or	   as	  something	  else	  entirely64.	  	  
Epicurus	   famously	  regarded	  death	  as	  a	   ‘nothingness’	   for	   the	  subject	  since	   it	   occurs	   after	   the	   end	   of	   human	   experience	   and	   therefore	   doesn’t	  affect	   directly	   the	   human	   being	   -­‐	   ‘when	   we	   die,	   we	   no	   longer	   exist’.	  Schumacher	   introduces	   an	   interesting	   theory	   which	   in	   his	   view	   naturally	  progresses	  from	  this	  classical	  definition,	  the	  taboo	  of	  death,	  also	  referred	  to	  as	  ‘the	  pornography	  of	  death’:	  “public	  practices	  and	  discourse	  pertaining	  to	  death	   are	   no	   longer	   connected	   to	   the	   ‘private’	   experience	   and	   feelings	   of	  those	  who	  die	  or	  are	   in	  mourning.	   […]	   It	  has	  become	  rare	   to	   see	   someone	  die.	  People	  no	  longer	  die	  at	  home,	  but	  rather	  at	  the	  hospital;	  the	  dead	  are,	  in	  a	  way,	   excluded	   from	   the	   community	  of	   the	   living.	   […]	  Death	   causes	   those	  who	  speak	  about	  it	  to	  shiver	  and	  to	  experience	  an	  uneasiness	  mingled	  with	  a	  fear	  of	   their	  own	  death	  or	  of	   the	  death	  of	  a	   loved	  one”.	  While	  reflecting	  on	  these	  phenomena	  the	  author	  declares,	   “the	  human	  being	   is	  deprived	  of	  his	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  64	  Schumacher’s	  book	  Der	  Tod	  in	  der	  Philosophie	  der	  Gegenwart	  (Darmstadt,	  2004);	  English	  tr.	  Death	  and	  Mortality	  in	  contemporary	  Philosophy,	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2010.	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death.	  We	  constantly	  lie	  to	  ourselves,	  saying	  that	  it	   is	  always	  someone	  else	  who	  dies,	  but	  never	  myself”	  (Schumacher,	  2011,	  p.	  2).	  	  
In	   the	   examples	   cited	   it	   is	   easy	   to	   see	   a	   recurrence	   of	   two	   main	  elements:	  the	  first	   is	  the	  fact	  that	  speaking	  of,	  or	  being	  in	  the	  face	  of	  death	  create	  uneasiness	  and	  makes	  people	  uncomfortable	  or	  afraid,	  which	   is	   the	  reason	   behind	   the	   fact	   that	  matters	   of	   death	   are	   normally	   dealt	  with	   only	  when	  it	  is	  imminent	  and	  in	  any	  case	  ‘behind	  closed	  doors’.	  This	  proves	  that	  death	   is,	   in	   fact,	   regarded	  as	   a	   ‘private’	   and	   ‘personal’	   event,	   although	   is	   it	  preferred	   to	  delegate	   the	  care	  of	  all	  business	   related	   to	   it	   to	  professionals.	  Real	  death	  is	  preceded	  by	  social	  death,	  as	  the	  dying	  are	  confined	  in	  hospitals,	  care	  homes	  or	  special	  facilities.	  The	  second	  idea,	  only	  suggested,	  is	  that	  the	  human	   being	   that	   does	   not	   face	   the	   matter	   of	   his	   own	   death	   is	   missing	  something,	   is	   living	   in	   a	   sort	   of	   lie	   and	   is	   ‘deprived	   of	   his	   death’.	   Both	  elements	   confirm	   the	   theory	   that	   death	   has	   to	   be	   regarded	   as	   an	   integral	  part	   of	   the	   human	   being,	   and	   the	   author	   rightly	   remarks	   on	   how	   early	  twentieth	  century	  philosophy,	  and	  particularly	  existentialism,	  were	  right	  in	  bringing	  the	  theme	  of	  death	  back	  to	  its	  centrality.	  	  
Schumacher	   specifically	   analyses	   Heidegger’s	   ambiguity	   regarding	  the	   phenomenon	   of	   death	   in	   a	   similar	   way	   to	   that	   highlighted	   by	   Stein.	  Heidegger’s	   main	   contradiction	   is,	   in	   fact,	   not	   dissimilar	   from	   what	   was	  highlighted	   above:	   death	   is	   presented	   as	   the	   most	   ‘own’	   event	   for	   any	  person,	  it	  regards	  that	  person	  and	  nobody	  else,	  it	  is	  said	  to	  be	  an	  occurrence	  that	   should	   clarify	   the	   structure	   of	   the	   human	   being,	   but	   instead	   the	   only	  thing	  said	  about	  it	  is	  that	  the	  human	  being	  dies	  ‘of’	  its	  mortality.	  Death	  does	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not	   add	   to	   knowledge	   or	   to	   the	   life	   experience	   of	   the	   subject,	   in	   fact,	   we	  could	   say	   that	   the	  human	  being	   is	   in	   a	  way	   impaired	  by	   it,	   since	   it	   cannot	  learn	  anything	  about	  the	  phenomenon	  of	  death	  from	  the	  death	  of	  others	  and	  also	   cannot	   control	   or	   overcome	   its	   own	   death	   and	   satisfy	   its	   ‘futural’	  structure,	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  is	  towards-­‐its-­‐future.	  Death	  is	  the	  limit	  of	  Dasein’s	  future	  and	  care	  for	  the	  future	  and	  it	  puts	  an	  end	  to	  all	  possibilities.	  
This	  traces	  an	  impossible	  circle,	  as	   it	  has	  been	  highlighted	  in	  Stein’s	  analysis	   of	   the	   ‘being-­‐toward-­‐death’,	   since	   death	   was	   described	   by	  Heidegger	  as	  a	  ‘possibility’,	  but	  instead	  reveals	  itself	  as	  “the	  possibility	  of	  the	  impossibility	   of	   any	   existence	   at	   all.	   Death,	   as	   a	   possibility,	   gives	   Dasein	  nothing	   to	  be	   ‘actualised’,	  nothing	   that	  Dasein	   could	   itself	  become.	   It	   is	   the	  possibility	  of	  the	  impossibility	  of	  every	  way	  of	  comporting	  oneself	  towards	  anything,	   of	   every	   way	   of	   existing”	   (SZ,	   p.	   307).	   In	   other	   words,	   in	   the	  moment	   of	   death	   the	   human	   being	   is	   reminded,	   in	   the	  most	   extreme	   and	  undeniable	  way,	  of	  its	  finitude.	  	  
	  
4.4.2.	  Illness	  and	  deterioration	  
	   In	   criticizing	  Heidegger’s	   theory	   of	   ‘being-­‐toward-­‐death’,	   Stein	   does	  not	  make	   any	   original	   statements	   in	   presenting	   death	   as	   a	   passage	   and	   a	  transformation,	   since	   this	   is	   also	   in	   line	   with	   her	   aim	   of	   reconciling	   with	  classical	   Christian	   philosophy:	   death	   as	   a	   natural	   passage,	   a	   substantial	  change	  of	  state	  for	  the	  human	  being,	  as	  the	  moment	  in	  which	  the	  bodily	  part	  ceases	   to	   exist	   while	   the	   soul	   is	   reconciled	   with	   the	   creator.	   However,	   in	  Stein’s	   interpretation	   the	   human	   life,	   although	   limited	   and	   subjected	   to	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deterioration,	   does	   not	   lose	   meaning	   or	   relevance:	   Stein	   criticized	   the	  description	  of	  life	  seen	  only	  as	  a	  progression	  toward	  death,	  a	  waiting	  for	  the	  end,	  and	  defends	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  moment	  of	  passing	  as	  the	  return	  to	  natural	  unity,	   describing	   it	   however	   as	   a	   release,	   a	   completion,	   a	   transition	   rather	  that	   an	   abrupt	   stop.	   What	   Stein’s	   position	   can	   offer	   to	   the	   contemporary	  debate	   on	   death	   and	   dying	   is	   therefore	   this	   strong	   focus	   on	   the	   positivity	  and	  fullness	  of	  existence	  itself	  and,	  as	  a	  consequence,	  the	  fact	  that	  death,	  far	  from	  being	  a	  mere	  evil,	  is	  given	  back	  a	  sense	  and	  a	  meaning.	  She	  sees	  death	  not	  as	  separate	  from	  life	  but	  as	  a	  part	  of	  it.	  
What	   is	   striking	  about	   Stein	   is	  her	   great	   attention	   to	   the	   ‘reality’	   of	  the	   moment	   of	   passing,	   an	   attention	   that	   no	   doubt	   derives	   from	   the	  phenomenological	   attitude	   of	   her	   evidence	   based	   analysis	   as	  well	   as	   from	  her	  ability	  to	  care	  for	  others	  and	  her	  attention	  to	  how	  people	  interact	  with	  each	  other.	  Also,	  as	  previously	  pointed	  out,	  Stein	  made	  use	  of	  her	  experience	  as	   a	   nurse	   in	   a	   military	   hospital	   during	   World	   War	   I,	   where	   she	   was	  confronted	   directly	   with	   the	   experience	   of	   death,	   and	   it	   is	   quite	   easy	   to	  imagine	  that	  such	  an	  experience	  was	  free	  from	  theoretical	  mediums	  and	  as	  crude	  and	  raw	  as	  a	  direct	  confrontation	  in	  these	  circumstances	  would	  have	  to	   be.	   The	   caducity	   and	   fragility	   of	   human	   life	   is	   expressed	   in	   Stein’s	   full	  understanding	  of	  the	  human	  body,	  which	  has	  a	  very	  important	  and	  positive	  role:	  the	  human	  body	  is	  certainly	  considered	  to	  be	  the	  outer	  point	  of	  access	  to	  the	  soul,	  but	  is	  subject	  to	  decay,	  pain	  and	  death.	  Rightly	  Calcagno	  points	  out	  that	  there	  is	  an	  important	  difference	  between	  death	  and	  dying:	  while	  the	  first	  is	  an	  end	  of	  temporal	  existence,	  the	  latter	  is	  “a	  lived-­‐experience;	  it	  can	  occur	  within	  consciousness,	  and	  insofar	  as	  it	  is	  a	  conscious-­‐lived	  experience	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we	   can	   re-­‐present	   its	   content	   in	   consciousness,	   delivering	   a	   concrete	  description	  of	  its	  essence,	  especially	  as	  it	  plays	  itself	  out	  within	  our	  human	  existence”	  (Calcagno,	  2008,	  p.	  61).	  	  
Stein	  investigates	  intermediate	  states	  between	  ‘full-­‐living’	  and	  death,	  which	   she	   calls	   ‘the	   real	   experience	   of	   dying’	   and	   disproves	   the	   ‘natural	  certainty	  of	  being’:	  	  
“These	   are	   first	   and	   foremost	   one’s	   own	   near-­‐death	   states:	   severe	  illness,	   especially	   when	   it	   brings	   sudden	   or	   progressive	   deterioration	   of	  powers	   or	   the	   threat	   of	   immediate,	   violent	   death.	   Here	   is	   where	   the	   real	  experience	  of	  dying	  sets	  in,	  even	  if	  the	  end	  does	  not	  come	  in	  the	  cases	  where	  the	  danger	  passes.	  In	  severe	  illness,	  which	  brings	  us	  face	  to	  face	  with	  death,	  all	   ‘concern’	   stops:	   all	   the	   things	   of	   this	   world,	   with	   which	   one	   has	   been	  concerned,	  lose	  importance	  and	  fade	  away	  completely	  from	  view.	  This	  also	  means	  a	   separation	   from	  all	   those	  who	  are	   still	   caught	  up	   in	   concern;	  one	  stops	   living	   in	   their	   world.	   Another	   care	   may	   replace	   it,	   as	   long	   as	   the	  inevitability	  is	  not	  yet	  understood	  or	  recognized:	  the	  exclusive	  care	  for	  one’s	  own	  body.	  But	  that	  will	  also	  end	  (even	  if	   it	   is	  possible	  that	  someone	  might	  stay	  prisoner	  to	  it	  and	  even	  be	  ‘surprised	  by	  death’	  in	  the	  mist	  of	  it)	  and	  then	  there	  is	  finally	  only	  one	  important	  question:	  being	  or	  not-­‐being?	  That	  being	  now	   in	   question	   is	  most	   certainly	   not	   ‘being-­‐in-­‐the-­‐world’”	   (MHE,	   p.	   76	   –	  77).	  	   	  This	   is	   effectively	   a	   list	   of	   many	   different	   situations	   that	   could	   be	  described	  as	  ‘toward-­‐death’.	  Stein	  even	  considers	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	  patient	  being	  a	  ‘prisoner’	  of	  his	  own	  body,	  a	  remark	  that	  alludes	  to	  long	  term	  loss	  of	  consciousness,	  for	  example	  for	  patients	  in	  a	  comatose	  state.	  	  In	  front	  of	  such	  a	  varied	   list	  of	  possibilities	   that	  could	  preclude	  death,	  or	  at	   least	  bring	   the	  human	  person	  to	  doubt	  the	  certainty	  of	  his	  life,	  a	  common	  denominator	  can	  be	  identified:	  the	  fact	  that	  in	  none	  of	  these	  situations	  the	  person	  is	  actually	  fully	   ‘in-­‐the-­‐world’.	   In	   such	   a	   situation	   it	   is	   correct	   to	   speak	   of	   the	   end	   of	  social	  and	  bodily	   living,	  as	   the	  dying	  person	   loses	   the	  capability	   to	  act	  and	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relate	  through	  its	  body.	  This	   is	  the	  case	  for	  most	  activities	  of	  everyday	  life,	  such	   as	   handling	   objects,	   engaging	   with	   things,	   knowing	   the	   world,	  communicate,	  and	  more	  generally	  ‘being-­‐with-­‐others’	  (at	  least	  in	  the	  case	  of	  someone	  in	  a	  comatose	  state).	  	  
This	  is	  the	  main	  reason	  to	  postulate	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	  life	  that	  is	  not	  a	  bodily	  one	  and	  also	  not	  a	  social	  one	  but	  that	  still	  retains	  some	  aspects	  of	  the	  life	  of	  the	  soul.	  It	  is	  at	  any	  rate	  a	   ‘personal’	   life,	  where	  both	  the	  psychic	  and	  the	  spiritual	  elements	  of	  the	  person	  are	  still	  present.	  	  
	  
4.4.3.	  The	  death	  of	  others	  
	   To	  shed	  light	  onto	  the	  definition	  of	  death,	  Stein	  challenges	  Heidegger	  on	  the	  understanding	  of	   it.	  She	  focuses	  on	  the	  fairly	  provocative	  statement	  from	  Being	  and	  Time,	   that	  the	  human	  being	  cannot	  experience	  the	  death	  of	  others.	  She	  argues:	  1)	  That	  there	  is	  a	  valid	  experience	  of	  the	  death	  of	  others	  that	  can	  be	  undergone;	  and	  2)	  That	  this	  experience	  significantly	  adds	  to	  our	  understanding	  of	  the	  event	  of	  death	  in	  general	  and	  of	  our	  death	  in	  particular.	  	  
	   The	  first	  element	  to	  consider	  is	  that	  everybody	  is	  confronted,	  more	  or	  less	   directly,	  with	   an	   experience	   of	   death.	   If	   the	  doubtless	   knowledge	   that	  life	   one	   day	  will	   finish	   still	   doesn’t	   concern	   us	  while	  we	   are	   young,	   ‘a	   full	  human	  life	  implies	  an	  understanding	  of	  being	  which	  does	  not	  ignore	  the	  last	  things’	   (MHE,	   p.	   77).	   In	   fact,	   many	   experiences	   speak	   in	   favour	   of	   it,	   the	  impression	  received	  from	  seeing	  someone	  die,	  above	  all,	  but	  also	  attending	  a	  funeral,	  witnessing	  the	  effect	  of	  the	  loss	  of	  a	  loved	  one	  in	  the	  actions	  of	  those	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close	   to	   him.	   All	   these	   elements	   contribute	   to	   the	   idea	   of	   death	   and	   its	  consequences	  that	  take	  shape	  in	  our	  knowledge.	  	  
	   Stein	  goes	  on	  to	  describe	  the	  process	  of	  dying:	  	  
“The	  one	  who	  has	  once	  witnessed	  a	  difficult	  death	  is	  for	  always	  lost	  to	   the	   indifference	   of	   ‘one	   dies’.	   It	   is	   the	   powerful	   sundering	   of	   a	   natural	  unity.	  And	  when	  the	  struggle	  is	  over,	  then	  the	  human	  being,	  who	  has	  fought	  or	   in	  whom	  the	   fight	  has	   taken	  place,	   is	  no	   longer	   there.	  What	   is	   left	   is	  no	  longer	  ‘itself’.	  Where	  is	  it?	  Where	  is	  what	  made	  it	  into	  this	  human	  being?	  If	  we	  cannot	  give	  an	  answer	  to	  this	  question,	  the	  full	  meaning	  of	  death	  is	  not	  clear	  to	  us”	  (MHE,	  p.	  78)65.	  	  She	  recognizes	  the	  unique	  character	  of	  each	  death:	  while	  some	  are	  a	  struggle	  and	  a	  fight,	  others	  may	  be	  a	   ‘mild	  falling	  asleep’,	  while	  one	  person	  may	   be	   scared	   and	   desperate,	   the	   other	   is	   calm	   and	   peaceful.	   What	   one	  death	  may	  testify	  is	  ‘in	  no	  way’	  the	  same	  thing.	  However	  she	  focused	  on	  the	  state	  of	  deep	  peace	  that	  comes	  after	  death	  has	  occurred	  and	  wonders	  how	  ‘could	   the	   simple	   cessation	   of	   life,	   the	   transition	   from	   being	   to	   not	   being,	  bring	   forth	   such	   an	   impression?’	   and	   moreover	   how	   the	   spirit,	   that	   ‘has	  impressed	   this	   seal	   in	   the	   body’	   could	   simply	   not	   exist	   anymore	   (MHE,	   p.	  78).	   In	   the	  search	   for	  evidence	  of	   the	  passage	   from	  one	   life	   to	  another	   life	  Stein	  describes	  the	  way	  that	  ‘the	  dying	  person	  is	  illuminated	  by	  another	  life	  in	  a	  manner	  visible	  to	  all	  who	  surround	  him’.	  	  
One	   might	   disagree	   with	   this	   description:	   although	   Stein	   rightly	  highlights	   the	   centrality	   of	   the	   ‘greatness’	   and	   uniqueness	   of	   what’s	  happening,	  the	  fact	  that	  sometimes	  the	  dying	  person	  could	  raise	  its	  eyes	  as	  if	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  65	  I	  amended	  Lebech’s	  translation	  to	  match	  my	  undetermined	  use	  of	  the	  pronoun	  ‘it’	  so	  far	  when	  it	  is	  referred	  to	  ‘human	  being’.	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it	   is	   reaching	  out,	  or	  much	  more	   frequently	   the	   fact	   that	  an	  extreme	  peace	  and	  serenity	  seems	  to	  take	  hold	  and	  prepare	  them	  for	  the	  next	  step.	  While	  this	  description	  could	  certainly	  be	  fitting	  for	  some	  episodes,	  other	  cases	  see	  death	  happening	  surprisingly	  quickly	  or	  worryingly	  slowly,	  too	  painfully	  or	  brutally	   sudden.	   In	   all	   these	   cases	   it	   would	   be	   impossible	   to	   describe	   the	  person	  who	  is	  dying	  as	  peaceful,	  hopeful	  or	  prepared	  for	  what	  it	  is	  about	  to	  happen.	  	  
There	   is	   truth	   however	   in	   saying	   that	   the	   observer	   perceives	   the	  event	  as	  an	  exceptional	  moment,	   in	  good	  or	  bad,	  and	  can	  see	  the	  signs	  of	  a	  body	   that	   used	   to	   be	   ‘full’	   with	   someone	   but	   is	   now	   a	   ‘empty’	   shell.	   The	  correctness	   of	   this	   description,	   although	   quite	   basic,	   is	   perhaps	   the	   best	  evidence	  that	  allows	  one	  to	  describe	  the	  moment	  of	  the	  death	  of	  somebody	  as	  a	  transformation,	  the	  inevitable	  departure	  of	  that	  person	  from	  life	  as	  we	  know	  it.	  All	  these	  aspects	  stand	  out	  as	  a	  sharp	  contradiction	  to	  Heidegger’s	  ‘one	  dies’	  and	  the	  only	  element	  which	  may	  be	  saved	  from	  that	  interpretation	  should	   be	   the	   uniqueness	   of	   each	   death,	   and,	   it	   may	   be	   added,	   of	   each	  testimony	  of	  death.	  	  
Another	   important	   element	   is	   the	   fact	   that	   in	   considering	   the	  experience	   of	   death	   Heidegger	   doesn’t	   take	   into	   sufficient	   account	   the	  possibility	  of	  a	  different	  form	  of	  being.	  Unlike	  Heidegger,	  Stein	  understands	  death	   as	   a	   passage,	   the	   entering	   into	   a	   different	   realm	   of	   being,	   and	  describes	  as	  objectively	  as	  possible	  the	  signs	  and	  the	  elements	  in	  support	  of	  this.	   She	   is	   clearly	   disappointed	   by	   the	   conclusion	   of	   Heidegger’s	   analysis	  and	   this	   means	   that	   she	   has	   recognised	   in	   it	   the	   potential	   to	   come	   to	   a	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different	  outcome.	  To	  express	  this	  Stein	  quotes	  her	  colleague	  and	  friend,	  the	  phenomenologist	   Hedwig	   Conrad-­‐Martius,	   who	   describes	   Heidegger’s	  reasoning	  as	  follows:	  	  
“as	  if	  a	  door,	  so	  long	  left	  unopened	  that	  it	  can	  hardly	  be	  opened	  anymore,	  is	  blown	  wide	  open	  with	   enormous	   strength,	  wise	   intention	   and	  unrelenting	  stamina,	   and	   then	   immediately	   closed	   again,	   bolted	   and	   so	   thoroughly	  blocked	  that	  any	  further	  opening	  seems	  impossible”	  (MHE,	  p.	  81)66.	  	  	   Conrad-­‐Martius	   refers	  here	   to	  Heidegger’s	  ontology	  and	   the	  way	  he	  has	  posed	  again	  the	  question	  of	  the	  meaning	  of	  being	  only	  to	  avoid	  it	   in	  an	  even	   more	   determined	   manner	   and	   give	   full	   focus	   onto	   the	   facticity	   and	  temporality	  of	  the	  human	  being.	  Heidegger	  reopens	  a	  debate	  that	  has	  been	  left	  closed	  for	  a	  long	  time	  (locked	  by	  idealism,	  religion	  and	  subjectivism)	  but	  instead	  of	  offering	  the	  key	  to	  it,	  he	  closes	  it	  again	  with	  more	  force,	  so	  that	  it	  seems	  it	  will	  be	  impossible	  to	  reopen	  it.	  	  
One	   might	   draw	   a	   parallel	   between	   this	   image	   and	   Heidegger’s	  attitude	  towards	  the	  matter	  of	  the	  end	  of	  life:	  he	  places	  the	  human	  being	  at	  the	  centre	  of	  his	  analysis	  but	  does	  not	  want	  to	  take	  into	  consideration	  that	  this	   being	   also	   has	   knowledge	   of	   other	   forms	   of	   beings	   around	   it	   and	  understanding	  of	  a	  higher	  being.	  He	  finally	  introduces	  the	  problem	  of	  death	  of	   the	  Dasein	   as	   the	   supposed	   phenomenon	   that	   can	   offer	   clarification	   for	  the	  Dasein	  itself,	  that	  allows	  the	  Dasein	  to	  be	  viewed	  at	  the	  highest	  point	  of	  its	   potential,	   only	   to	   throw	   it	   back	   onto	   itself,	   without	   any	   further	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  66	  Stein	  quotes	  from	  Hedwig	  Conrad	  Martius	  Heideggers	  ‘Sein	  und	  Zeit’	  in	  Kunstwart	  (1933).	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understanding	  or	  gain	   from	  the	  fact	   that	   its	   time	  comes	  to	  an	  end,	  with	  no	  hope	  of	  transformation	  or	  consolation.	  	  
There	   is	  no	  meaning	   in	   the	  death	  of	   the	  Dasein:	   it	  dies	  because	   it	   is	  temporal,	   it	   lives	  because	   it	  has	   to	   and	   it	  dies	  because	   its	   life	   comes	   to	   an	  end.	   The	   condition	   of	   ‘being-­‐toward-­‐death’	   only	   provides	   a	   certain	  ambiguity	   as	   to	   whether	   the	   Dasein	   has	   the	   possibility	   of	   a	   being-­‐after,	  however	   Heidegger	   fully	   clarifies	   that	   death	   is	   authentic	   and	   ‘mine’.	   The	  condition	  of	  after	  life	  is	  simply	  not	  debated,	  neither	  is	  the	  evidence	  that	  the	  
Dasein	  cares	  for	  its	  life	  and	  that	  this	  care	  and	  aspiration	  to	  prolong	  is	  in	  itself	  a	  reason	  to	  pose	  the	  question	  of	  what	  then?	  	  
The	  most	  important	  element	  in	  defence	  of	  the	  evidence	  that	  the	  death	  of	  others	  should	  be	  regarded	  as	  an	  experience	  that	  enlightens	  the	  nature	  of	  death	  itself	  is	  the	  fact	  that	  death	  is	  an	  event,	  which	  is	  experienced	  in	  terms	  of	   intersubjectivity	   and	   reciprocally	   through	   empathic	   representation	  (Calcagno,	   2008,	   p.	   65).	   When	   someone	   comes	   to	   terms	   with	   a	   loss,	   the	  experience	   shapes	   his	   or	   her	   future	   dealings	   and	   representation	   of	   death,	  may	   these	   be	   in	   terms	   of	   fear,	   anxiety,	   suffering,	   or,	   on	   the	   contrary,	   as	  peaceful	   and	   grateful.	   Furthermore	   from	   the	   experience	   of	   accompanying	  someone	   who	   is	   dying,	   carers	   experience	   what	   can	   offer	   comfort	   and	  reassurance,	  and	  what	  is	  instead	  futile,	  unhelpful,	  unnecessary	  or	  even	  cruel.	  	  
In	  an	  essay	  focused	  on	  the	  phenomenon	  of	  death	  in	  Stein’s	  critique	  of	  Heidegger,	   Ken	   Casey	   comes	   to	   a	   similar	   conclusion	   as	   Calcagno,	   and	  highlights	   the	  communal	  nature	  of	  death,	  while	  demonstrating	  Heidegger’s	  incongruence	  in	  his	  solipsistic	  view	  of	  dying:	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“The	   force	   of	   the	   critique	   is	   to	   see	   all	   community	   as	   inauthentic	   and	  tranquilizing.	   This	   is	   where	   Stein’s	   critique	   is	   helpful.	   One	   of	   the	   curious	  aspects	  of	  the	  line	  of	  inquiry	  in	  the	  early	  sections	  of	  Being	  and	  Time	  is	  how	  being	   in	   its	   everydayness	   is	   ‘already	  always’	  being	  with	  others.	  Mit-­‐sein	   is	  part	   of	   the	   world.	   However,	   Heidegger	   may	   be	   taking	   a	   quick	   turn	   to	   a	  solipsistic	  account	  where	  the	  death	  and	  dying	  of	  others	  is	  removed	  from	  the	  meaning	  of	  one’s	  own	  being.	  	   In	  this	  regard,	  Stein’s	  focus	  on	  the	  communal	  nature	   of	   death	   and	   dying	   is	   a	   salutary	   correction	   to	   Heidegger”	   (Casey,	  2012,	  p.13).	  	  	  
4.4.4.	  Terminal	  care	  	   Modern	   medical	   technology	   offers	   many	   often	   miraculous	   ways	   to	  rescue,	   support	   and	   possibly	   extend	   human	   life.	   Nevertheless	   there	   is	  current	   acknowledgment	   of	   a	   point	   of	   no	   return,	   so-­‐called	   ‘continuous’	   or	  ‘permanent	   vegetative	   state’,	   a	   state	   that	   differs	   from	   the	   simple	   lack	   of	  awareness,	   where	   the	   chances	   of	   regaining	   consciousness	   are	   strongly	  diminished	  although	  the	  body	  may	  continue	  to	  perform	  simply	  mechanical	  actions	  that	  can	  offer	  an	  appearance	  of	  life67.	  	  	  
The	   difficult	   decision	   in	   these	   cases	   for	   the	   doctors,	   carers	   and	  relatives	  of	  the	  patient	  is	  to	  determine	  when	  it	  is	  reasonable	  to	  give	  up	  hope,	  when	   the	   suffering	   is	   considered	   to	   be	   cruel	   and	   unbearable	   and	   where	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  67	  While	   in	  a	  vegetative	  state	  or	  a	  minimally	  conscious	  state	  a	  person	  can	   look	  awake	  but	  show	   minimal	   and	   fleeting	   evidence	   of	   awareness,	   an	   irreversible	   coma	   or	   persistent	  vegetative	   state	   (also	   called	   ‘brain	   death’)	   means	   a	   permanent	   unconscious	   condition,	  characterized	  by	  a	  complete	   loss	  of	  brain	   function	  while	   the	  heart	  continues	   to	  beat.	  This	  condition	   is	   incurable	   and	   irreversible	   and	   the	   patient	   has	   no	   reasonable	   probability	   of	  recovery.	  (“Irreversible	  brain	  damage	  and	  loss	  of	  brain	  function,	  as	  evidenced	  by	  cessation	  of	   breathing	   and	   other	   vital	   reflexes,	   unresponsiveness	   to	   stimuli,	   absence	   of	   muscle	  activity,	  and	  a	  flat	  electroencephalogram	  for	  a	  specific	  length	  of	  time.	  The	  legal	  definition	  of	  this	  condition	  varies	  from	  state	  to	  state”.	  See	  ‘Irreversible	  coma’,	  Miller-­‐Keane	  Encyclopedia	  and	  Dictionary	  of	  Medicine,	  Nursing,	  and	  Allied	  Health,	  Seventh	  Edition,	  (Online)	  2003.	  	  	  
	   155	  
medical	   aid	   cannot	   mitigate	   it	   anymore,	   and,	   in	   some	   cases,	   release	   the	  person	   from	   an	   artificial	   state	   of	   life.	   In	   other	   words	   one	   is	   called	   to	  determine	  what	  are	  the	  criteria	  that	  characterise	  a	  living	  person	  and	  when	  these	  are	  no	  more	  present.	  What	  is	  then	  the	  main	  element	  that	  promotes	  a	  living	   body	   to	   be	   a	   ‘person’?	   What	   is	   the	   appropriate	   care	   and	   way	   to	  accompany	   someone	   toward	   the	   end?	   These	   and	   other	   similar	   questions	  populate	   newspapers,	   ethical	   conferences	   and	   governmental	   debates	   and	  are	  not	  dissimilar	  to	  the	  difficulties	  in	  the	  background	  of	  Stein’s	  approach	  to	  the	  problem	  of	  death.	  
Stein’s	  thoughts	  offer	  a	  few	  interesting	  remarks	  with	  regards	  to	  how	  to	   care	   for	   people	   during	   serious	   (terminal)	   illness.	   In	   Finite	   and	   Eternal	  
Being,	  while	   describing	   the	   interconnection	  between	   form	  and	  matter	   and	  particularly	   Aristotle’s	   idea	   of	   active	   and	   passive	   potency,	   Stein	   offers	   an	  explanatory	  example	  related	  to	  medical	  care:	  
“Being	  cured	  takes	  place	  in	  the	  patient	  who	  is	  getting	  well.	  However,	  medical	   art	   as	   the	   power	   of	   healing	   which	   produces	   that	   ‘movement’	   [a	  change	   of	  movement	   in	   one	   thing	  which	   is	   originated	   by	   another	   thing	   or	  power]	  has	  its	  being	  not	  in	  the	  patient,	  but	  in	  the	  physician.	  […]	  But	  the	  art	  of	  medicine	   does	   not	   by	   itself	   suffice	   to	   bring	   about	   the	   cure:	   in	   addition	  there	  must	   be	   in	   the	   patient	   the	   power	   of	   capability	   of	   getting	  well	   or	   of	  being	  cured.	  While	  the	  former	  is	  a	  power	  of	  doing	  or	  acting	  [actio],	  the	  latter	  is	   a	  power	  of	   suffering	   [passio]	   or	   of	   being	   acted	   upon	   (active	   and	   passive	  potency).	  (EES,	  p.	  176)	  	  With	   this	   description	   Stein	   defends	   Aristotle’s	   theory	   that	   the	  capability	   or	   ‘potentiality’	   of	   something	   is	   rooted	   in	   the	   matter	   and	   that	  although	  the	  activation	  of	  said	  capability	  has	  to	  come	  from	  an	  external	  force,	  the	   participation	   of	   the	   one	   that	   this	   force	   is	   applied	   upon	   is	   absolutely	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central	  for	  it	  to	  fully	  operate.	  This	  theory	  is	  well	  fitting	  with	  everything	  that	  was	  said	  about	  how	  outside	  forces	  can	  impress	  and	  change	  the	  human	  soul	  and	   how	   the	   soul	   welcomes	   such	   impressions.	   In	   the	   same	   way	   Stein	  described	  the	  action	  of	   the	  eternal	  being	  and	  the	  response	  of	   the	  temporal	  being	  to	  this	  action.	  	  	  
In	  a	  previously	  quoted	  passage	  it	  was	  highlighted	  how	   the	  depth	  of	  the	  human	  soul	   remains	  mysterious	   for	  human	  understanding	  until	   its	   full	  capability	  is	  required,	  and	  Stein	  also	  remarks	  on	  the	  fact	  that	  “what	  human	  beings	  are	   ‘capable	  of	  doing’	  as	  free	  persons	  they	  learn	  only	  by	  doing	  it	  or,	  perhaps,	   in	   anticipation,	  when	   they	  meet	  with	   a	   specific	   demand”	   (EES,	   p.	  376).	  This	  observation	  could	  well	  describe	  how	  one	  person	  can	  find	  an	  inner	  strength,	   perhaps	   more	   than	   reasonably	   expected,	   to	   deal	   with	   a	   difficult	  situation.	   It	   is	  often	  said	  that	  someone’s	   inner	  motivation	  and	  strength	  can	  make	   a	   large	   difference	   to	   recovery	   but	   how	   much	   truth	   is	   there	   in	   this	  affirmation?	  More	   importantly	   can	   an	   active	   and	  open	  participation	  of	   the	  patient	  help	  a	  situation	  where	  full	  recovery	  is	  no	  longer	  an	  option?	  
Stein’s	   remarks	   can	   be	   effectively	   applied	   to	   the	   relationship	   that	  takes	  place	  between	  a	  doctor	  and	  the	  patient.	  Just	  like	  in	  all	  other	  forms	  of	  ‘response’	  Stein	  rightly	  stresses	  the	  interconnection	  between	  the	  powers	  of	  acting	   and	   being	   acted	   upon.	   In	   fact	   one	   cannot	   be	   without	   the	   other.	   A	  patient	  that	  works	  well	  with	  their	  doctor,	  who	  is	  not	  forced	  into	  being	  cured,	  will	   live	   the	   experience	   of	   being	   cured	   in	   a	   better	  way	   than	   someone	   that	  sees	   a	   therapy	   as	   an	   imposition,	   also	   a	   doctor	   will	   benefit	   from	   a	   co-­‐operative	  patient	  who	  will	   facilitate	   their	   job	   and	  not	   impede	   it.	  However,	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there	   is	   more:	   according	   to	   what	   is	   stated	   above,	   to	   cure	   someone	   must	  necessarily	   mean	   to	   ask	   and	   to	   implement	   their	   response	   to	   the	   cure,	  regardless	  of	  realistic	  outcomes.	  It	  must	  be	  a	  joint	  experience,	  a	  co-­‐operation	  between	  those	  who	  can	  provide	  such	  care	  and	  those	  who	  must	  not	   fight	   it	  but	  welcome	   it	   and	   from	   their	  part	  do	  whatever	   is	   in	   their	  power	   to	   let	   it	  operate	  to	  the	  best	  of	  its	  potential.	  	  
This	   is	   not	   always	   easy;	   in	   fact	   many	   of	   today’s	   criticisms	   and	  improvements	  related	  to	  medical	  care	  often	  are	  about	  patients	  wishing	  for	  a	  better	   understanding	   of	   the	   decision-­‐making	   progress	   and	   a	   more	  sympathetic	   and	   personal	   relationship	   with	   nurses	   and	   doctors.	   A	   small	  example	   can	   be	   offered	   by	   the	   debate	   generated	   in	   the	   UK	   around	   the	  Liverpool	  Care	  Pathway	   (LCP),	   a	   set	   of	   guidelines	   for	  doctors	   and	  medical	  staff	  to	  regulate	  the	  palliative	  care	  of	  the	  terminally	  ill.	  	  It	  was	  introduced	  in	  England	   from	   1990	   and,	   after	   an	   initial	   positive	   response,	   was	   heavily	  criticised	  and	   is	   currently	   set	   to	  be	  phased	  out	   and	   substituted	  with	  more	  general	  guidance	  based	  on	  agreed	  principles	  to	  support	  individualised	  care	  rather	  than	  a	  set	  of	  indiscriminate	  rules68.	  	  
Although	   the	   LCP	   was	   initially	   recommended	   as	   a	   model	   of	   best	  practice	   by	   the	   Department	   of	   Health	   and	   has	   been	   adopted	   in	   many	   UK	  hospitals	   and	   other	   healthcare	   settings,	   the	   protocol	   was	   shown	   to	   have	  been	   badly	   implemented,	   meaning	   that	   decisions	   were	   often	   taken	   for	  reasons	   that	   were	   not	   related	   to	   the	   well-­‐being	   of	   the	   patient.	   Heavy	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  68	  Online	  source:	  https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/212450/Liverpool_Care_Pathway.pdf	  
	   158	  
criticism	  by	  patients	  and	  their	  relatives	  argued	  that	  people	  were	  put	  on	  the	  pathway	  without	  their	  consent,	  and	  that	  death	  was	  hastened	  in	  people	  who	  were	   not	   dying	   imminently.	   Furthermore	   it	   was	   argued	   that	   it	   is	   often	  impossible	  for	  doctors	  to	  predict	  when	  death	  is	  imminent,	  so	  the	  decision	  to	  put	  a	  patient	  on	  the	  pathway	  was	  made	  without	  a	  solid	  foundation,	  or	  worse,	  for	   financial	   and	  /	  or	  organisational	   reasons.	  A	  predominant	   criticism	  was	  that	   the	  withdrawal	   of	   life	   support	   cannot	   be	   regulated	   by	   a	   set	   rule,	   but	  must	  be	   judged	  on	  a	  case-­‐by-­‐case	  basis	  and	  always	   in	   the	  best	   interests	  of	  the	  patient69.	  
Despite	   one	   of	   the	   aims	   of	   the	   LCP	   being	   the	   importance	   of	   good	  communication	  between	  medical	  staff	  and	  the	  patient	  and	  their	  family,	  this	  seems	  to	  be	  the	  biggest	  point	  of	  concern.	  The	  experience	  and	  review	  of	  the	  LCP	  has	  proved	  that	  it	  is	  essential	  to	  include	  the	  patient	  and	  his	  or	  her	  family	  in	  the	  decision-­‐making	  process	  as	  much	  as	  the	  circumstances	  allow	  it.	  Along	  with	  the	  lack	  of	  explanations	  for	  the	  patient’s	  questions	  or	  concerns,	  families	  also	   complained	   that	   the	   psychological,	   social	   and	   spiritual	   care	   of	   the	  patient	  along	  with	  their	  wishes	  were	  not	  always	  considered,	  and	  full	  priority	  was	  given	  to	  treatment.	  	  
It	   is	   impossible	   to	   analyse	   such	   a	   complicated	  matter	   in	   this	   short	  space	  of	  my	   thesis,	   however	   this	   discussion	  offers	   a	   valid	   example	  of	   how	  difficult	   a	   closeness	   of	   intent	   and	   effort	   between	   doctor	   and	   patient,	   as	  highlighted	   in	   the	   previous	   paragraph,	   can	   be.	   How	   can	   the	   dignity	   and	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  Online	  source:	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safety	   of	   the	   human	   person	   be	   at	   the	   core	   of	   medical	   care	   without	   an	  unconditional	  trust	  from	  the	  side	  of	  the	  patient	  towards	  those	  who	  have	  the	  authority	   to	   act	   to	   preserve	   their	   life?	   More	   importantly	   what	   are	   the	  consequences	  of	  dealing	  with	  the	  (end	  of)	  life	  of	  someone	  without	  their	  best	  interests	  at	  heart?	  
An	  interesting	  answer	  has	  been	  offered	  by	  a	  recent	  review	  of	  the	  LCP	  carried	   on	   by	   a	   Christian	   panel	   of	   researchers	   working	   on	   the	   ethics	   of	  clinical	   care	   and	   practice70 .	   This	   review	   states	   that	   the	   LCP	   was	   not	  necessaryly	  wrong	  but	  mostly	  wrongly	  applied	  and	  raises	  awareness	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  if	  nothing	  similar	  was	  to	  replace	  it,	  it	  could	  lead	  to	  a	  deterioration	  of	  communication	  with	   those	  who	   are	   dying	  with	   those	   close	   to	   them.	  Most	  importantly,	   the	   review	   argues	   that,	   if	   the	   protocol	   is	   wrongly	   applied,	  people	  who	  are	  not	   imminently	  dying	  may	  have	   their	  deaths	   ‘hastened	  by	  inappropriate	   treatment	   or	  withdrawal	   of	   treatment’	   once	   the	   pathway	   is	  commenced.	  
This	  confirms	  the	  fear	  that	  one’s	  death	  may	  be	  hastened	  and	  that	  the	  person	  will	   not	   have	   enough	   time	   to	   prepare	   or	   to	   come	   to	   terms	  with	   it.	  Undeniably	  a	  dying	  person	  would	   like	   to	  understand	  what	   is	  going	  on	  and	  maintain	  the	  capability	  to	  decide	  what	  can	  be	  controlled,	  as	  far	  as	  possible;	  this	  is	  a	  desire	  that	  is	  embedded	  in	  the	  core	  of	  the	  human	  being	  who	  finds	  it	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  the	  Director	  and	  the	  Governing	  Board.	  Online	  Source:	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difficult	   to	   let	  go,	  as	   it	  was	  highlighted	  by	  Stein,	  and	   that	  at	   the	  same	   time	  shows	  how	  the	  person	  is	  far	  from	  being	  ‘indifferent’	  to	  the	  end	  of	  its	  life	  and	  would	  wish	   for	   it	   to	   continue.	  Most	   importantly	   the	  patient	  and	  his	  or	  her	  close	   family	  are	  afraid	  of	  being	   ‘robbed’	  of	   the	  experience	  of	  death,	  which,	  however	  difficult	  and	  painful,	   is	  necessary	  and	   irreplaceable.	  One	  wants	   to	  ‘be	  there’	  with	  the	  dying	  one,	  despite	  the	  pain.	  It	  is	  an	  experience	  that	  needs	  all	  the	  time	  that	  one	  can	  get	  to	  deal,	  understand	  and,	  as	  far	  possible,	  come	  to	  terms	  the	  situation,	  if	  not	  for	  the	  patient	  themselves,	  certainly	  for	  those	  next	  to	  them.	  	  
This	  assertion	  must	  be,	  of	  course,	  put	  into	  context,	  since	  each	  process	  towards	   death	   and	   the	   way	   one	   lives	   through	   it	   is	   unique:	   there	   are,	   of	  course,	   cases	   where	   the	   difficult	   decision	   to	   withdraw	  medical	   support	   is	  taken	   after	   long	   deliberation,	   in	   agreement	  with	   the	   next	   of	   kin	   and	  with	  respect	   for	   the	   dignity	   of	   the	   person.	   This	   testifies	   furthermore	   to	   the	  absolute	  centrality	  of	  a	  trustful	  attitude	  and	  an	  open	  discussion	  between	  all	  parties	  involved.	  A	  ‘hurried’	  death	  inevitably	  leads	  to	  an	  impersonal	  death;	  a	  jumping	  ahead	  to	  what	  is	  bound	  to	  happen.	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4.4.5.	  Final	  remarks	  
	   We	   may	   conclude	   by	   saying	   that	   although	   nobody	   could	   put	  themselves	  completely	  ‘in	  the	  shoes’	  of	  the	  one	  who	  is	  dying,	  the	  experience	  of	  accompanying	  and	  supporting	  someone	  through	  this	  path	  definitely	  adds	  to	   one’s	   knowledge	   and	   understanding	   of	   the	   process	   and	   the	  moment	   of	  dying.	  This	  experience	  is	  far	  from	  being	  the	  cold	  witnessing	  of	  an	  event	  but	  is	  instead	  a	  living	  participation.	  	  
In	   the	   light	  of	   Stein’s	   analysis	   it	   has	  been	  possible	   to	   identify	   a	   few	  elements	   how	   death	   is	   experienced,	   in	   particular	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   fear	   of	  dying	   affects	   all	   human	   beings	   especially	   because	   they	   don’t	   want	   to	  relinquish	   life.	   In	   this	   sense	   the	   understanding	   of	   death	   belongs	   to	   the	  understanding	  of	  life	  itself,	  and	  the	  experience	  of	  death	  shouldn’t	  be	  hidden	  and	  discarded	  as	  a	  mere	  medicalised	  matter	  but	  should	  regain	  its	  humanity.	  Stein	   is	   perhaps	   wrong	   in	   presenting	   a	   peaceful	   image	   of	   the	   moment	   of	  passing;	   also	   not	   everybody	  will	   accept	   the	   idea	   of	   death	   as	   a	   passage	   to	  another	   state.	  However	   it	   is	   important	   to	   highlight	   that	   it	   is	   an	   event	   that	  matters	  and	  touches	  profoundly	  the	  dying	  and	  the	  living	  alike	  because	  is	  in	  fact	  experienced	  in	  a	  communal	  way.	  	  
Furthermore	   it	   is	   to	  be	  desired	   that	   those	  who	  professionally	  assist	  the	  ill	  and	  are	  called	  to	  support	  them	  to	  the	  end	  of	  their	  life	  could	  keep	  the	  wellbeing	  of	  that	  person	  and	  will	  of	  knowing	  above	  any	  other	  priority.	  The	  dying	   process	   needs	   time	   and	   shouldn’t	   be	   unnecessary	   shortened	   or	  hastened.	  	  A	  dying	  person	  and	  his	  family	  should	  be	  put	  in	  a	  position	  to	  talk	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about	  what	  is	  happening,	  to	  trust	  their	  doctor	  and	  feel	  motivated	  to	  actively	  participate	  in	  their	  care	  as	  a	  collaborative	  enterprise.	  	  
The	   trustful	   and	   open	   acceptance	   of	   being	   helped	   and	   being	   cured,	  along	   with	   a	   positive	   informed	   response	   in	   terms	   of	   strength,	   hope	   and	  courage	  must	  be	  evoked	  from	  the	  core	  of	  the	  patient.	  This	  may	  not	  suffice	  to	  save	  their	  life,	  but	  it	  will	  at	  least	  help	  towards	  making	  the	  experience	  of	  their	  death	  a	  personal	  one.	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Conclusions	  
	   I	   have	   argued	   that	   Stein	   offers	   a	   distinctive	   philosophical	   approach	  that	   responds	   to	   and	   augments	   Heidegger’s	   views	   on	   the	   nature	   of	   the	  human	  being.	  She	  challenges	  Heidegger’s	  answers	  by	  asking	  questions	  that	  relate	   to	   basic	   human	   experiences	   (life,	   death,	   fear,	   care).	   I	   have	   assessed	  how	  both	  authors	  start	   from	  the	  same	  set	  of	  questions	  at	   the	  beginning	  of	  their	   work,	   and	   I	   have	   argued	   this	   is	   the	   result	   of	   influences	   from	  phenomenology	  and	  Christian	  metaphysics.	  This	  proximity	  and	  shared	  point	  of	  view	  makes	  Stein’s	  critique	  even	  more	  remarkable,	  because	  of	  the	  almost	  diametrically	  opposed	  religious,	  historical	  and	  political	  development	  of	  their	  lives	   (Stein’s	   conversion	   to	   the	   Catholic	   Church,	   her	   failure	   to	   obtain	   a	  prestigious	   academic	   position	   and	   her	   death	   at	   Auschwitz;	   opposed	   to	  Heidegger’s	  move	  out	  of	  the	  Catholic	  tradition,	  his	  academic	  rise	  to	  fame	  and	  his	  collaboration	  with	  the	  Nazi	  regime).	  Aside	  from	  the	  biographical	  details,	  it	  is	  my	  opinion	  that	  Stein	  successfully	  contributes	  to	  a	  fruitful	  debate	  about	  Heidegger’s	  work	  and	  reads	  it	  with	  intellectual	  honesty,	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  she	  conducts	  her	  analysis	  whilst	  remaining	  open	  to	  revealed	  truths	  of	  faith.	  I	  have	   also	   argued	   that	   without	   the	   initial	   explication	   of	   Heidegger’s	  philosophy	   of	   existence	   Stein’s	   further	   development	   of	   the	   idea	   of	   the	  human	  person	  would	  not	  have	  been	  as	  striking	  and	  thought	  provoking	  as	  it	  is.	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The	   main	   findings	   of	   this	   research	   work	   can	   be	   recapitulated	   as	  follows:	  
-­‐	   The	  methodological	  critique	  
Stein	  argues	   that	  Heidegger	  maintains	  his	  analysis	  on	  a	   level	   that	   is	  strictly	  “of	  this	  world”	  (MHE,	  p.	  75),	  not	  only	  by	  concentrating	  his	  remarks	  on	   the	   structure	   of	  Dasein	   but	   also	   by	   avoiding	   two	   crucial	   questions:	   the	  question	  of	   the	  origin	  of	   the	  Dasein,	  and	   the	  question	  of	  being	  after	  death.	  Heidegger’s	  position	  is	  even	  more	  difficult	  to	  understand	  since	  he	  devotes	  a	  large	  part	  of	  the	  introductory	  sections	  of	  Being	  and	  Time	  to	  highlighting	  the	  fact	  that	  contemporary	  philosophy	  had	  forgotten	  the	  fundamental	  question	  of	   the	  meaning	  of	  being	  and	   that	   this	  question	   remains	   the	  main	   task	  of	   a	  pure	   ontological	   philosophical	   investigation.	   He	   offers	   further	   detailed	  criticism	  of	  the	  theories	  offered	  by	  personalism,	  philosophical	  anthropology	  and	  theology,	  when	  these	  have	  attempted	  a	  structural	  understanding	  of	  the	  human	  being.	  	  
I	  argue	  we	  must	  be	  impressed	  by	  the	  rigour	  of	  Stein’s	  methodological	  approach,	   as	   her	   critique	   arises	   from	   her	   observation	   that	   Heidegger’s	  argument	   fails	   to	   fulfil	   his	   main	   premises,	   which	   is	   that	   the	   analysis	   of	  
Dasein	  should	  be	  the	  preparation	  for	  a	  more	  general	  and	  informed	  analysis	  of	  being,	  which	  is	  never	  actually	  offered.	  Moreover,	  he	  states	  that	  the	  main	  aim	  of	  his	  work	   is	   to	  ask	  correctly	   the	  question	  of	  being;	  but	  he	  ultimately	  fails	   to	   ask	   any	   related	   questions	   and	   therefore	   can	   only	   arrive	   at	   a	  tautological	   investigation,	   where	   his	   conclusion	   is	   identical	   to	   his	   starting	  point,	  i.e.	  the	  temporality	  of	  being.	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-­‐	   The	  partiality	  of	  Heidegger’s	  description	  of	  the	  human	  being	  and	  
the	  coincidence	  of	  essence	  and	  existence	  is	  brought	  into	  question	  	  
Stein	  is	  not	  completely	  negative	  about	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  Dasein	  as	  presented	   by	   Heidegger,	   in	   fact	   she	   recognises	   positive	   elements	   in	   the	  concept	  of	  Befindlichheit	  and	  in	  the	  existential	  character	  of	  the	  human	  being.	  She	   describes	   Heidegger’s	   investigation	   as	   “accurate	   in	   a	   certain	   sense,	   in	  [the	  sense	  namely]	  that	  it	  reveals	  something	  of	  the	  basic	  constitution	  of	  the	  human	  being,	  and	  sketches	  a	  certain	  way	  of	  being	  human	  with	  great	  clarity”	  (MHE,	  p.	  81).	  What	  Stein	  criticises	  is	  the	  fact	  that	  Heidegger’s	  description	  is	  partial	  and	  incomplete	  because	  the	  investigation	  halts	  “in	  surprising	  ways	  …	  in	   front	   of	   references	  which	  present	   themselves	   in	   a	   direct	   and	   imperious	  manner”	  (MHE,	  p.	  70).	  Specifically,	  Heidegger’s	  analysis	  does	  not	  cover	  the	  totality	   of	   the	   human	   being,	   particularly	   concerning	   the	   failure	   to	   identify	  the	   psychosomatic	   being	   and	   the	   rejection	   of	   the	   traditional	   distinction	   of	  essence	  and	  existence.	  Heidegger’s	  reason	  for	  rejecting	  this	  distinction	  does	  not	   seem	   to	   be	   rooted	   in	   an	   ontological	   system	   independent	   of	   human	  existence,	  but	  mostly	  to	  be	  motivated	  by	  his	  methodological	  choice	  to	  avoid	  the	  way	  followed	  by	  traditional	  Christian	  metaphysics.	  Furthermore	  he	  does	  not	   manage	   to	   completely	   reconcile	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   human	   being	   has	   a	  certain	   understanding	   of	   eternal	   being,	   unlimited	   time	   and	   truth,	   all	  elements	  that	  should	  lead	  to	  theorise	  the	  possibility	  of	  beings	  different	  from	  human	   beings	   and	   the	   relationship	   between	   temporal	   being	   and	   eternal	  being.	   Finally	   he	   fails	   to	   give	   any	   life-­‐like	   character	   to	   the	   human	   being,	  which	  should	  naturally	   follow	  from	  his	   findings,	  at	   least	  as	  a	  postulate:	   for	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instance	   it	   is	  not	   stated	   that	   the	  Dasein	   does	  not	  have	  a	  body,	  however	  he	  chose	   not	   to	   discuss	   this.	   In	   a	   similar	   vein,	   the	   description	   of	   the	  everydayness	  of	  the	  Dasein	  and	  its	  mit-­‐sein	  could	  have	  opened	  the	  way	  to	  an	  analysis	  of	  inter-­‐subjectivity,	  however	  both	  phenomena	  are	  only	  depicted	  in	  their	   ‘degraded’	   form,	   as	   Stein	   highlights:	   “the	   description	   of	   ‘everyday’	  being	   is	   ambiguous,	   as	   it	   comes	   close	   to	   the	   mistaken	   affirmation	   that	  community	   life	   as	   such	   is	   ‘deteriorated’,	   and	   that	   ‘authentic’	   being	  means	  lonely	   being,	   whereas	   in	   fact	   both	   solitary	   and	   community	   life	   have	   their	  authentic	  and	  deteriorated	  forms”	  (MHE,	  p.	  81).	  	  
Although	  it	  is	  correct	  to	  say	  that	  Heidegger’s	  analysis	  is	  far	  from	  the	  real	  aspects	  of	   the	   life	  of	   the	  human	  being,	  one	  might	   say	   that	  Stein	   is	   too	  oriented	   towards	   social	   and	   anthropological	   interests,	   which	   play	   a	   large	  part	  in	  her	  remarks.	  The	  main	  point	  of	  the	  critique	  has	  to	  be	  found	  in	  the	  fact	  that	  Heidegger’s	  analysis	  portrays	  a	  type	  of	  human	  being	  and	  some	  aspect	  of	  its	  life,	  but	  not	  the	  entirety	  of	  it.	  	  
-­‐	   The	   opposition	   of	   the	   Dasein’s	   ‘thrownness’	   to	   Stein’s	   idea	   of	  
‘feeling	  secure-­‐in-­‐being’	  
Stein’s	   demand	   that	   there	   must	   be	   a	   higher	   being	   which	   is	   in	   full	  possession	   of	   its	   being,	   and	   that	   throws	   the	   Dasein	   into	   being,	   is	   solidly	  based	  on	  traditional	  metaphysics.	  This	   is	  not	  the	  only	  reason	   in	  support	  of	  Stein’s	   criticism,	   but	   there	   is	   no	   element	   in	   Heidegger’s	   investigation	   to	  explain	   the	   whereabouts	   of	  Dasein,	   neither	   is	  Dasein	   described	   as	   able	   to	  throw	   itself	   forth	   (far	   from	   it,	   it	   is	   repeatedly	   stated	   that	   it	   is	   not	   in	  possession	  of	   its	   being).	   Stein’s	  demand	   for	   further	   explication	   is	   justified,	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and	  so	  is	  the	  question	  of	  ‘why’	  the	  human	  being	  is	  thrown	  into	  existence.	  In	  this	   work	   I	   have	   presented	   one	   possible	   theory,	   which	   is	   the	   one	   Stein	  outlines	   in	   opposition	   to	   Heidegger’s	   ‘thrownness’;	   her	   concept	   of	  ‘Geschöpflichkeit’,	  i.e.	  ‘to	  be	  held/	  to	  be	  secure-­‐in-­‐being’.	  In	  her	  investigation	  Stein	   presents	   the	   human	   being	   as	   being	   placed	   in	   existence	   by	   a	   higher	  being	  which	   is	  a	  se,	   immutable,	  autonomous	  and	  necessary,	  she	  states	   that	  the	  human	  being	  has	  an	  understanding	  of	   this	  being	  because	   it	   is	   in	   touch	  with	  the	  fullness	  of	  being	  throughout	  its	  finite	  life.	  	  
The	   idea	   of	   security	   in	   being	   contains	   this	   important	   element,	   the	  serenity	   of	   ‘being	   looked	   after’,	   the	   confidence	   that	   arises	   from	   the	  knowledge	   of	   being	   supported,	   which	   are	   all	   elements	   that	   are	   in	   strong	  contrast	  with	  Heidegger’s	  existential	  anguish.	  Stein	  further	  describes	  being	  itself	   as	   being	   received	   by	   the	   human	   being:	   this	   offers	   a	   very	   interesting	  element	   for	   our	   analysis	   of	   Stein’s	   ontology	  of	   the	  human	  person,	   since	   to	  rephrase	  Heidegger’s	   thesis,	   the	   ‘thrower’	  now	  becomes	   the	   ‘giver’.	   In	   this	  way,	   though	   the	   acceptance	   of	   the	   gift	   of	   being,	   both	   the	   giver	   and	   the	  receiver	   acquire	   a	   clear	   ontological	   consistence.	   The	   receiver	   is	  characterised	  by	  the	  intrinsic	  openness	  and	  trust	  that	  are	  necessary	  in	  order	  to	  receive	  the	  gift	  of	  being,	  and	  in	  the	  same	  way	  the	  giver	  can	  be	  ascribed	  the	  fullness,	  love	  and	  pure	  openness	  that	  belong	  to	  this	  state.	  	  
-­‐	   The	  centrality	  of	  solitude,	   fear	  and	   the	  absence	  of	  an	  authentic	  
interpersonal	  life	  in	  Heidegger’s	  depictions	  of	  human	  existence	  
Stein	   demonstrates	   great	   appreciation	   for	   Heidegger’s	   detailed	  description	   of	   the	   everydayness	   of	   the	  Dasein,	   she	   however,	   also	   criticises	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the	  isolated	  and	  schizophrenic	  image	  of	  human	  being	  that	  emerges	  from	  it.	  Because	   of	   its	   impossibility	   of	   reaching	   any	   authenticity	   and	   long-­‐lasting	  awareness	   and	   the	   incapacity	   of	   experiencing	   true	   being,	   Stein	   calls	  Heidegger’s	  description	  of	  Dasein	  a	  caricature	  “despite	  it	  being	  elucidated	  in	  its	   ultimate	   depths.	   The	   exposition	   is	   not	   only	   defective	   and	   incomplete	   –	  because	   it	   wants	   to	   understand	   being	   without	   reference	   to	   essence	   and	  sticks	   to	   a	   particular	   way	   of	   being	   –	   it	   is	   also	   deceptive	   in	   regard	   to	   its	  subject-­‐matter,	   because	   it	   isolates	   this	   from	   the	   totality	   of	   ontological	  relations	  to	  which	  it	  belongs,	  and	  thus	  cannot	  reveal	  its	  true	  meaning”	  (MHE,	  p.	  	  81).	  	  
In	  conclusion,	  once	  again	  Heidegger	  is	  seen	  to	  be	  working	  on	  certain	  aspects	  of	  the	  human	  being	  and	  of	  human	  life	  that	  are	  chosen	  to	  support	  his	  premises	  but	  he	  does	  not	  offer	  a	  complete	  picture	  in	  his	  	  account,	  according	  to	  Stein.	  	  	  
-­‐	   The	   limited	   interpretation	  of	   the	  phenomenon	  of	  death	  offered	  
by	  Heidegger	  and	  his	  refusal	  to	  consider	  the	  possibility	  of	  being-­‐after-­‐
death	  
This	   is	   one	   of	   the	   deepest	   and	   most	   thought-­‐provoking	   aspects	   of	  Stein’s	   analysis	   of	   Heidegger,	   and	   has	   been	   debated	   in	   only	   a	   few	   critical	  works	   so	   far71.	   Stein’s	   analysis	   shows	   how	   Heidegger’s	   introduces	   the	  problem	  of	  death	  as	  supposedly	  the	  phenomenon	  that	  can	  offer	  clarification	  for	   the	  Dasein	   itself,	   only	   to	   throw	   it	   back	   onto	   itself,	  without	   any	   further	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  71	  See:	  1.5.	  Literature	  Review,	  p.	  15.	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understanding	  or	  gain	   from	  the	  fact	   that	   its	   time	  comes	  to	  an	  end,	  with	  no	  hope	  of	  passage,	  transformation	  or	  consolation.	  The	  condition	  of	  after	  life	  is	  not	  questioned	  or	  debated,	  neither	  is	  the	  evidence	  that	  the	  Dasein	  cares	  for	  its	  life	  and	  why	  that	  is.	  	  
The	   main	   thrust	   of	   Stein’s	   objections	   is	   that	   she	   sees	   most	   of	  Heidegger’s	  statements	  negated	  by	  the	  simple	  evidence	  of	  everyday	   life.	   In	  this	   sense	   she	   refuses	   to	   recognise	   ‘anguish’	   and	   ‘care’	   as	   the	   only	  constitutive	  elements	  of	  human	  being;	  she	  defends	  the	  fact	  that	  any	  human	  being	  wonders	   about	  what	  will	   be	   of	   it	   after-­‐death	   as	  well	   as	   during	   (not	  necessarily	   with	   fear	   but	   also	   for	   curiosity),	   and	   she	   describes	   signs	   and	  evidence	   of	   the	   fullness	   of	   being,	   the	   eternity	   to	  which	   the	   human	   soul	   is	  called	  upon,	  which	  is	  evident	  both	  inside	  the	  person	  and	  around	  it.	  	  
	  
In	  my	  findings	  I	  have	  outlined	  the	  two	  main	  consequences	  that	  can	  be	  extrapolated	  from	  Stein’s	  philosophy	  of	  the	  human	  person,	  and	  applied	  them	  in	  a	  contemporary	  context	  for	  today’s	  ethical	  debate.	  	  
The	   first	   one	   is	   Stein’s	   remark	   on	   the	   freedom	   and	   active	  participation	  of	   the	  human	  person	   to	  make	  possible	   the	  action	  of	   a	  higher	  force.	  Through	  her	  critique	  of	  the	  Dasein	  and	  the	  description	  of	  the	  human	  person	  originating	  from	  an	  eternal	  one,	  Stein	  succeeds	  in	  giving	  authenticity	  and	   freedom	   to	   the	   person,	   who	   is	   in	   charge	   of	   its	   own	   destiny	   when	   it	  comes	   to	   decide	   to	   open	   itself	   to	   the	   possibility	   that	   its	   life	   is	   something	  more	  than	  just	  existence.	  It	   is	   in	  the	  moment	  of	  acceptance	  of	  other	  beings	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that	   one	   can	  build	   true	   connections,	   and	   it	   is	   in	   the	   sincere	   recognising	  of	  one’s	   strength	   and	   of	   the	   security	   of	   being	   ‘supported’	   that	   life	   acquires	  depth	  and	  foundation,	  in	  the	  surrendering	  to	  the	  joyful	  acceptance	  of	  the	  gift	  of	   being	   that	   one	   can	   touch	   the	   true	  mystery	   of	   existence.	   If	   the	   ultimate	  ground	   of	   the	   human	   person	   is	   ineffable,	   it	   cannot	   be	   processed	   and	  understood	   rationally;	   on	   the	   contrary	   it	   is	   something	   that	   is	   received	  and	  
accepted:	  a	  gift	  of	   revealed	   truth,	  which	  presupposed	  an	  opening	   toward	   it,	  a	  ‘being	   seized’	   by	   someone	   or	   something	   else.	   Stein’s	   understanding	   of	   the	  human	  person	  celebrates	  human	  freedom	  and	  search	  for	  truth,	  but	  also	  the	  joyful	   recognition	  and	  discovery	  of	   it	  and	   the	  calm	  and	  trustful	  moment	  of	  being	  secure	  and	  at	  peace	  in	  the	  knowledge	  of	  being	  loved.	  
The	  second	   important	  conclusion	   is	   the	  positive	  and	  truly	  enriching	  description	  of	   the	   end	  of	   life	   and	  of	   how	   the	  moment	   of	   the	   end,	   far	   from	  being	   an	   invalidation	   of	   life,	   puts	   human	   existence	   into	   the	   context	   of	   a	  wider	   horizon.	   In	   the	   difficult	   moment	   of	   separation	   from	   the	   finitude	   of	  one’s	  life,	  one	  encounters	  a	  support	  that	  reminds	  one	  of	  its	  uniqueness	  and	  that	  offers	  hope,	  security,	  strength	  and	  meaning.	  Far	  from	  being	  a	  mundane	  and	   mechanical	   matter,	   dying	   can	   be	   approached	   in	   the	   medical	   care	  profession	   as	   the	   time	   when	   one	   can	   appeal	   to	   the	   deepest	   strength	   and	  value	  of	  the	  human	  person.	  
In	   a	   society	   where	   one’s	   death	   is	   often	   preceded	   by	   social	   death,	  isolation,	  and	  by	  the	  medicalisation	  of	  care,	  people	  are	  often	  called	  upon	  to	  make	   an	   informed	   decision	   about	   their	   (or	   their	   loved	   one’s)	   end-­‐of-­‐life	  moment,	   but	   they	   are	   often	   denied	   the	   time	   to	   come	   to	   terms	   with	   it.	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Recognising	   that	   the	   moment	   of	   passing	   is	   an	   essential	   part	   of	   life	   itself	  could	  help	  patients	  and	  doctors	  to	  keep	  respect	  for	  life	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  care,	  and	  respect	  the	  spiritual	  and	  decisional	  needs	  of	  the	  patient.	  Being	  included	  in	  the	  decision-­‐making	  process,	  as	  far	  as	  the	  law	  allows,	  can	  help	  the	  dying	  to	  return	  sense	  and	  meaning	  to	  the	  end	  of	  his	  or	  her	  life.	  The	  person,	  not	  the	  treatment,	  must	  be	  central	   in	   this	  process,	  and	   this	  can	  only	  happen	  when	  the	  patient	   is	  not	  needlessly	  deprived	  of	   the	  experience	  of	  death,	  however	  difficult	  and	  painful	  this	  may	  be.	  	  
Stein’s	  final	  judgment	  on	  the	  matter	  of	  what	  Heidegger’s	  view	  of	  the	  human	  being	   is,	   is	   as	   follows:	   “There	   is	  of	   course	  much	  more	   to	   say	  about	  Heidegger’s	  analysis	  of	  being.	  But	  we	  have	  come	   far	  enough	  to	  answer	   the	  question	   of	   whether	   it	   is	   accurate”	   (MHE,	   p.	   81).	   What	   Heidegger	   has	  described	  does	  not	  do	  justice	  to	  the	  complexity,	  beauty	  and	  potential	  of	  the	  human	  being	  as	  it	  really	  is.	  In	  the	  final	  analysis	  Heidegger’s	  philosophy	  turns	  out	  to	  imply	  inhumanity,	  solitude	  and	  death,	  and	  as	  such	  could	  not	  possibly	  be	  more	  opposed	  to	  Stein’s.	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